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ABSTRACT 
The advent of globalisation and liberalization have necessitated and escalated a momentum 
amongst natural and legal persons in the quest to make profits. As a result, there have been 
activities, characterised by ways in which to evade the orderly manner of commercial 
interactions, thereby evading the regulatory radars. This has generated an inquest to ascertain 
the symbiotic nexus between dirty money and private to private corruption. The culprits 
generated funds via crime in both the private and public sectors and used money laundering 
to reintroduce the profits into the formal system. It is at this juncture, that the convergence 
question presents itself. Some mechanisms or tools directed towards curbing the problems are 
in the form of ‘‘soft laws’’ like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The implementation 
is backed by the policy of ‘‘carrot and stick’’ mechanisms subtly introduced by global 
financial institutions exemplified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, exuding anti-money laundering and corruption characteristics. Some major 
Conventions and statutory mechanisms came in form of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC), the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNCTOC) 2000, the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 and US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 1977. This has necessitated the examination of the efficiency of the 
combative mechanisms, as there are evidently differences in the approach to tackling the 
issues on account of diverse jurisdictional frameworks.           
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                                                        Introduction 
The prevalent impression amongst keen and close economic observers is that the 
liberalization of the markets is undoubtedly, a “good omen.” This has been necessitated as a 
result of the dynamics of the trends brought about by the process of international integration 
that arose as a result of the interchange of world views, products, ideas, and including 
different types of culture. However, it is important also to look through the lens of the 
commercial/economic aspects of this integration known as “globalization,” taking into 
account that the word presents different connotations.  
With the advent of globalization and crumbling of trade barriers, it became evident that there 
was and still is a conspicuous interaction between legal and natural persons in the commercial 
sphere. The same level of interaction was also noticed and is still going on in business 
relationships amongst comity of nations. Of course, this brought about faster and more 
efficient manner of conducting business. As a result, profits were made, losses were also 
incurred. Wealth was created which was evidenced by the manner of life-style enjoyed across 
various strata of the society both nationally and extra territorially.  
It is good, to quickly point out that wealth creation did not commence with globalization. It is 
as old as history itself. And there have been instances where people have tried to hide the 
source of their money in order to avoid the inquisitive eyes of the authorities.
1
 As far back as 
1471, Minister Yao Ku’ei in China complained that the practice of ensnaring young and 
upcoming officials by providing ‘’secret loans’’ that would eventually ensure a great 
influence in the future, had become a big scandal. He therefore called for the reporting of 
such advances.
2
This has been going on for a very long time.  
Additionally, in China merchants around 2000 BCE used to hide their wealth from rulers to 
avoid taxation or confiscation of the wealth from the rulers and being exiled. They took this 
wealth from them and banished them. In addition to hiding it, they would move it and invest 
it in businesses in remote provinces or even outside China.
3
   
                                                     
1
 B. Rider ‘’Taking money launderers to the cleaners’’: Part 1 Private Client Business 1996.,B.Rider, The 
Perception of Corruption in Developing Nations, Third Int’l Anti Corruption Conference (1987) Hong Kong.       
2
R.Huang, ‘’Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century China’’ MS 92/968;MSL Tai-tsu Shih-lu 
1441 
3
 S. Grave, ‘‘Lord of the Rim’’ (1995) 1
st
 Edition p.353. Note BCE means ‘‘Before Common Era.’’ This was part of 
the calendar that ‘‘Man’’ used to track time. Others include ‘‘AD’’ and ‘‘BC.’’ This attitude is an indicum that 
hiding wealth is as old as history itself. 
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There is nothing specifically wrong in enhancing one’s economic arsenal by making more 
money. The problem here is whether during this process of trying to enhance or boost one’s 
pocket, the participants used lawful means to acquire financial gains. It is during this process 
of making money that various corrupt practices were and still are called into play by the 
actors. The orchestrators of this “macabre dance,” which is evident in both public and private 
sectors, will always attempt or be involved in avoiding the regulatory radar.  
In a bid to avoid the authorities or the regulatory template as the case may be, it is not 
surprising that the perpetrators employ their “best criminal endeavours” to hide the source of 
their illicit gains. In other words, they will engage in money laundering issues to fashion 
ways to use the money legitimately.  
J.D McClean indicated that from the point of view of the criminal, there is no use making a 
large profit out of criminal activity, if the profit cannot be used. Putting the proceeds to use is 
not as simple as it sounds. Although a proportion of the proceeds of crime will be kept as 
capital for further criminal ventures, the sophisticated offender will wish to keep the rest for 
other purposes. If this is to be achieved, without running a risk of detection, the money which 
represents the proceeds of the initial crime must be laundered, put into a state in which it 
appears to have an entirely respectable provenance.
4
    
It is to be noticed that such things as transparency, probity, and truthfulness are always very 
scarce commodities or in short supply; because the process involved in getting this money is 
illegal and mostly done in secret. The players, having got this “dirty money,” as pointed out 
above sometimes through corruption, dominated by bribery and played out sometimes in the 
private sector, which evidences ‘’private to private corruption’’ will want in most cases to 
reinvest the ‘‘dirty money’’ back to the system. It is during this process that the convergence 
scenario presents itself, and accompanied with some difficulties presented to the official 
establishment. 
The vibrancy of the regulations will no doubt, be put to test during this process that 
transcends national borders. Some of these regulations have extra-territorial status and 
contain provisos which are tactically tailored by the framers towards curbing the menace at 
the convergence point(s). It is to be noticed that some of the Articles are couched or styled in 
                                                     
4
 J.D McClean, International co-operation in civil and criminal matters, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
at p.261. It is generally agreed by academic commentators and other observers, that once ‘‘dirty money’’ is 
generated, the culprits in most cases will generally look for a way to navigate part or all of it into the legitimate 
economy.  
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words that are not mandatory. And the present writer sees this as a calculated deliberate 
attempt by the formulators to tactically respect states’ sovereignty. This is understandable, as 
every state is usually very unwilling to give up the sanctity of its sovereignty.    
It is not unreasonable to indicate, that putting a marker on what is ‘‘corruption’’ and ‘’dirty 
money’’ respectively, has been characterised by non-conflating opinions by various academic 
writers. Holistically, a look at the concept of ‘‘dirty money’’ in its relation to ‘’private to 
private corruption’’ will indicate that part of corruption issues has its origin from funds that 
emanate from “dirty money.”  
Corruption can be interpreted in many ways. The corruption picture is captured vividly by R. 
Alexander. He indicated that anytime corruption is considered as a crime, more particularly 
as a financial crime, you have to endeavour to ascertain what corruption means. It contains a 
lot of behaviours which encapsulates a lot of various crimes. It can cover other types of 
behaviours, which can be seen to be morally incorrect and could lead to someone to be forced 
to resign from his position or job. However, these behaviours, at least under English law do 
not actually amount to contravention of the law.
5
    
The term “dirty money” one can surmise, usually comes into play and depends on the odium 
that a particular jurisdiction attaches to the set of activities that give rise to that fund or 
wealth generation. Jurisdictional perspective is usually a condition precedent before money 
can wear the tag of being ‘‘dirty.’’ And this scenario is usually not a very rigid one, and can 
be said to be fluidic in nature. It is noticed that during the movement of this wealth from the 
informal to the formal economy, the money itself can quickly change its level of cleanliness 
depending on the stage.  
The fact remains that the owners of the ‘‘dirty money’’ will eventually want to integrate it 
into the legitimate economy to enjoy the fruits of their labour. Granted, that the ‘’dirty 
money’’ can come from various sources, which are inclusive of funds from both private and 
public corruption; in most cases, it would be an uphill task to distinguish the above, partly 
due to the issue of privatization. This usually, will have the potential of rekindling the debate 
whether there are significant differences between private and public corruption. This has 
prompted the question, whether there is really any need for this “Berlin Wall” to continue. 
The fact remains that the problems thrown up at the convergence point(s) emits significant 
                                                     
5
R. Alexander, ‘’Corruption as a financial crime,’’ Company Lawyer, 2009, 30(4), 98-104  
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negativities to the economic wellbeing of the citizenry and do distort the global financial 
markets.
6
  
It is therefore unsurprising, that the international community realised that they are in a very 
serious dilemma, and therefore decided to come together to fashion out different Conventions 
to stem or control the tide. It must be realised that some of the Conventions were reactive to 
changing ‘‘economic dynamics’’ of the time and a wakeup call. The United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC or Palermo Convention), 
effective 29 September 2003, and The United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), effective 14 December 2005 are notable ones. We also have some ‘’soft law’’ 
instruments that came into play as reactive mechanisms to stem or checkmate the negative 
tidal waves associated with the convergence dilemma.  
In fact ‘’soft law’’ can be seen as a set of legal norms, principles, codes of conduct and 
transactional rules of state practice that are recognised in either formal or informal 
multilateral agreements.
7
 It is recognised that soft law has the characteristics of presuming 
consent to the basic standards and norms of state practice but generally without the necessary 
opinio juris required to form a binding obligation under customary international law.
8
 Some 
of the typical examples of very persuasive ‘‘soft law’’ mechanisms include: the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Conduct and Recommendations 2005,
9
 the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations - often classified as the most important in the 
fight against money laundering, the Wolfsburg Principles, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to mention but a few. The combinations of the above 
have combined to fight the convergence issues.       
Interestingly, one will notice that ‘‘soft law’’ on its surface, is seen to be non-mandatory. But 
other relevant International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have played major roles in the convergence problems, 
provide them with the ammunition needed to tackle the convergence dilemma. This is 
achieved by using or employing what the present writer calls the ‘’adapt or perish 
                                                     
6
K. Alexander etal, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International Regulation of Systemic Risk p.84 
Oxford University Press 2006. See also IMF 2001a, E. Ekwueme and M. Bagheri ‘‘The intersection of 
commercial corruption and money laundering: a look at international responses and adequacy of regulations.’’ 
Amicus Curiea p.25 issue 95 2013.    
7
K.C Wellens, and G. M. Borchardt. ‘’Soft Law In European Community Law.’’ European Law Review 14: 267-
321  
8
Ibid No 6 p. 138 
9
For example ICC Article 1 2005 edition advocated strongly, the criminalization of private sector corruption.  
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mechanism,’’ ‘’carrot and stick approach’’ or ‘’conferment of tactical imperative status’’ on 
the ‘’soft laws.’’ The two bodies do this, by making it as a condition precedent, for countries 
to adopt the provisions of a particular soft law before accessing their services - a chess-like 
move, one can surmise. Stated differently, the IMF will use its Article IV, while the World 
Bank will use its conditionality and surveillance powers. 
In addressing the convergence problems, it must be noted that some of the convention 
oriented treaties and Directives, contain Anti-Money Laundering (AML) provisions to tackle 
the problem of ‘‘dirty money’’ and corruption. This can also be found in statutes, such as the 
United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010, which has been described as ‘‘the toughest anti-
corruption legislation in the world.’’10There is also the United States’ Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) 1977 and the UK Money laundering Regulations 2017.    
It is during the process of transmutation of the illicit money into clean funds that the 
perpetrators acquired from corrupt activities to the legal economy that the convergence 
scenario usually rears its head. And attempts were made to quantify or put a marker on the 
amount of money that undergoes this money laundering process. A former Managing 
Director of the IMF M. Camdessus, provided an estimate that one can say has since been 
pervasively quoted. He indicated that an amount that is equal to between 2% to 5% of global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is laundered within the global financial system each year.
11
It 
is very difficult to put a marker on the amount of ‘’dirty money’’ that is laundered globally or 
the quantum of criminal assets that would be subject to seizure. Interestingly and possibly 
rightly so, B. Rider calls this ‘’guesstimates.’’12 
We should also not miss the fact that the generation of “dirty money” through corruption is 
an activity that both natural and legal persons indulge in. However, it must be taken into 
account, that some legal persons with special reference to the banks are viewed to be 
principal conduits through which ‘’dirty money’’ can slip through into the wider legitimate 
economy. On account of this, it is the contention of this writer, that a robust corporate 
governance mechanism must be put in place to contain the menace of ‘’dirty money’’ and 
corruption that usually occurs through the banking system.  
                                                     
10
B. Brigid; D. Ezickson, J. Kocoras (2010). ‘‘The Bribery Act 2010: raising the bar above the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act’’ Company Lawyer 31 (11). 
11
 M. Camdessus, Money Laundering: The Importance of International Countermeasures (February 10, 1998) 
available on https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp021098  accessed on 20/05/2015   
12
 B. Rider, Accountability and Responsibility-Reinforcing the Criminal Law, paper delivered at opening 
ceremony of the Centre of Anti-Corruption Studies and Seminar  1
st
 April 2009 p. 223  
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Good governance is needed in all organizations, but the role of corporate governance in 
financial institutions with special reference to the banks should be given a more focused 
attention to help tackle the convergence dilemma. In fact, the negativities that bank failure 
emit to the society are colossal than those of other entities; largely because of the special role 
they play in the economy. They are, arguably, the most important source of external finance, 
especially for the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).This can also be viewed from the 
perspective of the principal-agent problem.
13
However, it does not mean that ‘’dirty money’’ 
cannot slip through other non-bank entities due to lapse governance matters. In fact, the 
Enron scandal in the USA revealed in October 2001 eventually led to the bankruptcy of the 
Enron Corporation. The directors created Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and by the use of 
accounting loopholes, were able to hide billions of dollars in debts, failed deals and projects. 
Through this way, they were able to siphon funds.                
The convergence dilemma has impacted very negatively on the larger society. In Africa 
alone, it is estimated that the combined cost of corruption and money that is laundered 
represents more than US$148 billion a year, about 25% of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).
14
 Worldwide, the annual sum that is paid as bribes and eventually laundered is said to 
be close to US$1 trillion, but again this is seen as a conservative estimate.
15
     
The impact of the convergence will indicate that in less developed economies, the rate of 
economic growth is retarded. The World Bank at some point, indicated, that 20% to 40% of 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) is lost due to issues of corruption and money 
laundering in less developed countries.
16
We should be mindful of the fact that the 
convergence issues contribute to the social inequality, political instability and conflicts in less 
developed countries. Scarce resources are diverted from worthy projects that would have 
assisted the lifting of the citizenry out of the poverty trap. This could eventually lead the 
members of the community to be very sceptical about the institutions inclusive of the political 
process and they could ultimately find themselves disengaged.
17
  
                                                     
13
 A. Mullineux, ‘’The corporate governance of banks’’ 2006 J.F.R &C, 14 (4), 375-382 
14
 ‘’Countries to Get Help Recovering Stolen Assets,’’ The New York Times September, 2007 
15
 ‘‘The Costs of Corruption,’’ Word Bank News and Broadcast, April 2004.  
16
‘‘Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities and Action Plan,’’ Word Bank 2007, June 
2007.  
17
Ibid. Indeed a lot of informed people are fully aware that in some LDCs, diverting of state resources meant 
for development purposes has impacted very negatively on the countries. Nigeria is a typical example of this 
scenario.  
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A former senior United Nations official indicated that the corruption cankerworm not only 
debases our democracy but also undermines the rule of law. The markets are glaringly 
distorted, economic growth is stifled and many people are usually denied their rightful share 
of the economic resources or life-saving aid.
18
      
In addition to the above, the thesis highlights that what is involved is to minimise the malaise 
to the barest, as it is virtually very difficult to harbour the conception that the problems are to 
be wiped off the global corruption slate completely. As it is always, and in consonance with 
the tradition of all academic inquisitions, there is definitely a general summary of this thesis. 
And this summation, has highlighted that there is truly an established link that exists between 
‘’private to private corruption’’ and “dirty money;” plus the fact that the tools in place to 
check-mate this, should inculcate the habit of evolving at a very fast tempo, principally, to 
keep pace with the perpetrators. The authorities should try as much as possible to always 
endeavour to be more proactive and less reactive to the convergence issues. It is the sincere 
hope of the writer, that the findings that are encapsulated in this thesis, inclusive of its 
strengths and weaknesses would be a springboard for further research in criminal finance, 
which is also part of economic crime. The reader should be mindful of the fact that laws and 
legislations are not static. They can be changed to reflect the dynamics of time. As a result, 
the writer has decided to concentrate on the extant laws and legislations as at the 1
st
 of 
December 2018.        
                                                     
18
 K. Annan, ‘’Corruption an insidious menace to economic and social development.’’ Available at 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/06/70622-corruption-insidious-menace-economic-and-social-
development-annan accessed 5th June 2016   
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CHAPTER 1  
Conceptualization of dirty money and private to private corruption 
1. Introduction 
Structural approach  
The aim of this initial chapter is to thematically put in place an approach that is seen to be 
legally peculiar, and also aimed to conceptually set out the scenario of ‘‘dirty money’’ and 
‘‘private to private’’ corruption. Although, the primary concern is not only to go ahead and 
set out what private to private corruption and “dirty money” are, but to marry the two against 
different facets of the society with special reference to Anglo-American and less developed 
countries scenarios. 
The writer will examine some of the relevant key statutes, together with their analysis in the 
academic literature. This preliminary chapter will commence, by informing the reader about 
the changing nature of the terms ‘‘corruption’’ and ‘‘dirty money.’’ It will elucidate that 
these terms, can sometimes be seen to have undergone a process of transmutation. And in 
certain circumstances, during the process of engaging in corruption which most of the time 
has ‘‘dirty money’’ as an element, there has not been a conflating view amongst some 
observers concerning at what point, that the tag attached to ‘‘dirty money’’ should be 
dropped.  
Additionally, ‘‘private to private corruption’’ has long been seen to be a significant factor 
that contributes to unfairness in the markets. The same can be said with the term ‘‘public 
corruption.’’ This part of the chapter will argue that since both public and private corruption 
have significant impacts on the markets, it is not appropriate to classify the two differently. 
Corruption should be viewed as corruption irrespective of which direction it comes from.  
The last part of this chapter, presents the reader with the genesis of key carefully selected 
United Nations tools that can be viewed as responsive to the convergence dilemma. Since the 
damage or financial disruption which the phenomena of ‘‘private to private corruption’’ and 
‘‘dirty money’’ transcends across international economic borders, it is not surprising, that 
these were not and have not been viewed as domestic issues, hence, this triggered concerted 
efforts in the international arena to tackle the menace or conundrum.              
 19 
 
1.2 Morphology of the terms - corruption and dirty money 
It is universally acknowledged that the problem of corruption and “dirty money” is a 
globalised one. It is no longer acceptable to ascribe them to a particular section of the global 
economy. It must be recognized that corruption in whatever form it manifests is inherently 
negative. And a major problem, in developing an adequate response, is the difficulty 
encountered in even defining corruption and also attempting to put a marker on what “dirty 
money’’ stands for.     
In tandem with the above, we need to define the terms corruption and “dirty money.” A close 
scrutiny of the study of origin of words - etymology, will indicate, that the word 
‘’corruption’’ is derived from a Latin word-‘‘corruptus.’’ This means to break in its simplest 
form. In fact, this derivation is an emphasis of the destructive effect of corruption on the very 
foundation of the society, plus the fact that its popular meaning contains all those situations 
where agents and public officers do break the confidence that is entrusted to them.
19
  
The Oxford English Dictionary has defined corruption as the ‘‘perversion or destruction of 
integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour; the use or existence of corrupt 
practices, esp. in a state, public corporation etc.’’ It went further to define the adjective 
‘’corrupt’’ as ‘’perverted from uprightness and fidelity in the discharge of duty; influenced by 
bribery or the like; venal.’’ It defines the verb ‘‘corrupt’’ in a similar way, except that it 
extends to any duties, ‘’public’’ or not, and offers a further definition: ‘’to induce to act 
dishonestly or unfaithfully, to make venal; to bribe.‘’ It defines the verb ‘‘bribe’’ as ‘‘to 
influence corruptly, by a reward or consideration, the action of (a person), to pervert the 
judgement or corrupt the conduct by a gift.’’20     
It is noted that these definitions, correctly lay emphasis on the importance of corruption in its 
legal sense, which culminates in the inducement to show favour, rather than showing of 
favour itself. Again there is a demonstration of the word to encapsulate acts other than what 
is traditionally termed bribery.
21
 Perhaps, one should emphasise that as things presently 
stand, the restriction of the definition of corruption to ‘‘public’’ duties no longer reflects the 
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present state of English law
22
or other modern nations. It can be argued that the absence of the 
restriction in the definition of the verb ‘’corrupt’’ includes all persons who are induced to act 
corruptly, irrespective of the fact that they may not be entrusted with the discharge of public 
duties or otherwise.
23
 
It is submitted, that the fact that this restriction appears in one definition but is clearly omitted 
from another displays a move from the tendency, which has existed until very recently in 
modern times, to restrict the use of the word to acts of public officials, having regard to the 
public nature of the crimes involved and the gravity attached to them.
24
 A perusal of the 
contents of the United Kingdom Bribery Act does not include the words ‘‘corrupt’’ or 
‘‘corruptly.’’ It instead, focuses on the notion of inducing another individual to act 
‘‘improperly.’’    
Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as ‘’the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.’’ This definition has the hallmark of simplicity. It has the advantage of including 
bribery that occurs in the private sector. Arguably, it contains other facets of corruption, such 
as bribery, and other related offences which include misconduct in public office, extortion, 
embezzlement, fraud, and theft.
25
A typical example of TI’s definition is where a director of a 
private company accepts a bribe to award a supply contract to a particular supplier. And this 
director has very strong powers and influence entrusted to him by the company to use in the 
best interest of the said company. At the end, he eventually misuses that power for private 
gain.  
It must be recognized, that it is very difficult to put a marker on what is actually meant by 
corruption. Attention to this difficulty has been pointed out clearly by R. Alexander. He was 
quick to point out that we have different legal systems and different cultures. On account of 
this, it is actually notoriously problematic to come to an agreed definition of corruption. He 
stated that corruption should be seen as an abuse of someone’s office either to commit some 
act/s that is in breach of his/her duty or to demand some kind of favour. This will be in return 
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for performing acts that are within their duty to perform in any event. It must be considered, 
how this relates to the law.
26
    
The above mirrors what the Council of Europe noted in 1995 about the difficulty of 
articulating an all inclusive definition of corruption. The Council made it clear that it is very 
difficult to find or articulate any precise form or degrees of corruption that one can say would 
be universally acceptable in every jurisdiction.
27
This presents a big problem in tackling the 
scourge.    
 Granted that there are various types of corruption, therefore, a cursory insight into some of 
these is necessary in order to illuminate both the morphology and the concept of corruption 
which includes private to private corruption. ‘’Grand corruption’’ readily comes to mind. The 
term is often used to describe scenarios where massive personal wealth has been got from the 
state apparatus by public figures through corrupt means.
28
  
This can occur when high government officials have power over the granting of large public 
contracts and local agent receives a commission if the transaction is awarded or won. This 
has three notable criteria: size, immediacy of its rewards, and mystification; the more 
technical and complicated a transaction, the less likely it is that questions would be 
asked.
29
Some of the major mechanisms of Grand corruption were fully described in G.M. 
Stuart’s book, Grand corruption in Third World Development.30The report of the Society of 
Advanced Legal Studies Anti-Corruption Working Group in 2002 eventually concluded that 
grand corruption includes two main activities: bribe payments and the embezzlement and 
misappropriation of state assets. This bribery could be part of a direct payment in return for a 
favour shown or payment of part of a contract that was granted as a result of bribery; often 
referred as a kickback.
31
Needless to say, there are various high-profile corruption cases that 
involve this type of corruption.  
Petty corruption is worth elucidating on. It is a term that is usually used to distinguish 
between grand corruption that is practised by Heads of State, government ministers, plus 
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senior officials, and the type of corruption that is for instance, perpetuated by some 
magistrates and judges. The above term is often employed to describe ‘‘facilitation’’ or 
‘‘grease payments’’ that are sought by officials for services that the public is entitled to free 
of charge. These types of ‘’greasing’’ include payments to a custom official to clear or pass 
goods; to immigration officers to have travel documents accepted, to medical staff to receive 
prescription drugs or to other benefits.
32
    
Petty corruption in less developed countries is even more pervasive than the above examples 
suggested. Some of the pernicious examples are located amongst the world’s indigent people 
who are helpless to stem the tide. A typical example can be seen in Kibera in Nairobi, reputed 
to be one of the largest slums in the world. Here, it is very difficult for the locals to fix or 
erect even the smallest of buildings without bribing a local fixer. In fact, jobs can only be got 
by bribing foremen. Additionally, some ‘’free’’ school places are only secured by payment to 
staff, and once your child is in school, you have to ‘‘pay’’ to get the homework marked.33 In 
all these, the money involved is usually small but however amount to extortion. Petty 
corruption is usually very difficult to deal with and most of the work in this area is carried out 
by certain dedicated Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
34
     
Although petty corruption is prevalent in many countries, TI rated the government of Mikheil 
Saakashvili in Georgia positively in this stead. M. Hunter was a senior TI analyst at the time 
of writing. He strongly believed that no country could be described to have had the lowest 
rate of corruption than Georgia and where people attested to the positive results of fighting 
the problem. This was an indication that government efforts moved towards the right 
direction in fighting petty corruption.
35
One cannot say that TI does not presently have its 
critiques. But credence is usually accorded to them as this observation was not met with any 
negative reaction.       
S. Shaverdashvili, the publisher and editor-in-chief of the Georgia magazine ‘’Liberali’’ 
attested to the fact that the culture of corruption had been eradicated from the day-to-day life. 
It could be very difficult to backslide, even under a different regime. Previously, it was very 
difficult to get your passport processed and you were expected to pay bribes. Georgia got 
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positive accolades even from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development for ease of conducting business and anticorruption efforts. The individuals that 
indicated that they paid bribes were very low in Georgia compared to other countries.
36
          
The issue of systemic corruption is a big problem. It is estimated that some 40-60 countries in 
the world suffer from this, ranging from some of the post-Soviet countries to places like 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and most of sub Saharan Africa. This type of corruption, sometimes 
called institutionalised or entrenched corruption, is simply brought about, encouraged or 
given serious impetus by the particular system itself. It happens where bribery itself is routine 
on a very large scale. It occurs alongside grand corruption. The remote causes are usually 
brought about by the inefficiency, inadequacy and typical undue laxity in the system. In 
short, a nation that is perceived to be rife with grand corruption will generally have petty 
corruption issues. A typical example with due respect, is Nigeria.      
This can come into play where corruption has permeated a country’s political and economic 
institutions and is no longer confined to just a few dishonest people. It can strive where 
institutions are seen to be weak, characterized by poor governance matters, not too adequate 
legislative controls, no independent judiciary, or proper oversight functions, and where 
independent media and civil society groups are absent or very weak. Many countries can fit 
into the above. As a result what surfaces is kleptocracy, a government that has 
institutionalized theft at its heart.
37
  
It does not necessarily mean that such regimes are to be tolerated. Take Nigeria for instance - 
a country that has private to private corruption issues like other countries. The criminal 
activities of some bad eggs involved in the notorious scam known as ‘‘419’’ or ‘’Yahoo 
Yahoo’’ has contributed in drawing negative attention to Nigeria. But impressively, the Shell 
oil company whose activities in the oil sector contribute very sizeable revenue to the Nigeria 
economy, has helped to portray a positive image of Nigeria. It has a zero tolerance to 
facilitation payment. Every Shell employee is aware of this and more assuring, is the fact that 
any Shell employee that is approached for a ‘’grease payment’’ in public place, like the 
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airport, just needs to show his/her Shell identity for the official to back off: this is a 
considerable achievement.
38
 
The truth of the matter is that there is systemic corruption in Nigeria. The Vice-President of 
Nigeria, Professor Osibanjo once stated: 
‘’Corruption as we all seem to agree, is an existential threat to Nigeria both as a nation and 
as a viable economic entity. Clearly, there is no doubt whatsoever whether any arm of the 
government can excuse itself, ....But the truth of the matter is that we all know that corruption 
in Nigeria is systemic.’’39              
Defining private to private corruption 
It must be noted that the study of corruption faces the initial challenge of defining the term, 
due to the fact that it has many meanings, legal, linguistic and moral.
40
Corruption is 
frequently denoted to be bribery and involves the payment of illegal compensation to a public 
official or a private person. However, it is important to understand the concept of ‘‘private to 
private corruption.’’ This is simply the type of corruption that is evident or occurs in a private 
organization or corporation when a manager or employee of that organization exercises a 
certain power or influence over the performance of a function, task or responsibility. As a 
result of the fact that he has a margin of discretion, he can choose to use this contrary to the 
duties and responsibilities of his job and can directly or indirectly harm the company for his 
benefit or another individual, company or organization. This can be in form of bribery, 
extortion or solicitation, illegitimate use of or trading of information, gifts, favours, 
facilitation payments etc.
41
       
The above can also involve a payment to or acceptance of a kickback or commission by a 
person in a non-governmental sector. The purpose of the payment is to influence the conduct 
of the person that receives the bribe and will most probably act in a way that is favourable to 
the briber and will not give due consideration to the interest of the employer, principal, 
fiduciary or client.
42
Put differently, illegal payment/s can be advanced to someone in a 
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private capacity or office to influence conduct. It can also include payments and the like 
made by persons in order to further the interest of the company that they represent.                  
In June 2016, Judge Anuja Dhir told Mr Simon Davies and Robert Gilam both directors of a 
UK company Mondial Defence Systems when they pleaded guilty to corruptly paying 
£120000 to a businessman W. Gannon as a kickback that they would go to jail. The payment 
was made in order to facilitate a contract worth £5m to enable their company supply bomb 
disposal equipments to British and American troops in Afghanistan. The Dorset-based UK 
firm was not alleged to be involved in the illegal kickback. This is a typical example of a 
‘’private to private corruption scenario.’’43   
The ‘‘bribes,’’ ‘‘proceeds’’ or ‘‘inducements’’ that the recipients got is a source of wealth to 
them. They will usually make very significant efforts to hide this wealth and find a way of 
reintegrating this into the legitimate economy. Mostly, they will be involved in money 
laundering depending on the size of their respective loots. This can present a difficult 
scenario on how this money is viewed. How ‘‘dirty’’ is this money? As indicated by B. 
Rider: ‘‘dirty money is money, or other form of wealth that is derived from a crime or other 
wrong.’’ He admits that this definition can open up a ‘’Pandora’s Box.’’44   
The above definition of ‘‘dirty money’’ he stated is broad enough to refer to wealth that is got 
via civil wrongs. Although, it is not every proceed of a civil wrong that should be seen to be 
‘’dirty.’’ However, if dishonesty is involved, there is the likelihood that this would attract the 
designation ‘’dirty.’’45In short, in situations where funds or wealth has been created by some 
form of conduct that lacks probity, with all intents and purposes, this should be a justification 
to attract the designation ‘‘dirty.’’ The problem here is that this could be viewed differently 
from various moral grounds. In some situations, where the issue involved is within a 
domestic one, it is expected that the local legislation and their value system in place can deal 
with the matter. There could be two or more jurisdictions involved and where the wealth or 
money eventually comes to rest, the preceding conduct of acquiring this wealth will not be 
seen as having broken any law.
46
One can quickly discern from the above, the difficulty of 
describing this money as ‘’dirty.’’ 
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Granted that the perpetrator will want to go through the process of laundering, it must be 
noted that this process may not necessarily be abusive in character or evil in its entirety. And 
to actually keep your wealth secret may not be viewed as objectionable from a legal or moral 
perspective. In fact, this can be seen to be prudent and beneficial depending on the 
circumstances.
47
     
Moving ‘‘dirty money’’ to make it appear ‘’clean’’ indicates that money laundering must be 
done. And the versatility of the process means that the move in most cases must be between 
the informal and the formal economies. This is associated with a wide range of some informal 
economic activities which can include tax evasion, pornography, prostitution, people 
smuggling or use of undocumented workers to drugs-related-matters etc.  
It is submitted, that the designation or classification of what a particular society will associate 
as being the product of ‘‘dirty money’’ must be dependent on the legislation in place. It is as 
simple as that. The reaction of that particular society’s social/moral tolerance to the given set 
of behaviour should be secondary. It is expected that this reaction may be very fluid by the 
society. This depends on what the present writer calls the ‘‘badge of social latitude’’ ascribed 
by that society to the said behaviour.      
Proceeds derived from tax evasion, prostitution and other criminal acts are simply ‘‘dirty 
money.’’ The proceeds will always be considered to be criminal property, irrespective of the 
fact that the tax regime or legislation in place may be seen to be economically oppressive or 
excessive. It does not matter if this is seen by some people as ‘‘grey money.’’ In fact, even 
money or wealth derived from the sale of pornographic materials, that could be legal in 
jurisdictions like Denmark, Belgium or the Netherlands, can be ranked as ‘‘dirty money’’ 
when the funds find their way to the UK. We have to be mindful as earlier said that the 
proceeds will often be considered as criminal property.  
Money in certain instances can be seen as clean, grey, dirty or hot. Clean as the name implies, 
does not indicate any negative issue because it is legitimately earned. Some ‘‘grey money’’ 
can be said to come from tax evasion which as the author indicated is not acceptable because 
the regulatory template on tax issues are tactically circumvented. 
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Hot money simply refers to financial flows that are stimulated by adverse changes in 
economic, social, and political conditions
48
 and may be an amalgam of clean, grey, and 
‘’dirty money’’ depending on the scenario. They tend to be short term but very volatile in 
character and has very strong potential to contribute to financial crisis.
49
                   
 R. Bosworth-Davies captured the distinction about the three terms. He stated that it is not all 
the money that one wants to launder that should be seen to have emanated from crime. 
Money that is classified as dirty is definitely hot money. But the opposite is not the same. We 
should note that there is definitely a very important distinction between money that is dirty 
due to how it is acquired and money that along the line becomes contaminated when the 
holders eventually dodge taxes or the exchange control mechanisms. This could be a massive 
burden on the shoulders of financial bodies that would have the intention of being seen by the 
general public to be very unwilling to help the laundering of ‘‘black’’ or ‘‘dirty money.’’ But 
at the same time, are prepared to allow flight capital or tax evasion which certain people refer 
to as ‘‘grey money’’ in their parlance.50  
The present writer does not agree with the latter point. We have to be mindful of the fact that 
in some jurisdictions, which also include the United Kingdom, the proceeds of tax evasion 
are in no uncertain terms seen to be the proceeds of crime. This is particularly encapsulated 
within the meaning of the money laundering laws. In fact in R v K,
51
 the Court of Appeal 
ruled that the proceeds of cheating the Revenue could amount to ‘’criminal property’’ within 
the meaning of s.340(5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 even in circumstances 
where the trade whose profits were liable to income tax or whose turnover was subject to 
Value Added Tax (VAT) is a legitimate trade. The Court was emphatic on this point, stating 
that any person that cheats the revenue must be seen to have acquired a pecuniary advantage 
as a result of criminal conduct within the confines of s.340(6) of POCA. This sum is therefore 
a benefit by reason of s.340 (5).   
It is submitted that in view of the various stages that money goes through to present a picture 
of legitimacy, it is not surprising that there has been a discordant opinion regarding at what 
stage to accord this wealth the toga of legitimacy. But suffice to say, that there must be a 
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time, that at least this wealth will have a de-facto legitimacy to enable the benefactor fully 
integrate it into the formal economy after the ‘’dirty money’’ had been ‘‘washed.’’   
The above is analogous to the story we heard about the Roman Emperor, Vespasian, who 
ruled from 69-79 AD. When he put a tax on the use of public toilets, his son, Titus, objected 
and said it was dirty. Vaspasian then instructed his treasurer to go into the store house to 
bring back some coins that had been washed on receipt. He held these out and said to his son: 
‘‘Pecunia non olet’’- money does not smell. However wealth or money is fungible. By the 
time we see it, it does not smell. But the truth is that some money definitely stinks or smells -
‘’Pecunia nunc olet’’ especially when it comes from drugs, people or human trafficking, and 
ransoms paid on kidnapping.
52
 
In addition, money that emanates from tax evasion is dirty as indicated above. As a result, the 
OECD has continued to lead its initiative that it launched in 1998. This was aimed in 
improving countries’ ability or capacity to tackle tax evasion. OECD believes that this has 
been facilitated by bank secrecy and offshore financial centres (OFCs). It is no surprise that 
OECD’s efforts have found support from the countries that need tax revenues to improve 
their facilities as they come under strain as a result of the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis. In fact, G8 has indicated in their Declaration in 2013 that ‘‘tax authorities across the 
world should automatically share information to fight the scourge of tax evasion.’’53               
1.3 Private to Private Corruption (PPC) as an unnecessary acronym or designation 
We have established that corruption has various ramifications and can present itself in 
different shapes and sizes. This can depend on the opprobrium attached to a particular set of 
inducement received by people placed privately or publicly to safeguard real or imagined 
excesses in the work they do. It does not necessarily matter if this occurs in a public or 
private setting; the tendency is that, it will still be viewed as inappropriate by many. The 
negative impact or effect will in most situations be felt by the public. Hence part of this 
wealth, as previously pointed out, will undergo money laundering processes.  
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The amount of money lost through corruption (public and private) is enormous and is now 
enhanced by the advent of new technologies. With the advent of these, a new sweeping 
impetus was presented to legitimate trade and commerce, of which criminal enterprises 
quickly took advantage. Vast mass communications therefore facilitated contacts with people 
all over the globe. Modern banking, with its revolution in electronics, helped international 
criminal transactions. This gave criminals immediate access that helped them to steal vast 
sums of money. The illicit huge profits were laundered.
54
With just a click on the computer, 
huge sums of illegitimate money can be quickly transferred to other safe havens by criminals.  
In the writer’s view, there is no need to distinguish between a private corruption and a public 
one. Private sector corruption discourages competition and also harms the market. The same 
can be said of public corruption. In the UK, the framers of the 2010 Bribery Act did not 
distinguish between the two. This issue was considered by the Law Commission in 2007 in 
its Consultation Paper- Reforming Bribery. The Commission pointed out that there was really 
no need to have separate offences for private and public corruption. It is difficult to 
distinguish with clarity the difference that exists between a public sector and private sector 
function. Increasingly, you will notice that what were formerly classified as public sector 
functions are now sub-contracted to private entities. On the other hand, many public 
companies now form joint ventures with private companies.
55
   
It can be deduced from the above, that in the opinion of the Commission, the increasingly 
blurry line between government and private sector makes the distinction between official and 
private bribery highly irrelevant. It is much more difficult now to actually capture the full 
picture of what is to be seen as a public body than it was more than a century ago. There is 
again the difficulty of ascertaining if a person actually belongs to this body or is really a 
private individual that has been contracted to carry out the function of a public body.
56
       
So many more private individual organizations are now contracted to provide public services 
or to provide services to the private sector that have a ‘‘public interest’’ element to them. In 
the private sector, the acceptance of advantages in doing business may be perfectly 
acceptable in many contexts. How should such people or bodies be treated, if there is to be a 
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separate bribery-related offence focused on ‘‘public’’ sector? The fact that there is now more 
private sector provision of goods and services in the public interest, makes it hard to argue 
that no one should ever accept advantages in any form, simply because what they do involves 
a public service dimension.
57
The present writer adds that this can be seen as issues of 
‘‘blending or amalgamation’’ of private and public functions brought about as a result of 
changing societal dynamics.     
Closely related to the above, there are other areas of the law that also changed in response to 
this blurred line. The issue of ‘‘restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity’’ readily comes to 
mind. Initially, the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a foreign state is generally 
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another sovereign state. Until the mid-twentieth 
century, this was treated as absolute. However, as governments and state enterprises became 
more and more active in commercial activities in the modern era, private entities interacting 
with foreign states attacked complete sovereign immunity as fundamentally unfair in 
eliminating judicial recourse and favouring state companies.
58
 
There was Anglo-American reaction to the above. The restrictive action adopted was this - 
foreign states were immune from jurisdiction relating to their ‘’public acts’’- acta jura 
imperi. But were not immune from jurisdiction for their ‘’private acts’’ including commercial 
activities - acta jura gestionis. Sovereign immunity was therefore restricted to bring fairness 
in commercial interactions between private entities and States. In the USA, this was 
evidenced in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). In the UK, State Immunity 
Act of 1978 came into play. In fact, the Council of Europe adopted a European Convention 
on State Immunity and an Additional Protocol that became effective in 1976. The United 
Nations finalized its Convention known as the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property (the UN Convention) on December 2, 2004.
59
But we 
have to note that States are only bound if they are signatories and eventually ratify, as 
ratification, effectively triggers that particular State’s legal obligation to implement or apply 
the Convention. We have to note that China still maintains the absolute doctrine and 
presently, has not changed their stance on this.
60
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We should be mindful, that we are in an age where corporate entities have arguably a greater 
accessibility into various facets of our lives than before. In fact, there is no reason to assume 
that the corrupt decisions of private company employees will necessarily cause less harm 
than the corrupt decisions of a public officer. A corrupt decision made by Fortune 500 
Company might adversely affect the lives of many victims than a corrupt decision made by 
bribe-taking judge, city councillor or even a member of the US Congress.
61
However, can one 
evidentially, surmise that the wrongs and injustices of official corruption or bribery differ 
qualitatively from those of private-to-private bribery? We should bear in mind that bribery in 
both public and commercial sphere is seen to ‘‘corrupt’’ both the political and commercial 
life by inviting inappropriate platforms for decision-making.
62
           
The present writer, summits that in recent years, we have witnessed a trend that indicates that 
the functions once seen to be governmental - operating of prisons, schools, post offices and 
various utilities etc have increasingly been taken over by private entities.  In the same fray, 
some business activities long viewed to be within the purview or exclusively operated by 
private entities such as banks and insurance, have been ‘’nationalized’’ or at least subject to 
significant government involvement.  
Liberalization of the market has made it very difficult to stick to the dichotomy of public and 
private bribery. And both emanate from corrupt practices. One of the most notable advocates 
of criminalizing private corruption - International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), has stated 
that there is no meaningful difference that exists between public and private to private 
corruption because they both distort commercial dealings and that they deserve similar 
treatment in law. Needless to say, the above position has been fortified by the rapid increase 
in privatization throughout the world, including developing countries, and the increased 
complexity and interaction between the public and private sectors in international 
transactions and by an increase in the monetary value of these transactions.
63
   
ICC Article 1 2005 edition on Combating Extortion and Bribery requires ‘‘Enterprises’’ to 
prohibit bribery and extortion at all times, in whatever form, whether direct or indirect. In 
fact, this prohibition applies to payments to public officials, political directors, officers, 
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employees and agents of private enterprise for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business 
or improper advantage.
64
It must be noted that the above is not legally binding on 
‘‘Enterprises’’ or businesses and can be classified as a sort of ‘’soft law’’ provision. But the 
ICC is a highly influential international body that big commercial players listen to. The fact 
that they do from time to time try to streamline what they think should be ‘‘best practices’’ in 
business irrespective of whether this is private or public adds serious impetus to the 
postulation that the distinction between public and private to private corruption should be 
disregarded.               
It is reiterated, that the distinction between public sector bribery and private sector bribery 
makes less sense in the twenty-first century. Since the 1980s, the private sector has grown at 
an alarming rate. This is especially noticeable in the former Soviet Union and also in other 
developing economies like India and China. In many countries, it is evident that the private 
sector is larger economically than the public sector. It is on account of this, that there has 
been a very blurring and opaque distinction between the private and public entities largely 
brought about by market liberalization, privatization plus the out-sourcing of many 
governmental functions.
65
During the performance of the above functions associated with the 
above scenario, bribes will exchange hands and significant proportion of the loot will be 
laundered to escape the regulatory radar. The presence of the present flux of economic affairs 
makes the distinction very infinitesimal.          
But we must be wary of the fact that it is not all the money that is generated via corruption 
that is laundered. M. Levi strongly believes that even without money laundering there would 
still be the issue of corruption. In spite of this, bribes can still be paid using cash or some sort 
of movable valuables like gold, diamonds and art works. Admittedly, it is not all the bribes 
that come one’s way that must be laundered. Part of the cash can still be moved around as 
grease payments or can be spent. Corrupt persons and the criminals themselves can employ 
laundering agents to do the work for them. They will rely on them to be very uncooperative 
when a criminal investigation seeks to trace the loot.
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Further, bribes can still be paid indirectly. For example, a US company may instead of 
inducing a government minister in Nigeria with cash, can pay the minister’s son’s fees in a 
UK university. Additionally, a commercial entity may bribe a potential client by offering 
particularly lavish hospitality, which it pays for directly. Bribes come in different shades and 
shapes and are mostly noted to be done in secrecy. This is its traditional hallmark.     
The above is arguably indicative that the same state of affairs is present in the illicit 
acquirement of wealth through either public or private bribery. The present writer, it is 
submitted, does not see any rational to exhibit the dichotomy between private and public 
corruption as both crimes can rightly be said to cut across national borders.      
1.4 From slumber to waking up: An overview of the key international responsive tools. 
In acquiring the so called ‘‘dirty money,’’ through illegal means, the actors will want to use 
their ill-gotten loot. They will do this by reintegrating this into the formal economy. In the 
process, there is a distortion on the normal or legitimate economic flows. To minimise this, 
the international community reacted to stem the tide. It was noted that this was no longer a 
national issue to be left to individual countries to deal on their own. This problem cuts across 
economic borders. The writer is of the view that curtailment of crimes must take a sort of 
international cooperation to tackle. P. Wilkitzki also argues that domestic criminal legislators 
should not see crimes as merely a national phenomenon.
67
  
The enhanced momentum that galvanized the international community is attributed to the 
growing negative consequences noticed in the increasing volume of drug trade and its impact 
on both the international financial system and the social/economic well being of the citizenry. 
When ‘‘dirty money’’ is made, albeit not only through drugs trafficking but also through 
other criminal activities, part of this money is laundered and in the process also used by the 
culprits to bribe their way through the system. The international community has no choice 
than to seek cooperation amongst its comity of nations.           
Since 1945, there had been a growing list of international instruments dealing with subjects 
as varied as terrorist offences, apartheid and genocide.
68
The United Nations is not the only 
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global institution with an interest in countering money laundering and promoting the tracing, 
seizing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Others include the International Criminal 
Police Organization (ICPO/Interpol)
69
 and the World Customs Organization (WCO, formerly 
Customs Co-operation Council).
70
Although WCO has no operational powers, its involvement 
in laundering flows from the fact that in many jurisdictions, the enforcement of relevant 
customs legislation usually falls within the relevant finance ministry to whom the customs 
report.
71
There have been instances where culprits have attempted to smuggle large quantities 
of physical cash of ‘’dirty money’’ and intelligence was passed. Both Interpol and WCO 
combined their efforts in the past to curtail this. In some instances, the customs organisation 
used the mechanism of ‘‘controlled landing’’ to get the criminals. 
The high political priority now accorded to ‘’dirty money’’ from the drug trade is of fairly 
recent origin. This can be attributed to the magnitude and the complexity of the problem that 
reared its heads in the 1980s when international concern came to focus on the global threat 
presented by international drug trade. Some experts have tried to analyse the trend. W. 
Gilmore has the view that the focus on drugs at that time cannot only be attributed to the 
escalating nature of its abuse. The negative social impact and its distortive effects on world 
economy plus its negative domestic political effect necessitated the attention. In Colombia 
during this period, politicians, judges and other prominent people were murdered. Attempts 
were also made to penetrate into the main organs of government using ‘’dirty money.’’ It was 
as a result of this type of problem, that the US invaded Panama to remove General Noriega 
from power. The suspicion was that the drug trade can even be a significant danger to the 
stability of international peace.
72
   
The situation is simply this - the clamour for “dirty money” through the drug trade generates 
enormous profit for the barons. The tendency is simply to engage in money laundering to 
hide the enormous proceeds. Many institutional frameworks are infiltrated through bribery, 
publicly and privately, as a result, they become very weak to tackle the malaise. This can be 
done by corrupting some Anti Money Laundering (AML) officers significantly in the banking 
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systems. When this occurs, it would translate into some ‘‘domino effects’’ in the world 
financial system.  
It must be noted that the process of cross-border illicit capital flight usually has a negative 
impact on the global economy. This can occur by firstly, encouraging bad economic policies 
in some countries and harming effective operations of state economies. Secondly, there is 
serious potential to corrupt the financial markets impacting negative confidence in cross-
country financial system and lead to risk increases and instability. Thirdly, as a result, the rate 
of economic growth globally is reduced.
73
                              
As previously pointed out, one of the most significant phenomena that galvanized the 
international community into action to combat the negative effects of ‘‘dirty money’’ is the 
drug trade. It must be noted that it is not only the drug trade that generates ‘’dirty money.’’ 
However, the proceeds from the trade are enormous to be ignored. The United Nations played 
a very significant role to make this happen through various Conventions. Of all these, three 
are particularly significant - the 1988 Convention in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (Vienna Convention), the 2000 Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, 
and 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).  
There were international measures before 1988 that made significant contributions in 
controlling the production of drugs that generated ‘’dirty money.’’ However, at some point, it 
became apparent that they lacked modern apparatus to deal with the range of complex issues 
raised by modern international drug traffickers.   
It was evident that the recipe in place at the time which primarily focused on the production 
and regulation of the dangerous drugs could only go as far as protecting medical and 
scientific uses. It did increase the cost of illegal trafficking. But it was inadequate due to its 
conceptual narrowness. A more robust reactive mechanism was needed as a base for better 
reactive legislation internationally.
74
          
It was evident that a new momentum globally was needed to supplement the existing 
mechanisms. There was the feeling that this must focus on transnational drug trafficking 
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operations and enhanced co-operations in law enforcement. There was an international 
awareness that the ‘‘dirty money’’ generated by the drug trade corrupted the global system 
and that a more ‘’enhanced and intrusive’’ anti-drug recipe was needed. It can be said that the 
underlying philosophy can be found in the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of 
Future Activities in Drug Abuse, adopted by the 1987 UN Conference on Drug Abuse and  
Illicit Trafficking.  
This focussed on ensuring that there should be a vigorous law enforcement apparatus that 
would reduce, deter, and make massive contribution to prevent drug abuse. It was evident 
that significant coordination amongst countries’ national agencies internally and extension of 
the same attitude cross-border was seriously needed to ensure a positive result.
75
     
Following the initiative taken by the government of Venezuela, the UN General Assembly on 
14
th
 December 1984, adopted unanimously a resolution expressing the view that as a result of 
the massive scale of illicit narcotics trafficking, it was necessary to put in place a Convention. 
This considered the different aspects of the issues in greater detail than they were in the 
existing international documents.
76
 
As a result, the General Assembly requested the UN Economic and Social Council to instruct 
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to prepare a draft convention “as a matter of priority.’’77 
The commission then adopted by consensus, on February 14 1986 a resolution with the 
relevant elements for inclusion. It was this that culminated in the UN conference and the birth 
of the Vienna Convention in 1988, described by the then United States President George H.W 
Bush as ‘‘of fundamental importance to effective international co-operation to combat 
drugs.’’78        
The Convention entered into force on 11
th
 November 1990, by 2010, it attracted 184 states as 
well as the formal participation of the European Commission. The Convention even attracted 
the positive participation of a growing number of world drug producing countries like - 
Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Nepal and Morocco. 
It is now regarded as constituting the essential foundation of the international legal regime in 
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this important area of concern.
79
 E. U Savona and D. Foe have rightly remarked that we have 
to evaluate a country’s ratification of the Vienna Convention as a good indication of its 
commitment, as a responsible member of the world community, to fight drugs and money 
laundering.
80
 
The writer agrees with this view, because the international community is strongly needed to 
fight the scourge, due to the fact that the activities need to be coordinated internationally. The 
culprits are highly sophisticated and tend to be a step ahead of the legislations in place.       
The key elements of the Vienna Convention relating to the convergence question  
Arguably, the principal effective strategy to nip the modern international drug trafficking 
activities of the cartels is to provide the law enforcement community with the required tools 
to counter their financial power. The essentialities of the above will include the 
criminalization of money laundering and also the confiscation of the proceeds. The strategy 
was in full realization that the proceeds of ‘‘dirty money’’ of which a great percentage 
emanates from drugs are used to infiltrate the system through both public and private bribery. 
When you make significant efforts to cut this off, there is the high tendency that the criminals 
will find it very difficult to continue polluting the system. 
The laundering process includes much that is not healthy for the smooth operation of the 
world economy. Article 3(1)(a) therefore places a strict obligation on each participating state 
to criminalise a number of drug trafficking activities which have an international impact, 
ranging from production and cultivation through to organisation, management and financing 
of trafficking operations. It targeted the drug barons, the first time that a global convention 
had done so.   
M.C Bassiouni remarked that the organizers of the international illicit traffic do not in most 
cases physically handle any drugs themselves. They instigate and finance the operations that 
are usually undertaken by their subordinates.
81
These are there to take orders and carry out the 
dirty work for their masters.  
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Article 3(1)(b) requires that the drug-related ‘’money laundering’’ be established as a 
criminal offence. It defined this as: 
(i) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any 
offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or 
from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the 
commission of such an offence to evade the legal consequences of his actions. 
(ii)  the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, 
rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or 
from an act of participation in such an offence or offences.    
The significance of this for international cooperation should not be under estimated. By 
requiring its criminalization and treating it as a criminal offence in paragraph 1, the drafters 
ensured that cooperation in respect of confiscation, mutual legal assistance and extradition 
would be easier to achieve. This is commendable because confiscation, mutual legal 
assistance and extradition have all played significant roles in assisting to reduce the impact of 
corruption and money laundering.    
The US delegation was elated about this, particularly the extradition aspect, because countries 
are obligated to establish Article 3 (1) offence in their local law. Therefore, this will meet the 
dual criminality requirement in extradition matters. Although, it is recognised that illicit drug 
trafficking is a universal extraditable offence, narcotics related money laundering is new and 
was not seen as an extraditable offence. The inclusion has changed the landscape and 
evidently is considered as one of the most important aspects of the Article.
82
At a practical 
level, the mandatory wordings of Article 3 in relation to money laundering that emanates 
from ‘‘dirty money’’ made signatories retune their respective domestic legislation.  
Another significant feature is the approach towards confiscation of proceeds derived from 
instrumentalities used in drug trafficking.  Article 5 treats this in detail. It addressed measures 
to be taken at national level and the necessary mechanisms to enhance international co-
operation in this important area. It is vital because confiscation measures punctuate the 
criminal’s ability to enjoy the loot and puts significant dent on the resources at his/her 
disposal to continue or refinance the crime.  
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Confiscation also prevents the offenders from unjustly increasing their wealth, and eliminates 
the advantages they have gained from their crimes. It also deters the culprit from crime by 
frontally attacking the profit base of the venture. This can protect the community by reducing 
the circulation of most prohibited items.
83
      
The first paragraphs of Article 5 treat the issue of confiscation at the domestic law and 
practice. They are framed in mandatory terms but were deliberately worded in order to allow 
each state a wider flexibility and discretion to achieve the required result. More so, Article 5 
addressed the stumbling block of the concept of bank secrecy which the harbingers of ‘‘dirty 
money’’ had used as clog to hinder investigation, to wit:  
‘’existing many bank secrecy laws are being used to obstruct co-operation and the provision 
of information needed for the investigation of allegations of drug-related offences.’’84This 
was addressed in Article 5(3): ‘‘A party shall not decline to act under the provisions of this 
paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy.’’    
P.W. Sproule and P. Saint-Dennis agreed with this and stated that removal of the bank 
secrecy impediments and excuse to discontinue investigation can be seen to be the most 
important mechanism employed to combat drug money laundering operations.
85
This is a 
welcome development due to the fact that culprits do usually with tacit connivance with some 
criminally minded gate keepers, often fronts this as an excuse in not helping with the 
investigations to get to the root of the criminality.   
The participants made sure in Article 7 that bank secrecy impediments were removed as a 
clog to progressing mutual legal assistance in investigations and prosecutions relating to 
money laundering. In fact, the provisions of Article 7(5) were wholesomely welcomed by the 
US delegation. It was recognised that countries can still conclude further bilateral or 
multilateral agreements to address issues of importance.      
With regard to forfeiture issues also contained in Article 5, the scenario presented looks very 
promising. This appears very clear with specificity and in most instances mandatory. It is 
agreed that this article can be classified as a significant breakthrough to attacking the gains 
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associated with drug trafficking. It enhances the view that to attack the profit base is very 
important in the war against drug trafficking and other criminal activities.
86
 
A further contribution was the introduction of the concept of mutual legal assistance (MLA) 
to many countries where this was still in its infancy. This is a great help in confronting the 
various stages of the money laundering. For instance, there could be a situation where the 
proceeds from a drug related offence are physically taken out from country A, deposited in 
country B (placement) and then transferred to financial institutions in country C (layering). 
Eventually the money can be paid into a number of corporations in different countries as 
payments of share transfers (integration). The only hope of tracing this loot back via 
confiscation by investigators in country A would be by MLA.
87
 This can be proactively 
employed in the recovery of proceeds of “dirty money.”      
Another important feature of the 1988 convention is the attention it paid to extradition. 
Although this is a continuation of the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended and the 1971 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. It adopted a basic approach that is similar to 
other multilateral instruments dealing with criminal activities. Article 6 requires that domestic 
criminal offences that give effect to the obligations of the 1988 Convention shall be deemed 
extraditable offences in any existing treaty between parties. And the obligation is restricted to 
more serious offences, including money laundering, provided in Article 3(1). 
It must be noted that the 1988 Convention is not really a radical departure from the tenets of 
state practice in this area. But nevertheless, as D. Stewart pointed out, Article 6 makes it 
somehow easier ‘’for prosecuting states to obtain the extradition of narcotics traffickers and 
cartel chiefs from overseas’’88It is fair to surmise that the Convention addressed the 
fragmented legal loopholes that the sophisticated ‘‘dirty money’’ earners through money 
laundering use to operate. It has made a solid foundation for future progress in this area.  
Another UN Convention that developed from the foundation laid by the Vienna Convention 
is the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime 2000 (UNCTOC). The primary 
purpose was to combat organised crime. Typical examples of the criminal groups are the 
mafia and yakuza groups commonly found in Italy and Japan. They have trans-border 
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influence. The Convention came up also to combat non-drug crimes. This UN initiative has 
its origins in the Political Declaration and Global Action Plan adopted at the World 
Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime held in Naples 1994. This was 
subsequently approved by the General Assembly in resolution 49/159 of December 1994. 
The processes and subsequent negotiations, led to the adoption by the General Assembly of 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in 2000. The cornerstone of this 
Convention is its Article 3 that sets out the scope of its application. It indicated that its scope 
of application applies to the prevention of, and investigation of stipulated offences. 
Admirably, this included money laundering plus other serious crimes that were defined in 
Article 2(b) by reference to the threshold of punishment. It was specified that the offence 
must involve ‘’an organised criminal group’’ and is ‘’transnational in nature.’’89The link to 
the present discourse is that ‘’dirty money’’ can also be acquired through organised criminal 
cartels that include drug barons. When the proceeds are got, part of it is used to corrupt the 
system through both public and private to private corruption. 
There was the initial problem of finding a definition for transnational organised crime. But 
this was later taken care of in Article 3(2). For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article, an 
offence is transnational in nature if:  
(a) It is committed in more than one state; 
(b) It is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction 
or control takes place in another State; 
(c) It is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one state; or  
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. 
Although, the 2000 Convention assimilated significant proportion of information from the 
Vienna Convention, it is not its clone. For example, the way it addressed the interface 
between organised crime and corruption in Articles 8 and 9 is to be commended. Article 31 
also applies to prevention as well as to prosecution of offences. It tried to undermine the 
activities of the criminal groups that generated ‘’dirty money’’ by focussing on their finance. 
European Union Action plan noted that the fundamental element behind organised crime is 
simply the pursuit of financial gain. And this will naturally be a magnet for the group/s to 
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explore other possibilities in pursuit of economic crime which eventually leads to the need to 
embark on laundering the proceeds after the criminalities.
90
  
Possibly, the most innovative provision was the inclusion of measures to prevent money 
laundering. This is reflected in Articles 6 and 7. A review of many novel features of the 2000 
Convention lies beyond our present discourse. The Convention minimised the potential 
barriers towards cooperation on issues of corporate criminal liability in Article 18(2). It also 
addressed the issue of returning confiscated proceeds from ‘’dirty money’’ that went through 
money laundering. This brought into play Article 14 for the return of property.  
Perhaps, the most significant UN convention that came into play to tackle the convergence 
issue of private to private corruption and ‘’dirty money’’ is the 2003 UN Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC). This entered into force in 2005 and by 2010, had some 148 state 
signatories.  
It contains several provisions that deal with both public and private sector corruption. It 
provides: 
‘‘Each state party shall take measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its 
domestic laws, to prevent corruption involving the private sector, enhance accounting and 
auditing standards in the private sectors and, where appropriate, provide effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for failure to comply 
with such measure.’’91         
The most significant anti-private sector bribery provision is Article 21 of UNCAC. It reads: 
‘‘Each state party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures  as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the course of 
economic, financial or commercial activities: 
a. The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any 
person, who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private entity, for the person himself or 
herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or 
refrain from acting. 
b. The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person 
who works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for 
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another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from 
acting.’’92          
It must be noted that a separate criminal offence is to be found in Article 22. This is similar to 
the provision contained in Article 17 that criminalizes the embezzlement of property in the 
public sector. The present writer therefore submits that this provides further evidence that 
public and private corruption are to be treated as equally very harmful under the 
Convention.
93
  
Aside above, the major focus of UN activities is on the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), based in Vienna. It has a specialist section, the Law Enforcement, Organized 
Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Unit. This provides vital assistance in legal field 
including significant assistance logistically to those jurisdictions that are confronted with the 
challenge of enacting very highly complex legislation needed to give domestic effect to the 
numerous obligations contained in 1988 and other subsequent legislations on issues of dirty 
money and private to private corruption.   
The present writer submits that the generation of ‘’dirty money’’ albeit through various 
means, do distort the fiscal and economic dynamics of the formal economy. This was the 
driving force that the international community needed to galvanise them to come together to 
fashion out the various responses.   
Finally, we should mention the OECD Convention of 1997. This helped in combating bribery 
of foreign public officials in international business transactions and includes anti-money 
laundering provisions. It is of interest that Article 7 required countries that have made the 
offence of bribing domestic officials as a predicate offence to money laundering to do same 
with regard to bribing foreign officials. Later on, the convention did not allow companies to 
embark on ‘‘tax deductibility’’ of the bribes that they paid to secure their businesses. They 
urged countries to stop the practice. Until then, companies seeking contracts abroad paid 
bribes to get them. They will later write it off as part of the expenses incurred.                  
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CHAPTER 2  
The Convergence of dirty money and private to private corruption 
2.1   Introduction  
Structural approach 
It is the aim of the writer not to deviate from an already established approach of not veering 
away from a legally peculiar perspective noted in the initial chapter. However, part of the 
initial application in this chapter, will be to show that at some point, there is amalgam of 
funds acquired through illegitimate manner noticeable in the private sector and the process to 
reintroduce this into the legitimate economy. Having pointed out previously, the difficulty 
associated in determining in certain circumstances, if an inducement can be classified as 
originating from a private or public source, the writer will clarify any scenario that comes up. 
This will always have in mind, the ‘‘inducement incidents’’ in Anglo-American and less 
developed countries as reference points. 
Going forward, a proactive attempt will be made to highlight that it is very difficult, after the 
creation of the illicit wealth, for the criminals not to attempt to reinvest the loot into the 
legitimate economy. The primary intention is to present this loot as if it emanated from a 
legitimate source. During the process of legitimising this wealth, it will be highlighted that 
the ‘‘dirty money’’ and the acts tainted seriously with bribery are usually very difficult to 
separate - hence the inseparability of “dirty money” and private to private corruption.  
Aside above, one would notice that there are certain jurisdictional differences in the approach 
to the notion of dirty money and private to private corruption. Enactment of statutes to tackle 
the conundrum came into play at different times in different countries - in the UK and the 
USA. As a result, there was a problem of quick reciprocal conformity to tackle the issues 
when presented extra-jurisdictionally. On account of the amorphous picture or perception of 
‘‘dirty money,’’ it was not surprising that different polities had different approaches on how 
to combat the malaise as there were evidently, some divergent cultural permutations and 
differences to take note of. Indeed, jurisdictionally, countries employ both criminal and civil 
law mechanisms to deal with the convergence matter.     
Granted, that generation of illicit wealth can emanate from nefarious and numerous activities, 
post generation, also presents its own problems. As the culprits would be very eager to enjoy 
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the ‘‘fruits of their labour,’’ money-laundering of this ‘’profit’’ could probably and evidently 
be the best option available in other to reuse the gains. But the process of acquitting or 
stripping the wealth of the traces of its illegal origin is not an easy thing to embark on.  
There are various or different processes that the money must go through. In elementary terms, 
the processes needed to finally reuse this money will have to pass through the followings - 
placement, layering and finally integration. Although, these three processes are noted to be 
the traditionally recognised stages that the dirty funds have to go through before being 
reintegrated, it must be pointed out, that this sequence is merely academic in form, and that 
funds can be laundered beginning at any stage. Not very unsurprising, the greasing ingredient 
that each or all the processes would need to achieve a positive outcome and employed as a 
complimentary tool is simply corruption. The perpetrators use corruption as a powerful tool 
to scale through the different stages. And instances are to be elucidated accordingly.                                         
2.2 The inseparability of dirty money and private to private corruption    
It has to be noted that ‘’dirty money’’ as previously indicated has the characteristics of 
changing the tag attached to it. This is necessitated on account of the particular 
transformative stage the said fund is. In fact, B. Rider stated that it can be argued that even 
procedures and laws that usually serve as a hindrance to perpetuate the tag of ‘‘dirty’’ on 
money by prohibiting its return to the formal economy can be seen to be 
disadvantageous.
94
This view was corroborated at some point following the activities of the 
government of Pakistan. The country had been noted to have a significant underground 
economic machine.
95
 
In fact, it was noted that at some point, the State Bank of Pakistan went as far as advertising 
for the sale of bonds on the basis of not even asking for the source of the funds and on the 
condition that no questions would be asked about identities. The present writer submits that it 
is not justifiable that a ‘’green light’’ was given for the purchase of bonds with no questions 
asked on the source of the funds. This is tacitly, indicative that the source would be very 
questionable and that there would possibly be corruption involved in the process. This brings 
into play the inseparability issue.               
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It is the submission of the writer, that any act geared towards the generation of wealth that is 
seen to be unconscionable, fraudulent and incompatible with civilized behaviours qualifies to 
have the tag of ‘‘dirty’’ attached to the proceeds - the writer will use this approach in this 
thesis. The fact simply is that when wealth or money as the case may be is generated through 
public or private corruption and/or other illegitimate manner, depending on the size of the 
loot, this is usually laundered with the intention of legitimate use. Therefore, in certain 
situations, there could be difficulties in ascertaining if this occurred within or outside the 
private economic sphere. But more importantly, the moment or instance the loots or proceeds 
go into the banking or financial system, ready to be laundered, the convergence and the 
inseparability issues come readily into play. And with all intents and purposes, this must be 
seen to be a factual situation and not fictional.  
The equation looks or sounds very simple. For money to have the tag or hallmark of being 
‘’dirty,’’ it must have to, arguably, be sourced from questionable means. And for there to be 
the notion or evidence of its inseparability from corruption, there must be a meeting point or 
convergence with another process. This process is money-laundering. Therefore, one is not 
far from the truth when it is surmised that there is a clear linkage between corruption and 
money laundering; it is the same as indicating that there is a nexus between ‘’dirty money’’ 
and money laundering. The writer’s approach in this thesis is simply this - where ‘’dirty 
money’’ is mentioned, it includes corruption as corruption has many facets. 
The World Bank’s credence to the inseparability issue  
The impetus or credence to the present writer’s assertion has been strengthened by the 
pronouncement of a leading International Financial Institution (IFI) - the World Bank. The 
Bank has been recognised as a very important leading institution when it comes to 
advancements of global economic tools that usually enhance better economic existence. The 
writer submits that the Bank’s observations have to be accorded very significant attention.96     
We need to take cognisance that the cankerworm of corruption and money laundering must 
be assessed as strongly related and has a self-reinforcing phenomenon. The proceeds of 
corruption are usually disguised and eventually undergo the money laundering process 
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manipulated by people that are corrupt who usually spend this or invest the proceeds. 
Simultaneously, corrupt activities in any country’s AML institutions (this can include 
financial institutions’ regulators, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), police, prosecutors, and 
the judiciary) can actually incapacitate the AML mechanism of that country and make it 
totally ineffective. It has been seen that the nexus that exists between money laundering and 
corruption has increased the focus of the Bank on corruption-related proceeds. It is observed 
that a significant deterrence to the corruption problem is the fact that there are no water-tight 
or absolute safe havens for the proceeds. They can be traced, seized, confiscated and 
eventually repatriated to the victim country.
97
  
There are some lessons that can be seen from the above. To start with, effective customer due 
diligence evidenced under AML/CTF requirements like the provision of details of a client’s 
background, the source of funds in addition to the identity of the beneficiary would definitely 
play an important role in the promotion of general financial integrity and would hinder 
corruption.
98
More so, the writer flows with the fact that the close co-operation between FIUs, 
anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement and the private sector is very important in order to 
maximise the impact the AML regime can have to combat corruption.  
It is noted that in many countries, the law enforcement agencies do specify corruption to be 
the main predicate offence that generates illegal funds to be laundered. This is the case with 
Nigeria. Therefore on account of this, AML policy is to a large extent primarily an anti-
corruption tool.
99
It is submitted that this should be seen that there is a significant indication 
that there is a link since most of the AML policies can be used primarily to control 
corruption.        
Aside above, the World Bank project that was carried out by its Financial Market Integrity 
Unit (FMIU), focused on the use of anti-money laundering information for anti-corruption 
purposes. This was a study of 15 anti-corruption agencies in the world. They were selected on 
account of their geographical location, size, type, and the presence of an Egmont Group FIU. 
The purpose was to ascertain how far a particular country’s anti-corruption agency used the 
data picked up by its AML data to combat corruption. The intention of the information was to 
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disseminate it to other countries to help them fight corruption as well as help in repatriating 
the proceeds.  
On account of the importance of the present discourse, the Bank in collaboration with the 
Egmont Group embarked on another project to ascertain the mode of governance of the FIUs. 
This was viewed as the Bank’s review of its governance and anti-corruption stance or 
strategy. The findings were utilized to strengthen corruption prevention in FIUs. 
Additionally, a study sponsored by the Bank was done by R. Gordon and B. Stevenson of 
Case Western University. It focused on the misuse of corporate vehicles and simulation of 
further discussion on the convergence dilemma. It has therefore not come as a surprise that 
the Bank has had an AML/CTF role to play as far back as late 2001. What it did was that 
instead of being seen as a standard pace setter in this field, it, through its operations, chose to 
assess compliance using FATF 40 Recommendations (R). This is usually achieved through 
such programmes as the Report on Observance of Standards, Codes, and Financial Sector 
Assessment Programmes.
100
 
Importance of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on inseparability 
The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) is arguably the back bone, 
guardian or the resource repository for the United Nations Convention (UN) that is relevant 
to financial crimes. The writer surmises, that the importance of mentioning UNODC is 
simply that its activities since coming into existence support the view or notion that there is 
tangible evidence that the convergence is not a mirage. It gave recognition to important link 
between private to private corruption and money laundering.  
Admittedly, UNODC has gravitated towards the convergence question. There are very 
important nexus that exists between corruption and money laundering. The fact is that the 
innate ability to transfer and hide funds is very vital to the perpetrators of corruption, more 
particularly when it comes to grand corruption. People that work in the public sector and 
some important private sector sections are exposed to bribery and are usually intimidated to 
help conceal illicit financial activities. It is on account of this that the authorities must 
implement a high degree of effective linkage and coordination needed to confront the above 
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issues and effectively implement measures that must positively impact on this.
101
This is a 
significant contributory stance that the convergence dilemma is a reality.  
Moving further, statutes legislated to tackle money laundering, can significantly be a positive 
contribution to detect corruption and related offences. This of course, can present a solid 
basis for further financial investigation. The identification and the required recording 
obligations and prompt reporting of suspicious transactions will definitely assist in detection 
of illicit capital flights narrowing down on their source. It can therefore be deducted, that 
corruption should be established as a predicate offence for money-laundering.
102
      
To further buttress the inseparability of “dirty money” and private to private corruption, the 
UNODC through its Global Program plays a vital role in extending AML technical assistance 
to developing world. It lists as a matter of priority, money laundering/corruption linkage as 
one of its vital areas of research. It has a very important paper in this regard that it published 
as far back as 1998 - Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering. This work 
led emphasis on risks or short comings posed by un/or under-regulated Corporate Service 
Providers (CSPs) and anonymous corporate vehicles.
103
     
We should also bear in mind, that the inseparability question was the major reason why the 
World Bank and UNODC put into place as far back as September 17 2007 Stolen Assets 
Recovery Initiative - St.AR. Part of the goal was to help to repatriate assets that were 
expropriated by corrupt people to their home country, ratification of UNCAC and extension 
of technical assistance to less developed economies. Once again, the proceeds are seen to be 
‘’dirty’’ and were laundered to foreign jurisdictions, and during this process the convergence 
or inseparability evidently happened through the financial system. The banking system is 
seen as a very notable accomplice and significant conduit in the convergence role.        
The aim of the St.AR joint initiative was to send the signal that ‘‘dirty money’’ (corruption) 
does not pay. This sounds interesting. It also claimed to transmit the message that it would 
constitute a strong force as a deterrent to corruption, this seems overstated.
104
But the present 
writer summits that there is ‘’profit in corruption.’’ Otherwise, how come that a lot of people 
are complicit and engage in this if there is the absence of profit. Some writers have surmised 
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that the StAR initiative is a consciousness-raising or hortatory exercise and that the publicity 
this has generated, so far, can still be classified as a positive vibe.
105
     
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 2003 and inseparability 
It is good to reiterate the fact that the present writer brings to the fore; that where corrupt 
money, which, with deep sense of sincerity is very elastic in nature is mentioned, it connotes 
or signifies ‘’dirtiness.’’ And when this ‘‘dirty money’’ undergoes the transformative process 
of laundering, the close affinity between corruption and money-laundering is thus evidenced. 
This simply is convergence. As a result, this has been evidently acknowledged in some 
important global Conventions.  
The author reiterates that UNCAC 2003 has been a very respectable and prudent source that 
has exuded very significant contributions to tackle the “dirty money” convergence issues. A. 
Argandona described it as the first genuinely global legally binding instrument on corruption 
and related matters that is the first to be developed with an extensive international 
participation comprising a broad consensus of signatory States plus international private 
sector and civil society organizations.
106
The importance of bringing the above convention 
into reckoning is simply that its Articles are reoccurring decimals in tackling the convergence 
dilemma at various stages of this thesis. Many people have found significant comfort in its 
Articles. And when “dirty money” is mentioned, corruption that has various facets usually 
comes into focus.          
The UNCAC has laid out the close nexus that exists between corruption and money 
laundering. The contents of the second clause of the preamble attest to this. In fact, the vital 
or germane areas include Articles 14, 23, 52 and 58. Article 14,
107
indicates that the 
signatories, mandatorily, have to set up AML supervisory arrangements. This should include 
customer due diligence and establishing beneficial ownership. A suspicious transaction 
monitoring system must be there, arrangements to monitor cross-border movement of cash 
and negotiable instruments, relevant information about electronic transfers, adherence to the 
standards of existing AML bodies, and ensure that the international cooperation among law 
enforcement, judicial and financial regulatory agencies are maintained. 
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Each facet of Article 14 will definitely be a serious hindrance to the perpetrators of 
corruption and money laundering. Whenever the ‘’dirty money’’ is available to be laundered, 
if the various facets are stringently adhered to, as envisaged by this Article, there will 
definitely be a serious block or hindrance for the actors or criminals to actualise their 
intentions. The target or aim is to make it very hard for the criminals to succeed, as 
interdiction is a very important element in crime deterrence. Former United States Senator 
Susan Collins who was the Chairman of Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on 
Governmental Affairs is of the opinion that once money laundering is stopped, much of the 
seed capital that criminal organisations need to operate would be dried up.
108
 
The UK’s Cabinet Office agreed. The view is that when the authorities remove assets from 
criminals, this disrupts the criminal organisation. It is similar to slamming excessive taxation 
on legitimate businesses which cuts their profit margin and reduces the working capital for 
existing enterprises. This can also remove the reserves to begin new criminal ventures.
109
    
Article 23
110
was drafted in a mandatory tone to facilitate the parties to the Convention to 
legislate in their domestic laws the criminalisation of money-laundering. This must take into 
account the domestic circumstances of each country. Parties are required to put into place 
various predicate offences that are needed to satisfy the money-laundering offence. It is 
submitted that the contents are good omen to the convergence or inseparability dilemma. 
Once there is legislation in place with the attendant consequences, that checkmates money 
laundering, the tendency is for the culprits to think twice before embarking on their criminal 
ventures.  
It is noted that Article 52
111
states that the signatories have to ensure that their financial 
institutions have to employ enhanced scrutiny on accounts opened by public officials. These 
include both domestic and foreign officials that have been conducting prominent public 
functions plus their families and close associates. They are known as Politically Exposed 
Persons (PEPs). This Article, also expects parties to draw up the modalities needed for the 
kind of natural and legal persons that this enhanced scrutiny should be applicable to. It is also 
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expected that parties have to consider setting up a financial disclosure system for public 
officials, including foreign financial accounts that have penalties for non-compliance.
112
  
There is really no single agreed universal definition of PEP. The European Union Third 
Money Laundering Directive (EU3MLD) defined it as ‘’natural persons who are or have been 
entrusted with prominent public functions and immediate family members or persons known 
to be close associates of such persons.’’113Irrespective of the various definitions of PEP (like 
those of FATF, Wolfberg Group, Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG etc), the 
consensus is that the chances of PEPs engaging in money laundering is higher than other 
people due to their proximity to positions that offer opportunity for rent seeking. It does not 
mean that all PEPs are corrupt and banks should take cognizance of this. Admirably, the 
FATF cautioned that the requirements are preventive (not criminal) in nature and should not 
be interpreted as stigmatising PEPs as being involved in criminal activity.
114
Proper due 
diligence must be employed by the financial institution dealing with them (enhanced due 
diligence ‘’EDD’’ is suggested).   
It must be taken into consideration that PEPs also conduct businesses in their private 
capacity. They also offer bribes, plus the fact that they have numerous companies set up with 
the intention of avoiding the authorities by disguising the beneficial owners. Some of them 
are very powerful and can influence the managerial decisions in private financial institutions 
and use them to launder their proceeds thereby reinforcing the inseparability or convergence 
question. This is irrespective of the fact that the banks are expected to carry out EDD on 
them.  
Aside above, Article 58
115
encourages parties to set up FIUs. This will enable the country to 
receive, analyse and disseminate relevant information (STRs) needed to track down the 
orchestrators involved in the convergence problem. Again, it must be noted, that establishing 
FIU is also a means of reducing the problem. However, this could be very problematic to 
some countries due to cost implications. Tackling ML can be a very expensive commodity 
for some Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The truth is that countries want to be seen to be 
in conformity with ‘’international standards.’’ Conformity with UNCAC and FATF 
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recommendations comfortably fit this template. But the cost implication on conformity 
presents a big burden to some of these countries.
116
    
P. Reuter and E.M Truman noted interestingly, that it must be classified or seen as an article 
of faith to the authorities who are located in the advanced world that all the nations need to be 
in possession of efficient AML regime, but however resources to maintain this are scarce. It 
must be noted that actually the global threat exhibited by the weaknesses in very poor nations 
may be quiet infinitesimal. This is the reality on the ground.
117
              
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other legal 
persons on inseparability  
Of relevance to the present discourse, is the role that was played by OECD in 1997, when it 
issued the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transaction (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). This was the product of the work 
first initiated by its Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions that 
came into play in 1994. We have to quickly point out here that OECD’s Convention is 
mentioned because bribery that occurs trans-national, along the line, permeates the private 
sector and as previously pointed out in this thesis, it is no longer necessary distinguishing if 
this occurred in the public or private sectors as both cause significant damage to the 
economic system.  
Of significant importance in this Convention, is the fact that it contains AML provisions. 
Article 7 calls upon signatories who have made the offence of bribing a domestic official a 
predicate offence for money-laundering to do so on the same terms for the bribery of a 
foreign public official. The importance of this, in this writer’s view, is that this recognises 
that when the bribes are received by either the domestic or foreign official, most of them go 
through the laundering process to disguise the origin thereby reemphasising the inseparability 
issue. This Convention frowned seriously against making bribery a tax deductable expense in 
business transactions. This was true in early 1990s but much less now. Most multinationals 
navigate their way into getting very lucrative business contracts in some countries. The 
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manner they do this is not very complimentary on account of the fact that bribes do exchange 
hands to land these contracts.       
As far back as 2006, the Working Group (WG) released its Mid-Term Review of Phase 2 
Reports. This was a compilation of reports for 21 individual country reviews that were 
completed in 2008. The section very relevant to money-laundering that dealt with article 7 
indicated that there was an absence of standard data collection techniques noticeable amongst 
countries.  On account of this, it was really very difficult to come up with a robust reportage 
on common trends between countries. It therefore, called for standardisation of data. It laid 
emphasis on how the proceeds of the bribery would be treated, rather than just the bribe 
alone.
118
  
On issues of inseparability, for a more enhanced evaluation to be recognised of this 
convention, there must be a clear indication that the suspicious transaction reporting systems 
have led to the discovery of foreign bribery and related money laundering incidents. If the 
assumption is that incidents of foreign bribery are regularly happening plus the fact that this 
involves money-laundering, it is within the confines of legitimate expectation that the 
reporting systems should be detecting foreign bribery on a regular basis. Unfortunately this 
was not the case as STRs did not quickly lead to bribery investigations in most of the 
examined parties.
119
 
One wonders and finds it puzzling and very disappointing that the developed countries that 
are noted as having a very high level of expertise in dealing with these issues did not produce 
the expected result. It was therefore, not a surprise to find a more disappointing scenario 
amongst the LDCs. It was the speculation that the above low level corruption-related STRs 
could be as a result of non-inclusion of foreign bribery examples in the typologies that were 
issued. This therefore, could have led to FIUs and the reporting entities not being adequately 
aware of the money-laundering and corruption linkage.
120
   
The writer notes that OECD in fact came up with another paper that helped to highlight the 
convergence dilemma in September 2007 titled ‘’Potential Obstacles to the Detection of 
Bribery of Foreign Public Official by AML Systems.’’ Three common characteristics in 
foreign bribery that sets it apart from many other predicate offences were looked into. First, 
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there is the generation of two types of illicit fund offences - payment of bribes and the 
proceeds of bribe. Secondly, there was the issue of the offence occurring abroad and lastly 
the relative newness of the offence. All these, might impact on the detection by AML. There 
was the problem of detecting bribery that happened via normal business transactions plus the 
issue of dual criminality obstacles noticeable in international co-operation.  
Aside this, OECD also entered into alliance with other legal persons and their 
pronouncements fitted the convergence or the inseparability problem. There was Asia 
Development Bank/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific. This came into 
existence in 1999. Their 2007/08 Work Plan expressed a very serious intention in 
collaborating with APG to investigate the link between corruption and money laundering.  
This was geared to undertake a good thematic review jointly with Asia-Pacific Group on ML 
tailored to the framework of the FATF/APG Project Group on the links between anti-
corruption and ML and financing of terrorism. There was the focus on strengths and 
vulnerabilities to the corruption of member nations’ anti-corruption mechanisms and to 
provide respectable suggestions for moving forward. A joint workshop geared towards 
protecting AML institutions in particular FIUs against corruption complemented the 
review.
121
   
The writer summits, that this group noticed that corruption occurs and participants navigate 
their way through the financial systems using bribery as a powerful weapon. AML are 
therefore weakened thereby reinforcing the inseparability or convergence question and the 
scrutiny of effectiveness of the system in place.  
The initiative, issued a report titled ‘’Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition and Asset 
Recovery of Proceeds of Corruption in Asia and the Pacific.’’ It suggested a substitute for 
mutual legal assistance in corruption matters. Instead of using this to recover the proceeds of 
corruption, the requesting state might ask its foreign counterpart to commence domestic 
money laundering charges.
122
The writer notes that this approach appears simpler and cheaper 
for LDCs.  
The input of Commonwealth to inseparability      
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Apart from the initiatives of OECD and other legal persons, the initiatives of the 
Commonwealth have added the spark to the inseparability issue. The work conducted was 
through its Economic Affairs, Governance, Legal and Constitutional Affairs divisions in its 
Secretariat. The work built on the efforts made as far back as 1999 on the commitment of 
Commonwealth Heads of Government to the Framework for Commonwealth Principles of 
Good Governance and Combating Corruption.        
In its work and as a follow-up on UNCAC implementation, the Commonwealth in 2005 
published a major report by its Working Group on Asset Recovery. The germane 
recommendations are as follows: Immunities from criminal prosecutions for head of states, 
government and political figures should be removed, there should be an enhanced scrutiny for 
both domestic and foreign PEPs, a mechanism for dealing with corruption by serving heads 
of state, effective conviction, and civil confiscation measures should be put in place as part of 
AMLs. It also suggested that bilateral treaties should not be necessary for assistance in this 
area. Asset registries for public officials should be used as an effective preventive mechanism 
more particularly when verified with tax information.
123
  
Needless to say, the writer surmises that there is actually in some Commonwealth 
jurisdictions a lack of political will to go along with the above recommendations. It is really 
very difficult for some countries to implement the above. Cronies or political associates are 
sometimes appointed into sensitive positions in some countries to cover the corrupt antics of 
the people that provided or facilitated the appointments.     
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and inseparability 
There is also an initiative by Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation-APEC that wanted to 
promote transparency and focussed on corruption and money laundering. This is relevant to 
the inseparability of “dirty money” and private to private corruption. Under the ‘’Busan 
Declaration,’’ APEC leaders agreed that the implementation by their respectable relevant 
economies of principles of United Nations Convention against Corruption (Article 14 
Measures to prevent money-laundering, Article 23 laundering of the proceeds of crime, 
Article 24 Concealment) can have a positive impact in advancing their commitment towards 
a cleaner and more honest and transparent community in the Asia Pacific region. The writer 
sees the above approach as an indication that the inseparability or convergence question, as 
                                                     
123
 Ibid No 95 p. 13 
 57 
 
being recognised by the organisation. This therefore evidences the fact that the problem is not 
fictional.  
Financial Action Task Force Style Regional Bodies - (FSRBs) and inseparability 
Very relevant to the inseparability question is the impact of other FATF-Style Regional 
Bodies (FSRBs). We have nine FSRBs located in different parts of the world. But for ease of 
reference, the writer will concentrate on a few. The statement attributed to Eastern and 
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) is of essence. In summary, its 
Strategic Plan stresses the need for the appreciation of corruption and money-laundering link.   
The difficulty in this region is simply that the topical issue of ML has been totally 
misunderstood and regarded as a separate and independent matter. Evidentially, most 
countries have actually developed financial sector reform strategies and anti-corruption 
strategies which have failed to address the FATF recommendations. Country policy makers 
have to be aware that AML/CTF measures are very important to financial development. It 
must be noted that money-laundering is simply the other side of corruption and other criminal 
activities. Needless to say, corruption is also one of the predicate offences of money-
laundering.  
When you cut off the means to use the proceeds of crime, this serves as a big deterrent. The 
ability for countries to investigate and at the same time repatriate corruption proceeds can 
obviously provide a respectable succour in terms of millions of dollars in returned revenue. 
On account of this, it is very essential that the AML programmes are not only fully integrated 
within the national development plans but also within financial sector reform and anti-
corruption programmes.
124
       
It is submitted that there is no gain-saying of the fact that ESAAMLG has beamed more light 
on the inseparability matter and recognised that large amount of ‘‘dirty money’’ is laundered 
which is acquired through corruption.     
In fact, the Inter-governmental Action Group against money-laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA) in its report on corruption-AML linkage; titled ‘’Corruption and Money 
Laundering in West Africa: Assessment of Problem Status and Effectiveness of National and 
Regional Control Initiatives’’ is clearly of the opinion that the report has revealed among 
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other things that the link or nexus between corruption and money laundering must be seen as 
a very strong manifestation of the evil of organised criminal activities. In fact, the very weak 
compliance level with the extant AML laws can rightly be seen as a result of corruption. 
Corruption not only produces, but evidently protects money laundering activities. As such, 
this assertion must be seen as the main message in GIABA investigation.
125
It is the 
contention of this writer, that the above strongly evidences the convergence issue and adds 
serious impetus to the dilemma.      
Other matters arising on the issue of inseparability 
Granted that there is a blurring of distinction between public and private bribery, several 
states are concerned about private sector bribery. This can be attributed in no small measure 
to the growth of international business and the growth of private sector which admittedly is 
larger than public sector in most countries. It has been noted, that the bribery of corporate 
officials, has a transnational connotation; just as the bribery of public official which has 
transnational effects into the public sector of many countries.  
Private sector corruption has the capacity to distort the efficiency and credibility of free open 
and global competition, and would destroy trust in the markets and eventually be a major 
barrier in creating an unbiased playing field in international trade. Public and private 
confidence in the rule of law is undermined when private sector corruption is tolerated. 
Political lobbyists can be used in private sector corruption to destroy the reputation of an 
organization. Attempts would be made to launder some of the proceeds thereby showcasing 
the inseparability matter. 
We should be aware that the private sector should be seen to be a major player in the 
inseparability issues that evidently involves money laundering. The activities of the private 
sector should never be ignored when you assess corruption as a facilitative element in money-
laundering. It is corruption that is used to make sure that this facilitative element is a must in 
a bid to secure the cooperation of the bankers, accountants, lawyers, remittance agents and a 
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lot of other accredited gate-keepers for the purpose of concealing massive funds that are 
laundered and ensure access to profits.
126
 
The writer has so far, advocated for an approach of non-distinction between public and 
private corruption. Other legislations geared towards dealing with the instrumentalities of 
private corruption point to the direction that proceeds of corruption are laundered to enable 
reuse into the formal economy. This is a glaring indication of inseparability of “dirty money” 
and private to private corruption.  
These instruments include but not limited to the followings: African Union (AU) Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003.
127
UNCAC 2003, Framework Decision of 
Council of European Union on Combating Corruption in Private Sector 2003,
128
Council of 
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999,
129
and Council of Europe Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption 1999.
130
 
The writer contends and surmises that the notion that ‘‘dirty money’’/corruption and money- 
laundering are separate matters may have been necessitated on account of the fact that 
initially corruption and money laundering were assessed by the relevant authorities as 
‘‘stand-alone-matters’’ and/or ‘‘distant relations.’’ However, the governmental responses 
should have been integrated. This disconnect is a product of distinct historical origins on the 
efforts to attack each independently plus the obvious non-flexible bureaucratic allocation of 
labour between anti-corruption agencies and AML agencies.  
2.3 Anglo-American and less developed countries’ approach to the idea of dirty money 
and private to private corruption. 
Indeed, and historically possibly rightly so, the style or manner with which the Anglo-
American and LDCs approached or tackled the monster of ‘’dirty money’’ and corruption -
both private and public can be seen from both the criminal and civil law angles. There are 
issues like extradition, dual criminality, mutual legal assistance, forfeiture, plus constructive 
trust matters that were used to bring the perpetrators to justice. Jurisdictionally, there were 
problems that one can possibly indicate were as a result of divergent recognition of the issues.  
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Initial Legislations, International Chamber of Commerce and Max-Plank Institute Study 
Legislation to confront the problem of corruption was put in place at different times in 
various jurisdictions. It has been observed, that public sector corruption was the first to attract 
sanctions for a considerable length of time. The spoils were laundered and this helped or 
prompted the convergence matter. Notably, the sanctions for private sector bribery were 
criminalized in many jurisdictions in the last 140 years. In the Anglo-American legal system, 
the common law offence of bribery was only applicable to the bench. As time went by, this 
attitude was changed. This was later extended to public officials and public functions - 
typical example being voting during elections. The offence of bribery, strictly speaking, was 
restricted at common law to corrupt payments that were made to people that only participated 
in public duties.
131
                     
In the United States of America (USA), in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it 
came to the fore that many US States passed legislation or general statutes. These 
specifically, outlawed and actually criminalized agents’ bribery. In addition, they also 
prohibited bribery in some industries. In some States, bribery of lawyers, appraisers, 
architects, even physicians and accountants were banned. Some of the USA Federal Statutes 
actually criminalised bribery in commercial context. This involved certain interstate trade and 
bribery was used to procure interstate transportation. Some people that appeared in television 
quiz performances paid bribes.
132
      
In the UK, the common law offence of bribery, which we obviously (at least in the 
assessment of many) know, can eventually be a comfortable source to trigger laundering. 
This was initially and legislatively backed by Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889. 
This criminalized public sector corruption. Interestingly, private commercial corruption was 
made a criminal offence by the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. This legislation, it is 
noted, dealt with both private and public agents. This particular legislation was not actually 
enacted to fundamentally deal with corruption. But it was directed to or aimed at the 
principal/agent relationship noticeable in business interactions.
133
Indeed, this British 
legislation provided the rightful pattern or model for a mimicked or similar legislation in 
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most Commonwealth polities. These include the jurisdictions of Australia, Canada, Hong 
Kong, India, Singapore and New Zealand.  
Prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 in England was only triggered or 
brought about with the consent of the Attorney General, a senior government minister. This 
was one of the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916 directed towards ‘’dirty money.’’ 
In fact, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA) had extra-territorial 
application when the corrupt act was committed by a UK national or a body incorporated 
under the UK law if the act was done within the UK.  
Above gainsaid, presently, statutes in various countries have criminalised ‘’dirty money’’ 
albeit through prohibition of corruption which usually leads to money laundering. In fact, in a 
joint study that was conducted by the ICC and the respectable Max Plank Institute for 
Foreign and International Criminal Law, it was indicated that as of 2008, that 10 out of 13 
OECD countries that were surveyed, had bribery statutes. It was noted that in the study, there 
were differing policy goals amongst the countries that criminalised corruption.
134
          
The report noted that in view of the fact that the various legal interests stand protected under 
criminal law on issues of bribery, it deemed it necessary to separate these under three 
headings. These include protection of corporate assets, shareholder rights, and property 
interests; penalizing the violation of civil law obligations, like the obligations of employees to 
employers, or agents to principals; plus minimising unfair competition.
135
        
As a result of the divergent approaches employed by various jurisdictions in analysing the 
“dirty money” concept evidenced in corruption definition - more particularly private 
corruption - the report noted that this logjam has led to differences in application of 
legislation. The proof of such offence therefore, becomes even harder, if this involves parties 
in different jurisdictions,
136
inclusive of the fact that the proceeds are laundered 
internationally, thereby prompting the convergence dilemma.  
It is as a result of the above, that at various periods, the UK enacted some legislation to at 
least tackle an aspect of the problem. For instance, the amendments in the repealed ATCSA 
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2001 allowed an expanded jurisdictional reach.
137
Of course, most people are aware that the 
present 2010 UK Bribery Act has its jurisdictional and extra-territorial reach. D. 
Chaikin
138
indicated that the expansion of the jurisdictional net is a good way of improving 
the effects of the criminal law.               
Extradition and dual criminality   
Continuing on the present discourse, the author notes that when a culprit is identified as 
having acquired ‘’dirty money’’ through corruption or other ‘’facets of dirtiness,’’ the legal 
instrument of international extradition can be employed to bring the person to book. 
However, this approach is fraught with difficulties. International extradition that is 
considered to be a more intrusive manner of cooperation has additional obstacles like: the 
difficulty of entering into bilateral arrangements with states whose legal systems are based on 
different ideological and political perspective that can result in an absence of trust. This is 
vital in any effective extradition marriage.
139
  
There is also the principle of non-extradition of nationals that we see in some non-common 
law jurisdictions. Japan refused the request from Peru for the extradition of Alberto Fujimori 
a former President of Peru claiming that he was a Japanese citizen. Again, you will come up 
with prima facia or probable cause evidentiary requirement that is a very old extradition 
requirement that is noticeable in some jurisdictions. There are the issues of expansive reasons 
for refusing extradition; such as severe penalties (death penalties) or humanitarian reasons 
which some states observe.
140
 
It will appear rather very surprising for the United Kingdom to grant an extradition request 
from Malaysia for a drug trafficking offence of its citizen. Drug-trafficking carries a death 
penalty in Malaysia and there is no provision for death penalty in the United Kingdom. The 
United Kingdom at the time of writing has triggered article 50
141
to opt out of the European 
Union after the Brexit vote and negotiations would be difficult and muddy. The implication 
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here with regard to extradition would be that the UK will no longer be part of the European 
arrest warrant system. But we still need to recognise that the UK had extradition 
arrangements with several other European countries prior to the creation of the European 
arrest warrant, but on the other hand it did not with some other countries, notably Spain. The 
UK on several occasions extradited people from other countries to its territories to face trials 
on corruption and money laundering.
142
The UK sought and extradited a former Nigeria 
governor James Ibori from Dubai. He was eventually convicted in the UK for money 
laundering and has served his sentence.       
The former petroleum minister of Nigeria Mrs Diezani Alison-Madueke forfeited properties 
(final forfeiture) worth over £1.5b to the Nigeria government. She was on bail in London and 
investigated in the UK by the National Crime Agency (NCA) for her alleged corrupt practices 
when she was a government minister. The Nigeria corruption agency - Economic Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) commenced action in Nigeria for her extradition in order for her 
to defend her corruption charges.
143
          
The writer summits, that the dirty money/money laundering question of international 
cooperation or approach that has thrown up the convergence quagmire is similar or akin to 
investigating international financial crime in its ramifications. In point of fact, the process of 
extradition is cumbersome. It is time consuming, expensive and possibly an inefficient way 
of international co-operation. However, some people may disagree and be on the other side of 
the thinking spectrum.    
The author notes, that there is a wild variety of practice among states on the dual criminality 
matter in extradition. Some states are inclined to applying a more technical approach to this. 
It means that there must be a corresponding or conceptual similarity between the offence in 
both the requesting and the requested state. Most states do not follow this system. And there 
is no requirement that the crime be described in the same manner as the crime in the 
requested country. 
Australia, is a typical example, where in practice there is the relaxation of the dual 
criminality, by adopting the ‘‘conduct test.’’ The pronouncement of Justice Dean in the 
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Australian case of Commonwealth v Riley,
144
presents undoubtedly, an interesting 
understanding of this issue. It must be preferred that in ‘‘conduct test cases,’’ what the 
authorities should be concerned with should be the substance of the matter and not its 
technical form. This is likely to command a general acceptance.  
The requirements of double criminality should be seen to be satisfied, when the acts in both 
countries are seen to be criminal, irrespective of the fact, that the two offences have different 
names and elements. Primary emphasis, should be placed on the acts that constitute the 
offence on the warrant, rather than the usual general theoretical correspondence between the 
legal elements of the offence, that are alleged to be committed against the law of the 
requesting state and some offence that are recognised by the law of the requested state.   
The writer, agrees with this and notes that UNCAC adopts a ‘‘flexible conduct oriented 
approach’’ to dual criminality.145It indicated that the Convention will apply to the ‘’dirty 
money’’ offence (corruption) where the extradition is sought for an offence that is punishable 
under the laws (domestic) of both countries. The above article is subject to article 43: 
‘‘In matters of international co-operation in criminal matters, when ever dual criminality is 
considered a requirement, it shall be deemed fulfilled irrespective of whether the laws of the 
requested State Party shall place the offence within the same category of the offence or 
denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting State Party, if the conduct 
underlying the offence for which assistance is sought is a criminal offence under the laws of 
both State Parties.’’146 
The writer, submits, that the whole thing hinges on the substance and not the form of the 
offence as corroborated above. The author notes that Article 43 displays a similarity that is 
recognizable in most international treaties. But irrespective of the fact that it contains or 
assimilates a ‘‘conduct-oriented’’ approach of dual criminality, this does not exclude the 
difficulties inherent in the requirement. D. Chaikin a notable legal author gives support to 
this. He is of the opinion that the application of the double criminality principle may still 
require a translation or substitution of certain factors. These can include the locality, 
institutions, officials and procedures.
147
         
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) 
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It is noted that Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) is vital in dealing with the convergence 
matters involving “dirty money.” Holistically, there is a much weaker case to propagate to 
retain dual criminality in MLA than extradition. The reason is simple - MLA is less intrusive 
on the rights of individuals. As will be elucidated in further segment of this thesis, Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) recommended that countries should do their best to provide MLA 
even in the absence of dual criminality. We have to be aware that the Harare Scheme
148
does 
not usually require dual criminality as a mandatory reason to refusing MLA. The Scheme as 
amended in 1999 recognises that there are negative cost implication matters not in favour of 
LDCs. It therefore, set some guidelines in apportioning costs on MLA with special attention 
to the needs of LDCs. The author assesses this as a good approach.       
Civil recovery approach 
So far, we have focused on some of the criminal dimensions in the approach used to confront 
the culprits in the ‘’dirty money’’ convergence issues. In some instances, the civil law 
approach can be used and considered effective in ameliorating the problems. Indeed, when 
the culprits have through their criminal ingenuity, effectively acquired their ‘’dirty money,’’ 
laundered all or some of them, the establishments can employ civil mechanisms to get this 
loot back or at least a sizeable amount. This can be done through civil forfeiture of corrupt 
proceeds. It does not necessarily mean that it is only liquid assets that this is directed to.  
Several countries including the United States, Australia, Nigeria and the United Kingdom do 
have civil mechanisms or laws that permit civil forfeiture of illicit assets. Interestingly, in the 
US, the Federal Statute on civil forfeiture is arguably regarded (in the minds of many) as one 
of the most robust or effective for the recovery of corrupt proceeds, albeit ‘’dirty money’’ 
proceeds emanating from foreign offences.
149
18 USC ss 981 is the general civil forfeiture 
provision in US and it is very wide. It contains long list of offences of which the proceeds 
may be subject to forfeiture. The good thing here is that any property that is subject of ‘’dirty 
money’’ and has passed through the convergence process or in violation of US Bank Secrecy 
Act 1970 (BSA) may be forfeited. This is sometimes called civil seizure or civil judicial 
forfeiture. The action here is simply against the property and not the actual person involved 
or the defendant.  
                                                     
148
Mutual Legal Assistance Scheme amongst Commonwealth nations   
149
See 18 U.S.C N 981 
 66 
 
S.D. Casella is understandably, an authority in asset forfeiture matters in the United States of 
America. He indicated that civil forfeiture should not be seen as a criminal matter. In this, the 
government in place must file a clearly separate civil action that is against the stated property. 
This must be ‘‘in rem.’’ The government will then judicially proceed and prove on a balance 
of probability that the said property was actually got from crime or used to commit it. Civil 
forfeiture does not really depend on a criminal conviction. And the action itself can be 
commenced civilly before indictment, after indictment or even if there is no indictment to 
start with.
150
   
The writer notes that the provision does not require a concurrent criminal matter against a 
specific defendant. In fact, this can be used in circumstances where the money launderer is 
either dead, missing, cannot be located or even a fugitive.
151
In the UK, Part 5 of the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002 covers this. In this, the State is not required to prove its case by relying on 
the established criminal standard of proof - the essential ingredient or parameter, is for the 
state to indicate, that based on just probable cause, the property is subject to forfeiture. This 
process will apply even if the property is held in favour of a nominee and it is shown that 
he/she is subject to money laundering but there is insufficient evidence to get a criminal 
conviction.  
We have to note that it is a requirement in civil forfeiture matters that the property must be 
traceable to the offence. A former Nigerian governor from Bayelsa State in Nigeria, Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha who died in 2015, had his Maryland home in USA forfeited in this manner 
and substantial amount of cash in United Kingdom. Late Col Qadhafi’s son had his property 
estimated to be worth £10m forfeited in UK. Another former Nigeria Governor of oil rich 
Delta State, who was convicted of money laundering and corruption, was released in Dec 
2016 after completing his jail term in UK. Additionally, the US DoJ secured a restraining 
order for forfeiture of more than $3m looted funds and a mansion in Houston Texas owned 
by him.
152
  
In Nigeria, $15m was ordered by a Nigeria court to be forfeited to Federal Government of 
Nigeria. This sum was purported to be a subject of bribery to the corruption agency of 
Nigeria - EFCC to scupper the trial of James Ibori. In August 2016, EFCC under sections 26 
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and 29 of EFCC Act 2004 applied to the Federal High Court for an interim Forfeiture Order 
and had two shopping malls belonging to Gesil Khan located in Bayelsa State and over 
£100,000 forfeited. She was the resident commissioner for Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) for the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria. Bribes were distributed 
and allegedly facilitated by ex-Nigeria Petroleum minister Mrs Doziani Alison-Madueke.
153
  
Interestingly, on 16
th
 February 2017, a Federal High Court in Lagos ordered the final 
forfeiture of N34 billion linked to her to the Federal Government of Nigeria that was stolen 
from Nigeria National Petroleum Company-NNPC. The investigators traced the looted funds 
to three banks in Nigeria.
154
Wonders they say shall never end in Nigeria! The sum of 
$9.8million and £74,000 was recovered hidden in a safe in a house owned by a former group 
managing director (GMD) of NNPC Dr Andrew Yakubu. This money was forfeited to the 
Nigeria Government in February 2017.
155
           
Constructive trust dimension 
The author submits and recognises that proceeds of bribery in whatever guise is “dirty 
money,” even if this emanates from a fiduciary or any agent. The process of a civil liability 
for a corrupt agent through the doctrine of constructive trust, it is surmised, is an effective 
way of stripping the profits of “dirty money” or corruption whenever it is identified and 
judicially pursued. This is more likely in countries that apply the English concepts of equity. 
In fact, trustees, servants, employees, agents and even directors who accept bribes plus 
making additional profit from what was accepted, and eventually betray the trust of their 
beneficiaries, masters, and principals may be seen as fiduciaries. They are not supposed to 
keep money that they have made through bribery, without the consent of their principal/s. 
Bribery is always a dominant element in corruption and is prevalent worldwide. This is why 
it is good that the principle of constructive trust must be applied. An agent that receives bribe 
holds that in constructive trust for his principal. If the agent is an officer of the state, then the 
principal is the government that he serves. The leading case here is Attorney-General for 
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Hong Kong v Reid.
156
In fact, in this case, Reid had already been prosecuted successfully and 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The case was still commenced. This emphasised the 
different roles of the criminal and civil law mechanisms. The criminal law can be used at 
least, albeit theoretically, to appease the society, whilst the civil law makes sure that the 
defendant does not enjoy the fruits of the crime.       
It is noted, that at the trial of Reid, he was ordered to pay back the funds of which he did not 
comply. Instead, he used part of the money to buy good properties in New Zealand, his native 
country. An action was instituted to recover the properties by Hong Kong Government. The 
Privy Council entered judgement in favour of the government because the properties were 
seen to be held in trust by Reid in favour of his principal. This is irrespective of the fact that 
the properties may have appreciated in value and in addition to the fact that the money used 
to purchase them may not all be from bribery. The court could have devised a way to separate 
the non-bribery funds if this was proved.            
Lord Templeman was very clear on this. He ruled that a bribe if accepted by a fiduciary in 
breach of his duty must be seen to hold this bribe on trust for his principal. Even if the 
property increased in value, the fiduciary is not in any manner entitled to the surplus in 
excess of the initial value of the bribe. This is on account of the fact that he is not allowed by 
any means to make a profit out of his breach of duty.
157
    
Suffice to say, that it is recognised that in the Anglo-American common law systems and 
some other jurisdiction(s) like South Africa, the civil enforcement apparatus have 
considerable advantages when compared with the criminal side of events. This can be in 
terms of detection, flexibility, remedies and resources. ‘’Dirty money’’ that comes through 
corruption is more likely to be detected by the victims.  
A competitor that ended up not benefiting from a valuable contractual scenario or has had its 
employees thoroughly suborned, can seek civil judicial succour. However, there could be this 
problem of proving that the aggrieved competitor could have succeeded in getting the 
contract and must find a way of seeking other kind of liability. Arguably, private litigants do 
enjoy the advantage of flexibility in prompting a law suit in deep contrast to narrow 
constraints of indictments. In fact, private remedies in their ramifications are gateways to 
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compensatory remedies and other potential measures that have serious potentials to deprive 
the ‘’dirty money’’ culprit to enjoy the gains. The great advantage of civil law is that there 
are some speedy procedures in place to freeze the proceeds of ‘’dirty money.’’158This has 
been demonstrated in many instances.  
2.4 The lubricating role of corruption in enhancing money laundering stages.  
The author notes, that possibly unbeknownst to many, judicial notice has long been taken of 
the fact that corruption is amorphous and is in certain instances always interacting with 
money laundering and this has prompted the convergence question. As a result, it has been 
identified as a dominant facilitative element to the origins, stages or what one may call 
‘’artificial stratifications’’ identified as money laundering processes. The earlier part of this 
thesis indicated the difficulty associated with finding a conflating acceptable global definition 
of corruption. This is as a result of divergent jurisdictional differences. In the same vein, one 
can be excused to assert in a cautious manner that same is applicable in arriving at a 
definition of money laundering when one takes into cognizance jurisdictional perspectives to 
this.    
In the UK and other common law countries, as well as in continental Europe
159
money-
laundering is seen as taking action with any form of property that can encompass intangibles 
derived from criminal acts that want to obscure the beneficial owners.
160
In the US, money 
laundering is seen as engaging in financial transactions that usually conceal the identity, 
source, or destination of illegally acquired money. In other cases, the offence of handling the 
crime proceeds, do include money laundering.
161
            
The definition of money laundering, ranges from the authoritative language of statutes to the 
‘’punchy’’ comments of judges. B. Rider indicated that it amounts to a process which 
obscures the origin of money and its source.
162
Of course, it is because too much attention was 
directed understandably to the crusade against the drug trade, that the topic of money 
laundering has been perceived to be somehow synonymous with the subject or debate on 
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tracing the illicit gains acquired from the drug trade. This, sounds very problematic as not all 
crimes as we know involve a continuous enterprise.         
In point of fact, many people believe that money laundering has a seamless and stratified 
process - placement, layering and integration. But this view can rightly be said to be just 
academic in nature. Having said this, the author would want to adopt subsequently, this 
academic seamless process noted above for the purposes of the analysis. B. Rider captured 
this vividly. It is noteworthy that we have to be very mindful of the fact that the discussion of 
the processes involved in money laundering has been very limited and essentially derivative 
outside the USA. Additionally, it is a fact that a limited few have recognised that even the 
present traditional way of laundering involves a series of actions and is not classified as a 
seamless exercise. In the UK for instance, until very recently, the need to intricately examine 
some sophisticated attempts to obscure the origin and the control of funds were rarely 
encountered by lawyers and the police. Due to this, there arose the tendency for people to 
think that the laundering process is simply very simplistic even when drug matters are 
involved. In fact, laundering usually encapsulates various stages and it is a fact that different 
legal and enforcement considerations do apply.
163
                            
It is advantageous to add that the term ‘‘money laundering’’ has been indicated to originate in 
the modern era from the ‘‘Mafia’’ corrupt ownerships of the various significant and intensive 
washing saloons in the USA.
164
The gangsters in order to further hide their illicit generated 
money got from such ventures like extortion, gambling, prostitution and bootleg liquor, had 
the generated income mixed with the money they earned from the Laundromats. This was 
competently supervised by Al Capone. It is on record that he was in 1931 convicted for tax 
evasion. We have to note that money laundering as an offence did not exist at that time.
165
        
Aside above, ‘‘money laundering’’ as an expression has also been indicated to have three 
stages - placement, layering and integration - this is of fairly recent origin. The above term 
gained serious prominence colloquially during the presidency of Richard Nixon during the 
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We should be aware that the processes of money laundering do not necessarily follow this 
pattern. And that for each academic stage, corruption one way or the other permeates each 
stage to give it what the author has analysed as ‘‘a stamp of legitimate stance.’’ The players 
are so criminally imbued or sophisticated that money laundering does not sequentially follow 
a straight jacket or one dimensional mannerism of the above order.
167
The launderers are very 
possibly a step ahead of the various anti-money laundering (AML) mechanisms. This is why 
the law in this area is not static and is always evolving.   
The academic money laundering stages  
It is vital to bear in mind that money laundering is a process. In fact, without the network of 
banks and other financial institutions to facilitate the three stages of money laundering and to 
lend an air of respectability to the proceeds when they eventually reappear, money laundering 
would be virtually impossible. Therefore, banks and other financial institutions have been 
positioned in the forefront of the fight against this.
168
This is often a complicated set of 
activities and mostly not evidenced as a singular act. Of course, it is in an effort to present a 
more robust analysis of the phenomenon, that it has become somehow academically 
expositional to present a three pronged approach to the analysis. An Australian Report 
indicated:  
‘’Such a scheme would take raw proceeds of crime, held by the offender, manoeuvre them 
through a process that would conceal their source and confuse and break the money trail, 
and then return them to the offender legitimised and ready for further safe use.’’169 
Placement is the initial stage in which the ‘’dirty money’’ launderer attempts to put the loot 
or money into the financial system. Here, the journey starts to transfer the money from the 
informal economy into the formal economy. Informal is employed here by the author to 
emphasise that the loot or money was not legitimately acquired. And in order for this loot to 
be enjoyed, there must be a transition into the legitimate economy where the culprit will be in 
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a better position to enjoy it. Therefore, for the transition to take place, the ‘’dirty money’’ 
starts its journey for legitimisation from the placement stage for the money to be mixed with 
the legitimate money in the system. 
It is good to emphasis here, that the placement stage comprises two stages - primary 
placement and secondary placement. The launderer will attempt to deposit his cash into the 
banking system. This is arguably the most difficult of all the stages. The launderer runs a very 
high risk of being caught with his loot. It is at this stage that corruption steps in to lubricate 
the process. But the launderer has a very strong potential to evade the regulatory radar placed 
before him by conniving with corrupt bank officials and other gatekeepers to evade the 
system or regulations put in place. Primary placement ipso facto can involve the use of the 
‘‘structuring’’ or the ‘‘smurfing’’ methods in banking jargon. Large quantities of money are 
systematically broken up into small amounts and deposited to evade the reporting scrutiny 
from government agencies whilst the officials look the other way - because they have been 
compromised via bribery. In the US, any sum that is above $10,000 mandatorily is subject to 
be reported.
170
 
For example in Nigeria, it was noticed that many government officials that have amassed 
wealth through corruption were able to have their money comfortably placed into the banking 
system. They could not be able to do this without the connivance of the bank officials that 
have been compromised by bribery (this is lubrication at work). Some of these people are 
PEPs and through their influence, were able to place their money into the system. And some 
also have substantial influence in the financial system they use by way of ownership of these 
banks - hence the capability to circumvent the system.  
Secondary placement can exhibit the characteristics of converting the money into different 
assets, the use of front men, and the setting up of legal persons or in some instances the use of 
some insurance policies.
171
On this note, it must be taken into account that the services of 
some professionals like lawyers and accountants are usually employed to achieve this. 
Granted that there are bad eggs in every sphere of life, Ibori’s lawyer Mr Badrash Gohil was 
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for the part he played in laundering the loot the former 
governor acquired. This lawyer was described as the ‘’architect’’ by the judge. The point the 
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writer is making is simply that professionals and other gatekeepers are complicit in 
lubricating the various stages by using bribery to oil the money laundering process.
172
At this 
stage, the launderer can significantly influence the process by even purchasing the financial 
institution or dishonestly, setting up one in an offshore centre.                           
The second stratification is the laundering process itself. And this is made up of two basic 
parts - washing and layering. Washing refers to the process of removing the illegitimate toga 
of the loot or “dirty money.” Admittedly, three techniques can be generically noticed here. 
The launderer can firstly mix the ‘’dirty money’’ with clean ones. This can be achieved by 
mixing a lawfully derived income from a business with the unlawful loot in a cash intensive 
business like a pizzeria
173
or by under-invoicing the exports and over-invoicing the imports of 
an export/import business having the hallmarks of a commodity company. Secondly, is to 
transform the medium of the money. For example, cash can be changed into casino chips and 
back into money. This makes it very difficult to differentiate the ‘’dirty money’’ and the 
original casino winnings. Thirdly, the launderers can conceal the beneficial owners by 
formulating sophisticated financial vehicles designed to cheat the system - these can include 
fake mortgages, and use of solicitor trust accounts.
174
In all of the above, corruption in 
different guise is employed to enhance the process.  
Layering will require a systematic web of serial and possible parallel transaction concocted in 
such a manner as to make it very difficult or virtually impossible to trace the paper trail. 
Here, the previous monetary movement is designed to be lost to the investigators. It is here 
that the Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) are involved in a very significant manner. The 
essence is to make sure that routing money via various jurisdictions would make it very 
difficult for the investigative and regulatory apparatus to trace the loot. There could be a clash 
of bureaucratic red tape due to divergent jurisdictional legal undertones. Again at this stage, 
inefficient cooperation of criminal prosecution, tainted with judicial corruption would 
enhance the layering stage at the convergence point.        
Integration is the last process. Here there is the presence of the illicit money being ‘’brought 
home to rest’’ in the formal or main economy. These could include specific stocks and/or 
direct investment in real estate. There were cases of individuals who attempted to integrate 
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their loot into the legitimate economy. For instance, Dr Erastus Akingbola was found liable in 
2012 by a London court for buying real estate in London worth £8.5m. He was a former 
managing director of a collapsed bank in Nigeria - Intercontinental Bank PLC presently 
known as Access Bank.
175
Other cases abound. In all the three stages, corruption was actively 
employed as a lubricating tool in them.        
There are other methods of integration and the loan-back technique can also be used. This can 
be seen to be possibly the neatest way of bringing back the loot home in form of a loan. What 
happens is that the culprits will arrange dubiously for the money they have in an offshore 
account to be given to them in form of a loan in their company in an onshore place. This 
money will now be transferred completely free of taxes and can still be used to cut taxes that 
are due on domestic income. The borrower has a legal obligation to repay his loan once it is 
incurred and with its interest. The situation will be that this process can be repeated 
successfully many times with the consequent result that the money laundering integration 
process increases in expansive diameter.
176
 
Money laundering as we can decipher, involves a series of stages and each has its own 
characteristics but the dynamics are not well understood. It is reiterated that the money 
laundering stages must be appreciated to comprise different stages and each has a peculiar 
characteristics. People that are charged with the detection of such issues must be alert to the 
implication of a process that has been meticulously designed to minimise exposure and 
detection. But the truth is that the legislators have severally failed in their appreciation of the 
nature of money laundering in terms of its character plus objective. It is possibly right to state 
that in this situation, they have taken for granted a somewhat stylised model which does not 
really conform to the realities on the ground. The criminals involved in this are often very 
sophisticated and usually have the capacity for evasion and adaptation for any legislative 
threat.
177
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CHAPTER 3  
The domino-effects of corruption and money laundering in less-developed countries 
3.1 Introduction 
Structural approach 
Indeed, we have noticed so far that corruption is amorphous in character and contains various 
facets. The components (bribery, extortion, embezzlement etc) and other illegal activities 
(including tax evasion and people smuggling etc) can be said to be very significant 
contributors to the generation of ‘’dirty money.’’ The generation of this ‘’dirty money’’ from 
the informal economy to the formal one must in most cases transmute via a process. This 
process is experienced, via a convergence point which brings into play, the money laundering 
process.  
In point of fact, one is tempted to ask the question - what is the motivation for people to go 
into this exercise - corruption and money laundering? The possible reasons or stimuli in a 
holistic basis on why people participate in corruption and money laundering can be said to be 
vast. The participants or culprits have possibly looked into the ‘’cost-benefits-scenario’’ and 
also the lax regulatory setups in the respective jurisdictions that they use.           
Aside indicating the causative factors, the author will make a significant attempt to show that 
post-causal affects of corruption and money-laundering, evidently, have some negatives on 
the various polities that this has been fostered on. The domino-implications in less developed 
countries are massive, albeit via deprivation of sound standard of living, destabilization of 
positive economic growth, triggering of reputation risks, disincentive to expected foreign 
direct investments, distortion of political processes, erosion of proper economic planning, 
loss of revenue etc. The writer calls this a ‘’seismic commercial detonation.’’   
In the last part of this chapter, aside the causal and the negative effects of the problems due to 
corruption and money laundering there has been a difficult assessment of the quantum of the 
damage. Each source or assessment is evidently engaged in guesswork on the actual quantum 
or figure of the colossal loss. They are all engaged in ‘’guesstimates’’ as indicated by B. 
Rider. The present writer agrees with this. Differently stated, the point as he and others are 
making, is simply that it is impossible to come up with a figure that one can be confident is at 
all accurate. It is as simple as that. ‘’Guesstimates’’ are indeed what they are.  
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3.2 Possible causes of corruption and money laundering: A holistic overview 
Corruption and money laundering are all facets of financial crime which can also be seen as 
economic crimes. Corruption is a negative activity.
178
Perhaps, it is right to look into what 
motivates people to be corrupt and have the temptation to commit crime. It is safe to say or 
assume that the possible explanations for the causes plus the occurrences of corrupt activities 
can be located in the interactions of the individual and his societal structures. Attempts have 
been made to explain the above from a variety of perspectives. There are the public choice; 
bad apple, organisational culture; clashing moral values; the ethos of public administration 
plus the correlation theories.
179
  
The public choice theory, explains that people are usually portrayed as rationally very 
calculative in character. They later decide to become corrupt and engage in money 
laundering. This is because the expected advantages of the corrupt activity outweigh its 
expected disadvantages. It can be classified as a situation of possible penalty and the chances 
of being caught during the act. This can be seen as a scenario of cost benefit analysis.
180
       
The bad apple theory seeks to justify these economic crimes to be located in the existence of 
individuals with very faulty character - the so called bad apple. It indicates or postulates that 
there is a causal chain or relationship from bad character to a corrupt act. Put differently, the 
cause of corruption and money laundering can be found in a defective human character and a 
predisposition towards criminal activity.
181
    
Organizational culture theory focuses on the culture and structure of the organization that the 
agent gets his remuneration. In fact, there is this underlying assumption that there is a certain 
group culture that latently engraves in peoples mind or mental state to follow and participate 
in corruption and money laundering.
182
This type of behavioural pattern can be noticed in the 
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financial sector with particular reference to the banks. It has been noticed that most people 
that are employed in the financial sector are fundamentally people of ‘’good behaviour.’’ But 
once ‘‘inside,’’ they tend to be initiated or influenced in some ‘‘anti-regulatory activities’’ 
that are present in the sector. They are tempted and eventually join in the corruption and 
money laundering activities in the banking system. This negative group syndrome quickly 
catches up with them, and they, in most instances would be caught by the long arm of the 
law.       
The testimony of Mr Antonio Geraldo before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation 
by the United States Senate on abuse of private banking services by money launderers as far 
back as 1999 elucidates this. By way of introduction, this man was reputed to be of good 
character. He began his career as a private banker in 1986 at Citibank, worked for Bankers 
Trust, and American Express in a similar capacity. He was a key participant in laundering 
money for the likes of former President Omar Bongo of Gambia, Raul Salinas de Gortari - 
the brother of former Mexico president, Mohammed and Ibrahim Abacha - the sons of former 
Nigeria president. The man was eventually convicted of money laundering. 
The exchange between Senator Collins and Giraldo will help to elucidate the organisational 
culture impact on Geraldo. It was put to him (Geraldo) that he should be aware that there 
were a lot of procedures, regulations and policies that CitiBank had in place that should have 
actually prevented the issue of money laundering that was highlighted in the bank. It was 
evident that what took place was regarded as a culture of impunity tacitly geared towards 
neglecting the compliance mechanisms in the bank. It was epitomised with the attitude of 
indifference on where the bank got its business. The situation with the bank was analysed as a 
clear turning of blind eye to where they got their business. They were not interested in asking 
very penetrative questions on the source of funds.
183
  
It must be taken into account that the above assertion was corroborated by Geraldo and was 
necessitated by the prevalent work culture in the financial institution. It was made clear that 
the attitude was as a result of the engraved work mannerisms that the bankers encountered in 
their work place.
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The writer, summits, that there are many ‘‘Geraldos’’ in the financial sector who have been 
caught up with the ‘’cultural bug’’ exhibited on account of the ‘’ethical indeterminacy’’185at 
work in the financial markets. Social norms may be shaped by culture. Policies that are 
usually put in place by financial institutions like banks to deal with corruption and money 
laundering, will only be effective, if supported by appropriate work culture that specifically 
re-instils ‘’good levels of ethical determinacy.’’ If the work culture in an organisation does 
not support compliance, the tendency would be that you are not going to get very far in 
tackling the scourge of corruption and money laundering. The financial sector and other 
professional enablers are serious participants due to their work culture in this.   
In January 2017, German bank Deutsche Bank was fined £500m by the regulatory authorities 
for using their bank as a conduit for money laundering. The bank allowed gangs to move 
money from Russia by using the technique of ‘‘mirror’’ trades that involved the purchase and 
sale of identical securities in different jurisdictions. This was jointly investigated by both 
London and New York authorities. Tellingly, the New York authorities said that Deutsche 
bosses allowed a ‘’pernicious culture’’ to develop, with ‘’control failings that were long-
standing and enterprise-wide.’’186    
In the writer’s opinion, there is an overlap that is traceable between those that are caught up 
in this ‘’cultural bug’’ and bad apple. In certain circumstances, there are individuals who 
have never offended earlier in their entire life. This is due to the fact that they do not have the 
opportunities to do this. However, these people, when they enter the financial sector or 
government service as the case may be, grab the chance to make money through crime.       
It is the above attitude in the financial sectors that usually tend to diminish or neutralise the 
stigma connected with white-collar crimes. There is an enhanced attitude in this circle to 
downplay what constitutes immoral or criminal conduct in the financial circle or markets. 
There is this blinded ‘’air of greed is good mentality’’ in the circle which obviously may have 
narrowed a wide range of actions considered to be illegal. Violation of some regulations may 
be seen in the circle as just ‘‘mere infractions’’ and not really worthy of reprimands - this 
may be the attitude in certain cases. Possibly, even in situations where there is an 
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investigation or charge for fraud, the word ‘‘theft’’ may not usually be made very significant 
and may be hidden.  
C. Stanley indicated that the investigations of criminality in the financial sectors are usually 
seen to travel under a lot of labels that can best be seen as asinine. This usually leads to the 
activities of the culprits in the financial sector to be sort of sanitised and consequently 
neutralised due to this labelling.
187
 
The present writer does not agree with C. Stanley’s view on the above. What he indicated 
might be the case in the past - possibly more than twenty years ago. This is no longer the case 
today. There could be a bit of sympathy for those caught up in minor infractions. But in cases 
of very clear fraud, money laundering, insider dealings etc in the financial sectors, the 
authorities one can honestly say have been very robust, intelligent and have not folded their 
arms - the culprits are punished according to the law.    
Moving forward in the present discourse, it has been identified, that the ethos of public 
administration theory are closely related to the theory of organisational structure.
188
However, 
the correlation theories have been seen not to start from either an implicit or explicit straight 
forward theoretical explanation model, so to speak as seen in the previous five groups but 
rather, from specific factors.
189
   
Aside the above early theories, some writers and policy makers have also opinionated on the 
possible causes of corruption which eventually in most cases trigger money laundering. It has 
been argued that poor institutional setups or structures in less developed countries that are 
evidently shaped by structural inequalities, morality or state stability can be classified as 
significant contributors.  
In fact, J.P Dobel argues that in certain situations, most corruption incidents do require some 
individual moral choices. This can depend upon the human capacity for avarice and evil. 
Nevertheless, corruption of the state, results from the consequences of individual human 
nature interacting with systemic and enduring inequality in wealth, power and status. In this 
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situation of such inequality, some group of individuals will eventually have de facto or 
legally sanctioned priority of access to wealth, power and status.
190
       
The present writer has noted the above author’s comments. I do not agree with the assertion 
that corruption and money laundering occur on account of inequality. But rather, we should 
holistically view the template as a spectrum that can range from individual acts. This 
emanates, through increasingly widespread corruption to the situation where people, whether 
in or out of government, are enmeshed or entangled in politics brazenly permeated by 
corruption.    
J.M Mbaku argues that in societies, where civil servants’ remuneration is low, the propensity 
is that a sizeable part of the public servants’ total remuneration could be derived from 
engagement in outside activities, resulting in very significant increase in bureaucratic 
corruption.
191
We have to note that there are two possible causes why civil servants’ salaries 
are low. The first indeed is brazen. Here, the government of the day, may make a decision to 
pay their public servants very low wages. The reason could be that the government expects 
these public officers to make up the shortfall through bribery and even extortion. This was 
basically, the approach that the then late Nigeria military ruler Sani Abacha took during his 
time. In fact, former military President Ibrahim Babangida utilised the same approach before 
Abacha.    
The other reason is simply lack of resources to pay for the public servants’ wages. This is 
understandable. The government of the day may feel possibly rightly that it would like to pay 
the public servants handsomely but does not have the money to do so. We should note that 
this is not true for a country like Nigeria that has the resources to meet this. In the 1990s, 
Russia and Cambodia are two countries that fit this. Burkina Faso in West Africa is another 
good example.        
There may be instances where if the remuneration is increased it would reflect a significant 
increase or improvement in revenue collection or could happen after pay reforms in tax 
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administration.
192
The writer agrees with this and therefore submits that poor remuneration 
can trigger corruption and money laundering in some emerging economies.  
J.M. Mbaku is of the view that the possible causation of corruption which in most cases, 
showcase or result in money laundering may be traced to socio-ethnic and linguistic lineage 
of people in a given polity. The fact is that peoples’ outside behavioural patterns can be 
associated with their culture and value system. This may eventually lead to nepotistic 
practises that are associated with bureaucrats.
193
It might not necessarily mean that these 
people are more dishonest. We need to note that also in some cultures the duty to cater for 
families comes first in their agenda than their loyalty to their country or duty to the country’s 
laws. So, these people need to cater for their loved ones. Even when the government pays 
them well, the officers still have bills to pay.     
Interestingly, another angle to the above could be this: does it mean that some races are more 
corrupt or dishonest than others? I do not buy into this. There are sadly others that continue to 
take this view. And include paternalistic Western commentators on developing countries or 
even in a developing country itself. Here you may see one ethnic group commenting on the 
other. For instance, in a developing country like Nigeria, the Yoruba ethnic group may take 
the view that the Igbo are more corrupt than them. However, the facts on the ground do not 
reflect this. Every ethnic group has examples of people that take a stand against corruption in 
Nigeria.         
Some scholars have boldly drawn a nexus between the presence of corruption which leads to 
money laundering to the process of modernization.
194
J.M Mbaku further stated that 
corruption in LDCs is believed to emanate from the clash or conflict that is noticeable 
between some entrenched traditional values and the imported norms which do accompany 
modernization and the social-political developments.
195
     
The scenario in the above conflict, has therefore, left a significant space or vacuum. This has 
created opportunities that have necessitated individuals to continue to exhibit mannerisms not 
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justified by modern nor traditional norms.
196
This vacuum is quickly filled with corruption 
and the perceived largesse acquired is channelled out through money laundering. And this has 
possibly created the convergence dilemma.  
It has been stated by J.D Donahue that it is the government intervention in the private sector 
commercial activities, that has sparked corruption in a majorly manner.
197
But in contrast to 
the above, another author, M. Szeftel, has put forward the argument that it was the neo-liberal 
agenda which came about through the processes of liberalization and deregulation that was 
responsible in making western donors to proceed and have the ideological assumption that 
political corruption came about, as a result of growing state intervention.
198
It has been 
postulated that market forces will through greater competition eventually lead to low levels of 
corruption and money laundering.
199
 
We have to be mindful of the fact that it can be evidenced in this situation, that the prevailing 
market forces have the capacity to discipline the participants in a more effective manner than 
the public sector. Here, the ability to succeed is linked to a sound economic policy. The 
enlargement of the scope and improving market functionality will definitely be a source of 
strength to the competitive forces. This will arguably reduce or eliminate bribes that the 
holders of public office may be offered or extort to get them.
200
 
The writer does not agree with the above. Let us pause for a minute and reflect on the opinion 
of M. Szeftel and the World Bank. The evidence or prevailing circumstance does not align 
with their observations in some developing countries. For example, a country like Nigeria, 
where there is the view - at least in the mindset of some people that there is a sound economic 
policy on paper - implementation is another issue. Irrespective of the pronouncements that the 
government makes, indicating that there is a sound economic policy, cases of rent seeking 
and bribery in that country has not been significantly lowered, irrespective of the fact that 
there is the believe that market forces have been left to operate in a competitive atmosphere.          
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Changes in the regulatory mechanisms may trigger corruption and money laundering in 
developing economies. There may be instances where new staff or employees are put in some 
sensitive positions when new regulations commence. Some market participants may use this 
opportunity to handsomely bribe them for a favourable result towards their businesses. Of 
course, the next natural course of event is for this loot to be laundered depending on the size. 
This may result in a situation where the overseeing of government functions are moved out of 
government hands into the hands of independent organisations. Here, the writer has in mind 
the creation of non-state bodies as regulators.
201
The uncertainty associated with the transition 
to the market, has the potential to be exploited by corrupt entrepreneurs, even in a more 
ruthless fashion than those in control of state apparatus.
202
 
Irrespective of the fact, that there has been a considerable volume of deregulation and 
liberalization in transition nations and other developing countries, over the last twenty years 
or so, corruption and money laundering is still in the high.
203
The continuing causative factors 
that trigger corruption and money laundering so far identified, seem to have smoothened the 
pact for heavy negative consequences in the economy of developing countries.   
It must be noted that the stance taken by the writer in this thesis, is that once corruption is 
activated by any form of activity, there arises, a very high propensity for money laundering to 
be the next natural sequential order of events. This usually, will depend on the volume of the 
acquired loot, hence the convergence matter.  
3.3 The negative effects of the two phenomena in less developed countries 
It is fair to indicate, that the writer has so far, demonstrated in this thesis that there is a valid 
correlation or convergence between corruption and money laundering. More so, it has been 
emphatically stated that there are causative factors for this, supported by views of eminent 
scholars and theorizations. Obviously, there are domino implications of this. And the stance 
the writer posits in this segment of the chapter is simply, that granted that the two phenomena 
are rigorously in most instances, very symbiotically linked, it is therefore arguably acceptable 
that the negative effect of each can also be attributed to the cause that emanated from the 
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other. Simply put, we shall view the negative effects of corruption as same as the negative 
effects of money laundering - most corrupt money end up being laundered. 
One of the significant effects of corruption and money laundering in developing economies is 
that it slows down the rate of economic growth. The World Bank estimated that the proceeds 
of corruption of which significant amount is laundered, has equalled loses of 20 to 40% of the 
Official Development Assistance in developing countries.
204
The Bank also noted that there is 
evidently, a 0.5 to 1.0% point drag on economic growth. This has been necessitated, on 
account of the fact that a widespread corruption and money laundering has the potential to 
create the above percentage gulf in comparison to a similar country that has little corrupt 
activities.
205
  
In Africa alone, it is estimated that the cost of corruption and money laundering, is more than 
US$ 148 billion per year. This is thought to represent about 25% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).
206
Additionally, this increases the cost of goods even as high as 20%.
207
Large amount 
of money is laundered from corrupt processes, but the exact amount has not actually passed 
the empirical test. The reason is that it is actually very difficult to keep a tab on the exact 
sum. In both developed and developing countries, it has been estimated that the annual 
money that is paid as bribes and which are possibly laundered should be US$1 trillion and 
this has been seen as a conservative estimate.
208
       
Corruption and money laundering in developing countries do discourage the requisite 
investment prospects. It has been noted that comparatively, investments in a relatively corrupt 
country, when compared with an incorrupt one, can turn out to be 20% more expensive.
209
 
To conduct business in Nigeria in a very large scale may have strong potential to be very 
expensive. This is attributed to the corrupt terrain in Nigeria irrespective of the usual anti-
corruption stance of the government. Instances are many on this. As at the time of writing, 
the ‘’$182m Halliburton bribery scandal’’ has not yet been judicially settled in Nigeria. This 
is, irrespective of the fact, that some of the culprits have been sentenced in USA. Although, 
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the Buhari administration that has corruption as a focal point of his administration has 
reopened the matter through EFCC. Time will tell if he is going to succeed on this because 
very powerful personalities are allegedly implicated, including two former Nigeria 
Presidents.         
A survey of 3,600 firms in 69 countries that was carried out for the World Development 
Report gives impetus to the negatives of corruption and by extension, money laundering. The 
report indicated that the issue of corruption presented a serious problem (and still presents) to 
potential investors. More than 40% of entrepreneurs indicated that they actually paid bribes to 
get things moving. A large number of companies are aware that the fact you have paid the 
bribe is not actually a guarantee that the service would be delivered. As a result, many have 
feared that more ‘’dirty money’’ would be requested by other officials thereby increasing the 
cost of business and encourages economically unproductive relations.
210
         
However, we have to note that foreign direct investment (FDI), may still flow to developing 
countries in which corruption is systemic. But here, bribery must be affordable and the result 
must have the characteristics of being very predictable. Indeed, in this situation, it normally 
is. Corrupt officials generally know better than to ask for bribes that the company cannot 
afford. But still, corruption can still have a significant effect on foreign investment. Where 
corruption is seen to be in large scale and systemic, investments may be concentrated in some 
extractive sectors of the economy where operations can be enclaved or alternatively, in light 
manufacturing or trading operations that can be relocated if rent taking becomes 
unbearable.
211
Some foreign investors, may decide to shun the country altogether.  
High levels of corruption can act seriously as a disincentive for FDI. On the other hand, to a 
significant percentage of foreign firms, corruption is seen to be a cost of conducting business 
to be recovered from revenues.
212
They simply view this as a cost of doing business in that 
jurisdiction in question. In the writer’s opinion, the perception of a particular country as a 
corruption-laden-environment is very likely to discourage FDI. Some potential foreign 
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investors do not like operating in an environment that is corruption laden. The result would 
be for that ‘’recipient’’ country to miss out in some FDIs. Additionally, firms that believe that 
they can bribe their way through may be held back due to sanctions and punishment that 
await those caught in the act. I do not think that there are sufficient numbers of foreign 
investors prepared to pay the required bribes due to the fear of being caught.     
The positive news is that we are aware that tax deductibility of bribe money for contracts has 
been taken care of by a Convention. This is a plus for anti-corruption and money laundering 
crusaders. Prior to the OECD Bribery Convention of 1997, companies deducted the money 
they paid on bribes in their tax returns and classified this as business expenses. This 
Convention, later in 2009 made it illegal for companies to do this as this attitude did not 
present a level playing commercial field. This was binding on OECD members and non-
members that have signed up to the Convention and ratified it.  
The OECD 2009 Recommendation on Tax Measures for Further Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions further strengthens the role of 
tax authorities to fight bribery. This required explicit legislations to fight this scourge. And 
many countries have implemented this in their domestic legislations. The UK Bribery Act 
2010 forbids bribery to get contracts and has extra-territorial application.         
Corruption and money laundering can undermine LDCs genuine privatization efforts to 
reform their economies. Criminal organizations have the potential and resources to outbid 
legitimate purchasers of former state-owned enterprises. The scenario is this - illicit proceeds 
are usually invested in this manner and criminals increase their power for more criminal 
activities and corruption. They therefore succeed in depriving the country of what should 
amount to a legitimate, market-based and tax-paying enterprise.
213
  
Macroeconomic stability can be undermined. This can happen via the loss of government 
revenues and excessive spending. It occurs through corruption in tax and customs 
departments, through debt incurred when the required scrutiny of finance ministries plus 
Central Banks are bypassed, when contracts that are awarded to high-cost bidders or without 
competitive tendering, and through the general erosion of expenditure control.
214
       
                                                     
213
J. McDowell and G. Novice, Economic Perspectives, U.S State Department, May 2001.  
214
Ibid 
 87 
 
This is a serious matter, more particularly, when a well paid CEO of a Thailand 
manufacturing company during an interview admitted that he would like to be a customs 
officer. This reasoning was predicated on the fact that the customs officials receive massive 
gratifications to process goods.
215
The fact is that this observation does not actually come to 
many people as a surprise if you are aware of what goes on in certain sea ports in LDCs, 
especially in Nigeria. They have for example in Lagos, Apapa and Tin Can clearing wharfs. It 
is no secret that massive gratifications are paid to the custom officials to get the goods of 
importers cleared from the wharf. As a result, many custom officials have become 
millionaires overnight irrespective of the Nigeria government anti-corruption position.        
It must be noted that small entrepreneurs are likely to be affected and caught up in the 
corruption web in developing countries. Some of the evidence from the private sectors’ 
assessment, have suggested albeit rightly that corruption increases the cost of doing business 
and the smaller firms, do bear some of the costs of this in a disproportionate way. Bribes 
obviously, can prevent these firms from growing.
216
    
Negative impact on the environment, the poor and resource depletion   
There is a very serious danger that the environment will suffer due to corruption and money 
laundering. It must be recognised that many developing countries have passed laws to protect 
the environment. Not only that, they have also created some special agencies given the 
responsibility to monitor these laws. However, there is often, disconnect in most developing 
nations between policy and implementation. Of course, compliance with these environmental 
regulations, do usually impose on firms some costs that they usually avoid by paying bribes.  
In Nigeria for instance, there has been a very noticeable degradation and neglect of the 
environment as a result of the oil spillage in certain areas of Niger Delta Region. This is as a 
result of the oil exploration in the region. This area in Nigeria is accountable for over 80% of 
the oil produced in that country. The oil companies have behaved in such a way that may be 
suggestive, that they have forgotten that the local community is also a stakeholder. They may 
not have taken into account the impact of their activities. Of course, the writer is aware they 
have in mind, the maximisation of their shareholders profit. This should not be to the 
environmental degradation of the local communities. The neglect of the communities has 
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been linked to the cause of armed conflict in the Niger Delta region resulting in the 
emergence of different armed groups claiming to protect their ‘’natural resources.’’ The 
consensus is that the agencies have been compromised by the oil firms as a result of wide 
spread ‘‘egunjeh.’’217Noticeably, there is also rent to be earned in some tropical rain forests 
from logging. Here, permits may be obtained corruptly, and inspectors bribed. The effect on 
the environment can be devastating - air pollution, soil erosion and even negative climate 
change can come into existence.          
It is incumbent on us, to recognize crucially, the fact that, it is the poor that suffer due to 
corruption and money laundering. Where there is grand and systemic corruption, this filters 
into petty corruption. The writer summits, that when access to public goods and services 
requires bribery, of course, the poor are usually excluded and suffer. On account of their lack 
of political influence, they may even end up, being asked to pay more for some services than 
people with higher incomes.  It is obvious, that the under privileged and destitute, do not have 
the capacity to pursue some ‘‘alternate options.’’   
Indeed, proceeds of corruption that eventually in most instances get laundered internally and 
cross-borders have a very serious potential to deplete the natural resources of less developed 
countries (LDCs). This can be noticed in the primary forests. A typical example is that 
facilitation payment of US$50 is paid in bribes for every cubic meter of timber that is felled 
in Cambodia.
218
More so, in Indonesia, it has been estimated that the lost forest revenue has 
set back government coffers to the tune of US$4 billion per year or five times the annual 
health budget and some of this money was laundered.
219
There is a negative impact on the 
health sector which can be evidenced in loses in health funds. For instance, there was a time 
in Ghana, it was estimated that the percentage of allocated funds that do not eventually reach 
the hospitals and clinics to be 50% of the allocated funds.
220
     
Questionable acceleration of economic development, impact on money laundering laws 
and reputational implications  
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It has been put forward that corruption which also involves money laundering at the 
convergence point, can contribute to economic development. The argument is that it can 
serve as an instrument for the allocation of scarce resources and make some investments 
possible. It can strengthen the private sector by reducing the uncertainty and even the 
negative effects of bureaucracy.
221
It can possibly fulfil some societal needs. It can include a 
form of better economic choice and the promotion of the market economy that could with 
corruption go un-headed.
222
 
There is the belief in some quarters that corruption can in certain cases raise the economic 
growth in two ways. To begin with, ‘‘grease money’’ or ‘‘speed money’’ has the serious 
potential to side track delays in red tapes. Again, some workers that are allowed to extort 
money can work harder, particularly where bribes are allowed to act as a peace rate.
223
It is 
fair to comment, that this scenario may only be beneficial in short term and is not sustainable 
long term with regard to economic planning. Of course, the writer is glad to point out, that 
this view is not a universally held perspective. To buttress this point, we need to note that in 
the UK, the Bribery Act 2010 does not contain any exemption for facilitation payments. It 
has a zero tolerance for this.      
In some LDCs, Anti-Money Laundering Laws (AML) lack robustness, or bribery is usually 
used to make them weak. The criminals may bribe the officials of the AML. The banks that 
are supposed to be positive conveyors of economic development are sometimes acquired by 
the perpetrators in developing nations. As a result, what follows, is simply that the banks are 
now used to launder their illicit money to other safe havens.
224
The officials of the financial 
institutions that are not owned by the corrupt, may be bribed so that the required proper due 
diligence of customers are not carried out. The result is that suspicious transactions are not 
reported to the appropriate quarters. The loot is as a result laundered, depleting the scarce 
resources of the country.  
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Money laundering can increase the probability that the financial institutions will then become 
corrupt and controlled by criminal elements. Some of the institutions can be small but still 
can cause economic havoc by way of contagion. This eventually leads to negative 
reputational consequences that have been caused by operational risks and effects critical 
investor trust.  It is no secret that a reputation for integrity is a hallowed asset for investors 
anywhere in the world. Different types of abuse that go on in the financial system can rightly 
compromise financial institutions’ and jurisdictions’ reputation. This will undermine the 
investors trust in them and lead to the weakening of the financial system.
225
       
It must be noted that a potential user of a financial institution will be hesitant to use that 
institution if it is widely known that the bank is a criminal institution. When the defunct Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal unfolded, this made people to 
terminate their commercial relationships with them. The bank’s activities were massively 
revealed to be shrouded in secrecy with various cases of money laundering levelled against 
them by investigators. Their reputation one can say was at its lowest level when the 
authorities moved in. 
It is no secret that reputational risks can emanate from operational failures, and also failures 
to comply with the relevant laws and regulations plus other sources. This is very damaging 
for banks due to the fact that the nature of their business requires that confidence of their 
depositors, creditors and the whole market place must be kept at the highest level.
226
It is no 
secret that this can lead to bank runs where depositors will panic and make moves to 
withdraw their money plus other domino implications.       
Indeed, it is fair to state that corruption and money laundering have contributed in their 
various manifestations and have the corrosive capacities to undermine the LDCs efforts in 
their bid to harness the global framework that has been set up in fighting money laundering 
(ML).
227
It is good to point out that in the inherently corrupt template readily found in some 
developing countries, the laws, systems set up to tackle corruption, ML and the underlying 
offences do not operate smoothly or robustly. This is as a result of the weak institutional 
setups or frameworks and as a result democratic progress suffers massively.  
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Furthermore, it is fair to indicate that money laundering in certain situations, can be 
associated with stimulation of the local economy on the positive side. We are aware that 
laundered corrupt money often involves the proceeds being exported. But within the country 
that it occurs, they are used to buy goods that include houses, cars, yachts, or whatever. This, 
one can say, stimulates the local economy. It is not all bread and butter for the local economy. 
In certain locations, negatively, this will lead to increase in real estate prices. This will be 
good for people wishing to sale their houses for very high prices. But on the other hand, the 
locals wanting to buy are priced out. In certain cases, they do depress the domestic prices of 
commodities, thereby corroding on the profitability of domestic businesses.
228
This can 
happen when the launderers, invest in the same goods domestic businesses are involved in 
and sell at under-cut prices.     
We have to be mindful of the fact that if money laundering is allowed to flourish in the 
financial sector with ease, the result will be a significant increase and enhanced criminal 
activity in the real economy. The criminals are not interested in pursuing a credible economic 
policy in tandem with government aspirations. This is irrespective of the jurisdiction. BBC 
noted that a leading Swiss lawyer warned that the Russia mafia groups infiltrated 
Switzerland’s economy irrespective of the tighter money laundering regulations introduced in 
that country. The popular view was that Russia criminals established concrete footholds in 
about 300 Swiss companies. This was as a result of the then Swiss traditional banking secrecy 
laws. It was feared that there could be high gang violence.
229
It would not come as a surprise 
that when criminal gangs are in control, there would be struggle for supremacy to control 
their areas of operation potentially resulting in serious violence amongst them.        
There was a time a study of money laundering in Brazil suggested an enhanced penetration of 
the economy by organized criminal gangs from Russia, Nigeria, Korea and other criminal 
groups in the early 1990s. This was attributed to the attractiveness of Brazil’s ‘’large and 
modern financial services sector’’ that attracted money-laundering activities from abroad.230  
Above aside, it has been evidenced, that crimes facilitated by corruption and money 
laundering hinder developing countries’ economic growth. Money that is meant for the good 
                                                     
228
L. Brent, L. Bartlett, (2002) ‘’The Negative Effect of Money Laundering On Economic Development.’’ Paper 
prepared for The Asian Development Bank Regional Technical Assistance Project No. 5967 Countering Money 
Laundering in The Asia and Pacific Region.    
229
Russian Mafia threatens Switzerland, BBC, August 8, 1999.  
230
Andrea Frota Machado de Morais, Money Laundering in Brazil (2000), p.33. 
 92 
 
of the general public is usually pocketed by a few people in power. This obviously drags that 
country backwards in terms of its development momentum. The Vice President of Equatorial 
Guinea Teodoro Obiang who is the son of the president at the time of writing settled a 
forfeiture action that was brought against him in the USA by DoJ in 2014 and relinquished 
more than $30m worth of assets in the USA. He is believed to have assets worth more than 
$100m.
231
He also faced another forfeiture matter in France. His lawyers in Paris did put up a 
defence that the properties that belonged to him seized so far should come under diplomatic 
immunity. He did not succeed. Additionally, he was sentenced to three years imprisonment in 
absentia. The fact here is that his country’s development is stunted due to diversion of state 
assets.  
Management Development and Governance Division of United Nations Development 
Programme has reviewed the conclusion reached in other studies and corroborates that cross 
country research suggests that high corruption levels are harmful to economic growth. When 
corruption is associated with organized crime, legitimate business is discouraged, allocation 
of resources is distorted, and political legitimacy is compromised.
232
Overall, the economic 
damage perpetuated by corruption and money-laundering in LDCs, has been an unambiguous 
conclusion or findings in so many economic literatures. And as previously pointed out in this 
thesis, money laundering is always a key facilitator in this, hence the convergence question.   
Money laundering can simply increase the risk of economic instability. The launderers do not 
have the interest of the economy as their priority. Macroeconomic stability as we know is the 
fundamental basis of sustainable economic growth. This is because it increases national 
savings, private investments, improves exports and balance of payment with improving 
competitiveness.
233
In LDCs, the IMF has indicated that there are two mechanisms by which 
significant volumes of money laundering can induce macroeconomic problems - hot money 
and misleading of information to policy makers. 
Money laundering and capital flight negativity nexus in less developed countries (LDCs) 
The writer reinstates that money laundering refers to transactions relating to property that is 
derived from activities that are criminal in themselves. A typical example is simply 
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corruption. Capital flight in itself is the large export of funds from a given place. This is 
usually evidenced in a large scale and may have a legitimate or illegitimate origin. It is good 
to note that the perspective of LDCs and developed countries on this is different. The 
economic negative effect of the two in LDCs is the same because they both destabilise the 
polity.  
Large capital-flight flows through a particular region may be triggered by specific episodes of 
political flux, like the fall of the Soviet Union or alternatively, the reign of a corrupt dictator. 
Therefore, the financial flows that would accompany these activities are unstable, and can 
contribute to the instability of the exchange rate, the amount of money available in an 
economy and inflation or the general price levels.
234
Also long reigns of some dictators can 
also increase the money laundering activities in LDCs and impact negatively on their 
economy. The intensity or volume of money laundering activities through European financial 
centres during the reigns of Mobutu and Marcus impacted badly on their countries - DRC 
(Zaire) and Philippines.    
We have to understand that some phases of money-laundering transactions are often 
conducted within the informal economic sectors. Such transactions do not usually appear in 
the official government data. This therefore, distorts or presents inaccurate information to the 
policy makers. They then find it difficult to manage such issues like monetary levels, interest 
rates, inflation and exchange rates.
235
  
The obvious effect of illicit capital movement or flight is to worsen the scarcity of capital in 
LDCs. It is massively noticeable that the costs of this flight include a degradation of 
productive capacity, tax base and obvious control over the monetary aggregates. It is no 
secret that this eventually poses a burden on the general public and policy making becomes 
very difficult.
236
    
It has been evidenced that these capital flights have been very enormous. And these can also 
include non-illicit capital - this is not money laundering. This can include some scenarios 
where very senior bank officials decide to transfer very sizeable part of their legitimately 
earned salaries to another jurisdiction. This will have a serious negative economic impact but 
it is not money laundering as previously pointed out at the beginning of this section. The 
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overall picture is that the episodes impact negatively on the domestic economy of the LDCs. 
The UNODC ‘’guesstimated’’ that the illicit financial transactions that originated from Africa 
to be more than $400 billion. And of this amount, $100 billion was estimated to have 
originated from Nigeria.
237
Most of the laundered money was never repatriated back to the 
victim countries.   
Corruption and money laundering have not covered themselves in glory in LDCs. The 
presence of the two phenomena, which notably have helped organised crime to permeate the 
political structures, has led to social and political unrest within the society. Circumstantially, 
it has been noticed, that in many transitional economies, there is deep rooted independent link 
between money laundering, organised crime, politics and the public sector. This can foster a 
type of significant symbiosis between the state and the criminal organizations.
238
Criminals 
gain access to political power due to corruption and money laundering. They employ the vast 
sums accumulated through dirty means and invest in the political process. Political office 
holders are bribed to enhance access to decisions. 
There could be financial donations to political office aspirants. By this, control can be gained 
over the office holder when he/she comes to power.
239
This is not healthy to developing 
countries. This was the case in Colombia in the 1990s. The then President Ernesto Samper 
was accused of collecting about US$6 million from the Cali Cocaine Cartel to fund his 
presidential campaign.
240
Money laundering has the capacity to infiltrate the political 
composition in the society, short of violence. As pointed out above, it can be through the 
financing of the political process. The Inter-American Development Bank has estimated that 
the cost of violence generated by organized crime in Latin America to be in the region of 
US$168 billion - equalling 15% of Latin America’s GDP.241                  
3.4 The problem of quantification or marker on the impact   
Interestingly, this thesis has so far taken cognizance that corrupt proceeds have the hallmarks 
of undergoing the money laundering process. This can be evidenced in both the internal 
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environment that this occurs, plus the allegation that there are some receptive financial 
institutions situated in advanced countries that accept the loots, possibly knowingly. Indeed, 
to some, this presents a debatable issue. It was earlier indicated, that money laundering, 
corruption and capital flights, cause enormous strain on the limited resources of LDCs.  
Aside above, various prominent academicians have made some bold attempts to get the exact 
figures involved. However, the figures presented are not exact and have not been able to 
positively go through the empirical test. These figures are based on conjectures and estimates 
in most cases. We have to admit, that corruption as a crime is based on the hallmarks of 
secrecy and in most of the times, is usually accompanied with money laundering and more 
importantly due to the secretiveness, is very difficult to quantify.
242
 The writer, summits that 
this is not only difficult but actually impossible to quantify accurately.    
We have to be aware, that the statistical information, plus other round numbers that are 
usually presented or bandied about by various organisations with particular emphasis on law 
enforcement and other government agencies are mere ‘’guesstimates,’’ and emanates from 
the informal economic activities. The figures are themselves very difficult if not impossible 
to verify or measure. Some are just random figures that are generated to support future 
funding requests.
243
But we have to make use of some few words of advice here - the fact that 
they are estimates, do not actually mean that they are misleading.     
Admittedly, there is this argument that since corruption which eventually leads to money-
laundering is usually triggered by a culmination of societal issues or factors - it is a 
mountainous task to have a measurement of these social factors.
244
This has contributed to the 
quantification problems or dilemma. It is as a result of this, that Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) was created by Transparency International (TI). Notably, membership cuts across a 
large number of countries - not less than 180 as at 2019 inclusive of advanced and developing 
countries. The aim or purpose is an attainment of a qualitative and acceptable assessment of 
the corruption pervasiveness. Within the cluster of the Non Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), TI, with branches in major global areas and was founded by Mr Peter Eigen, a 
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former World Bank regional director, has arguably, the most comprehensive perception 
index. This was first lunched in 1995.
245
     
Each year, TI scores countries on how corrupt their public sectors are seen to be. TI’s CPI 
emits a strong signal to governments and these countries have been forced to take notice. 
Behind the perception is the daily reality for the inhabitants. Admittedly, the index cannot 
capture the individual frustration of the reality. However, it can be said to encapsulate the 
informed views of respectable analysts, business people and experts around the globe.
246
     
It must be taken into cognizance, that on a particular level, TI’s CPI since its coming into 
existence, has played a very significant part to raise public awareness about corruption. The 
CPI on the other hand, has attracted very sever criticisms with regard to the qualitative 
transparent methodology that it used in its assessment which clearly indicated only the flip 
side of the cankerworm. This is simply the accepting template and complete ignorance of the 
private sector.
247
This evidently is a problem.  
Another reservation on the CPI is the methodology used. This involves the size of the survey 
that was used in different countries and the selection of these countries. J. Christenson argued 
that the CPI has presented a sort of ‘‘stereotypical perception’’ concerning the corruption 
geography. Additionally, there is the suspicion that the pervasiveness of TI ranking exudes a 
reflection of probable confusion and bias about the present corruption and money laundering 
issues. For example, 40% of the countries that were identified as being least corrupt are found 
in the offshore tax havens, inclusive of major centres.
248
The United Kingdom may have 
deliberately been silent on proactively tackling the offshore tax havens that are used to 
tactically hide some ‘’dirty money.’’ There is this perception (in the minds of some people) 
that the wealthy are deliberately being protected. This is of course very debatable. However, 
the recent Tax Justice Network’s ‘’Corporate Tax Haven Index’’ (CTHI) 2019 showed that 
the UK was placed as number 13 and seen as the ‘’greatest global enabler’’ of corporate tax 
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avoidance. 8 out of overall top 10 that received the highest scores are all British Overseas 
Territories. This does not look good.
249
        
There was a time it was stated that the UK must be placed on the list of most corrupt 
countries. This is on account of the fact of their historical role as a defender of tax havens of 
its overseas territories and crown dependencies plus the fact that the UK was somehow 
perceived to have undermined the EU’s attempt to close these loopholes.250The present 
author is of the view that the opinion that the UK should be on top of CPI as the most corrupt 
is uncharitable and uncalled for. It is evident that the UK has been seen from a long time to 
be fighting corruption. This is reflected on the various corruption laws that were passed and 
even mimicked by other jurisdictions as a model to fight the scourge in the UK and extra-
territorially. Of course, we are presently witnesses to arguably, the ‘’most robust ever’’ 
corruption legislation in the world - UK 2010 Bribery Act. Needless to say, it contains very 
robust anti-corruption mechanisms.     
It does not mean that there exists a country that is corruption free. In fact, with the revelations 
and allegations contained in the WikiLeaks and the Panama Papers, there exists the strong 
believe that these, admittedly may contain some truth.
251
It is fair to submit that the problem 
cuts across many countries, but to suggest that the UK should be somewhere on top of the list 
is not welcome - at least in the opinion of many.   
The present writer submits that the observation that CPI does not actually represent the true 
corruption and resultant money-laundering geography may be flawed. The 40% least corrupt 
countries found in the offshore area is possibly reflected on their compliance mechanisms 
they have put in place that suited the methodology used. This may have led to the dilemma of 
quantifying the menace and this is problematic.
252
  
It is on account of the quantification dilemma, that there have been some academic papers 
mainly in the socio-political and economic circles in a bid to assess quantification. These are 
mainly based on some theoretical frameworks which have been used in the analysis of 
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corruption that would also lead to money laundering. There has been capitalism literature. 
This is based on capital accumulation as a theoretical lens.
253
Additionally, there is the state 
theory that is primarily based or focussed on class theory.
254
Some have also employed policy 
choice theory, whilst others used a public choice approach. The writer submits that it is due to 
the problems associated with the quantification of corruption, that there have been the various 
theorizations.  
An assessment of the corruption and money laundering scenario, will clearly indicate that 
most ‘’dirty money issues’’ will occur in the informal sector of the economy. There is usually 
absence of statistics and official records of the amount of liquidity involved. This in itself 
leaves the terrain open to conjectures on the amount of liquid assets involved in transition to 
the formal economy, since notably, most of the transactions are conducted under the cloak of 
secrecy. It is therefore, on account of the hazy or opaque nature of corruption and money 
laundering transactional characteristics, that it is virtually very difficult if not impossible to 
actually place a marker on the quantum of the amount involved in the process plus the fact 
that the perpetrators evidently suffer from ‘’honesty poverty.’’   
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CHAPTER 4 
The role of corporate governance in the convergence scenario 
4.1 Introduction 
Structural approach 
This thesis has so far attempted to demonstrate that there are multifarious issues involved in 
corruption. The writer so far has indicated that corruption and ‘’dirty money’’ have the 
hallmarks of being chameleonic in their outlooks. The attempt by the orchestrators who have 
made the money in secrete to transmute the spoils into what the writer calls ‘‘legitimate 
stance’’ has given rise to the convergence scenario. The issue is simply this - illegitimate 
money was sourced through some dubious mannerisms in secret, and the most possible next 
step the culprits usually take is to try to spend the money legitimately. After all, it is of no 
use, making illegal profits or money, if there is no avenue of spending the loot without being 
caught by the long arm of the law.  
It is no surprise that some inquisitive minds may pause and reflect on the above scenario. 
Have we tried to ask ourselves some probing questions, why arguably, most of these loots 
one can convincingly argue emanate and even at the same time pass through many legal 
persons? In fact, are we to continue to dwell under the mistaken assumption that all is well 
with the way our corporate entities are managed? The writer is of the view that to think this 
way is simply delusional in the light of the present corporate circumstances. Assuming the 
author’s assumptions are faulty, why is it that some corporate collapses were engineered by 
the way the directors/managers of those companies operated?  
In some of the collapsed companies, it was evident that corruption and fraud reared their ugly 
heads and were significant contributory factors in their demise. Illegal funds were generated 
through fraud and with the active connivance with the corporate officers and outside 
influence - the loots were laundered. This again brings into forefront the convergence 
question. Of course, some of these companies included Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), Barings Bank in United Kingdom (this bank was the world’s second 
oldest merchant bank after Berenberg Bank).There were still others that collapsed as a result. 
In some of these entities and others, there was a lack of cohesive or robust approach in 
corporate governance issues that necessitated massive corruption and laundering of dirty 
funds.      
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This brings into fore the corporate governance matters in dissecting the issues embedded in 
financial crime. Corruption, fraud and dirty money play significant negative roles. This 
section of the thesis will dissect what we really mean by corporate governance and its role in 
check-mating corruption. Efforts will be made to assiduously elucidate the theories that gave 
rise to corporate governance and juxtapose them with corruption and ‘’dirty money.’’ Of 
course, reference will be made to the principal-agent problems with particular insight into the 
agency theory being pinpointed as crucial ingredient amongst other theories to the 
convergence problems. It will be elucidated that the managers of the corporate entities have 
lowered their guide in managing the respective organisations that they were entrusted with. 
They have as a result, allowed fraud to be less prudently addressed, thereby allowing 
corruption and ‘’dirty money’’ to slip through these organisations.                                 
The writer will seek to justify that it is as a result of less prudent or non robust Board of 
Directors and weak Chief Executive officers that the issue of corruption and dirty money 
have been noted to be significantly present in corporate set-ups. This section of the thesis will 
additionally, impute aggressively that if there are prudent Non-Executive directors that act as 
checks to the excesses of executive directors, there is greater likelihood that fraud could be 
curbed to the barest minimum in the corporate circles.  
Another important angle to the problem that is to be addressed is whether the directors took it 
upon themselves to make sure that they established the relevant committees in their 
companies. These include but not limited to the audit/risk and ethical committees. The writer 
will argue forcefully, that a responsible and robust audit committee will have very strong 
tools necessary to detect effectively and nip in the bud or at least to a minimalistic level the 
issues of corruption and ‘’dirty money’’ in a corporate organisation. It will be the contention 
of the writer, that on the issues of corporate ethics, the directors should be seen to lead ‘’from 
the top to the shop floor.’’ More so, the managers of such entities, have they put in place the 
right “corporate atmospheric scenario” to encourage whistle blowing?  
The financial institutions with special reference to the banks play very significant role in 
issues of money laundering and corruption. The banks also by virtue of their activities should 
convincingly, play very significant contributory roles in the economy as a whole. They are 
not like other generic corporate entities - they provide money to oil the economy on account 
of the role they play in servicing the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). It is as a result 
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of this that the writer is of the opinion that the corporate governance in banks must be given a 
closer or special attention.  
Bank corporate governance matters are slightly different from those of the generic 
companies. If a major bank collapses as a result of some significant issues that include 
corruption and money laundering, the effect this emits on the general public is not the same 
compared with the collapse associated with other generic legal entities. The negative 
externalities or domino implications are quite different. The writer will proceed and put in 
place a summary of this chapter with the aim of linking the scenario with remaining segments 
of this thesis.    
4.2 Analysis of what corporate governance stands for in the convergence scenario 
When we talk of the convergence scenario, the author is emphasising that whenever 
illegitimate wealth or ‘’dirty cash’’ is generated, the criminals, usually in most cases want to 
use this money by employing the laundering mechanisms. It is at the point of laundering that 
there is the “convergence scenario.” This is the approach that has been and will continue to 
be used in this thesis. Any part of benefit derived from that illegitimate wealth is simply 
criminal property. And derivation of the ‘’benefits,’’ in most cases will be done by 
participating in the ‘’macabre dance’’ that is money laundering. This is usually done through 
legal persons or corporate entities in secretive manner. This is where lapses evidenced in our 
corporate governance of legal persons are clearly contributory factors in the convergence 
process.
255
  
Interestingly, and possibly so, corporate governance, has only recently come to prominence 
in the business world. The term ‘’corporate governance’’ and its possible everyday usage or 
lexicon in the financial press is actually a new phenomenon of the last two and half 
decades.
256
And the use of the term seems to have been on the increase after the last financial 
crises of 2007/8. Opinions seem to be pointing towards the failure of corporate governance 
mechanisms in checkmating some corporate collapses of which fraud and corruption were 
seen to be serious contributory factors to the demise of most of the companies.         
Definitional issues in corporate governance 
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It is fair to state that a generally accepted definition of corporate governance has not yet 
evolved. Traditional concepts describe corporate governance as a complex set of constraints 
that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a firm or as every device, 
institution or mechanism that exercises power over decision-making within a 
firm.
257
Differently stated, corporate governance deals with the decision-making at the level of 
the board of directors, top management, the different internal, external mechanisms that 
ensure that all decisions taken by the directors and top management are in line with the 
objective/s of a company and its share holders, respectively.
258
 
An arguable narrow definition has been given by A. Shleifer and R.W Vishny.
259
They view 
corporate governance as a process that deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting returns on their investments. An even wider 
definition has been presented by OECD as: a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives, and monitoring performance, are determined. Good corporate governance should 
provide incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interest 
of the company and its share holders and should facilitate effective monitoring.
260
Objective 
that is anti-corruption is one of them.  
Transparency International (TI) defines corporate governance to mean the procedures and 
processes on how private sector organisations are directed, managed and controlled.
261
   
A further important definition is that presented by Sir A. Cadbury. He stated that corporate 
governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage 
the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of 
those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society.
262
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Corporate governance can be seen as a set of arrangements through which organisations 
account to their stakeholders. In fact, corporate governance and development are strongly 
related. Research has consistently shown that strong corporate governance supports economic 
development. This is achieved by the promotion of efficient use of resources and by creating 
conditions that attract both domestic and foreign investments. We should remember that good 
corporate governance contributes to the sustainable development prospects of countries, 
increased economic sustainability of nations, and institutional reforms that come with it, 
provide the necessary basis for improved governance in the public and private sectors.
263
This 
may be difficult to attain where there is massive corruption that ultimately leads to laundering 
of the loot. Part of the negative result is that massive state resources are fraudulently 
dissipated, thereby improvising the public. But good corporate governance reduces this.       
The reader may ask what corporate governance has to do with the issues of ‘’dirty money’’ 
and private to private corruption. The answer is: if organizations do not exhibit a robust 
amount of ‘’prudent checks and balances,’’ this, will be a gateway to corruption, fraud and 
other negative activities. The unhealthy wealth created as a result will be comfortably 
laundered, possibly seamlessly, while the general public suffers as funds meant for the 
developmental projects are frittered away due to lax monitoring mechanisms in state owned 
enterprises.                
Good corporate governance as an antidote to corruption 
When bribery, a subset of corruption, is reduced or checkmated by robust governance, there 
will be a reduction in money laundering. Good corporate governance is a crucial ingredient in 
a country’s infrastructure. Proper governance processes are very likely to create an 
environment that is conducive to success and increase the creation of wealth by improving 
the performance of honestly managed and financially sound companies.
264
It does not 
necessarily follow that there exists a perfect corporate governance system that guards 
companies and their stakeholders from consequences of error. Companies are not immune 
from failure: corporate collapse happens for different reasons. But lax corporate governance 
often plays some part in their demise.
265
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The above is part of the reason why the system of ‘’checks and balances’’ that are supposed 
to support corporate governance needs to work reasonably well. In fact, the presence of an 
effective corporate governance system within institutions and across economies, promotes a 
level of confidence that is fundamental for the purposes of appropriate functioning of the 
market economy.
266
The writer posits that when these are adhered to, it reduces bribery and 
corruption, which of course can be seen as ‘’dirty money.’’ This will eventually converge and 
transmute into laundering. When companies embrace and enhance good governance ethos, 
they have more chances of doing well by eliminating bribery and corruption.       
Transparency international has reinforced the writer’s position. This globally respected anti-
corruption organisation has indicated, albeit most possibly correctly; that strong corporate 
governance system is a vital component of a company’s efforts to reinforce the right 
incentives, practices and to address the corrupt matters they confront.
267
We should bear in 
mind that there has been an empirical evidence that has shown that without good corporate 
systems in place, the overall impact of the anti-corruption initiatives are reduced and the 
growth of companies and the countries where they operate is undermined.
268
  
The author is strongly of the view that we should always be aware, that where there are 
numerous evidence of bribery and corruption, this has a strong potential to drive away 
investment. Good corporate governance serves as a framework to secure investor confidence, 
enhance access to capital markets, promote growth and also strengthen economies. By 
providing for clear game rules and robust checks and balances, corporate governance systems 
help to lower company costs and do increase economic output.
269
Bad governance generates 
‘’dirty money’’ for laundering purposes of which the overall impact is negative for the 
economy.   
Corporate governance framework differs from country to country. This is usually based on 
the legal, regulatory and institutional environment, but the similar thing about the frameworks 
is that they all have one aim - they define the rights, responsibilities, and behaviours that are 
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needed from the company’s owners and managers for the business to operate 
successfully.
270
It may possibly be rightly said that business momentum is usually slowed 
down, when there is massive evidence of bribery and corruption. However, we have to 
always note, as earlier pointed out, that there is never one-size-that-fits-all mechanism. 
Above aside, we have to take cognizance that the processes that characterize strong corporate 
governance systems align in many respects with key elements of anti-bribery tools. Most of 
these are encapsulated in TI’s Business Principles for Countering Bribery, effective risk 
management, integrity, transparency standards and accountability.
271
We are aware that when 
bribery occurs within the private sector, it can happen in a company, between companies and 
in dealings with the public sector plus private citizens. Effective or good corporate 
governance prevents bribery which is a subset of corruption or at the very least, limits its 
negative effects. Additionally, good corporate governance is usually grounded on socially 
acceptable principles. It also promotes honest and responsible behaviour and adheres to its 
practices to the letter and the spirit of the law. Of course, collectively, these are the antithesis 
of corruption.
272
     
The board of directors role in countering corruption 
Perhaps, it is prudent for us to remind ourselves that in most corporate setups, the board of 
directors play very significant part in making sure that the entity delivers on the corporate 
objectives. When there is an efficient board, it follows that this trickles down positively on 
the corporate behaviour of the organisation. The board of directors leads and controls a 
company. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe, that an effective board is highly 
fundamental to the success of the company. It is the link between managers and investors and 
is very important for good corporate governance and investor relations.
273
Very few people 
will possibly argue that the board of directors is not the engine room of an effective corporate 
set-up devoid of corruption. It can be likened to a robust combination of very good midfield 
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football players that dictate the tempo of a football match. If they don’t play well, the 
tendency is highly likely that the team will lose the match.              
The role of the board of directors was aptly captured by Sir A. Cadbury. It is his observation, 
that the boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors, the auditors and to satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the 
board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into 
effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their 
stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in 
general meeting.
274
    
We should also bear in mind that the Code in United Kingdom emphasised that the role of 
board of directors is to provide an entrepreneurial leadership of the company. This should be 
within a framework of prudent and effective controls that would enable risks to be assessed 
and managed. It is the recommendation of the code that directors should receive appropriate 
training when they are appointed.
275
  
There are two types of boards - the unitary board and the dual board. The unitary board of 
directors is usually the form of board structure that is found in the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Nigeria. This is characterised by one single board comprising both the 
executive and non-executive directors. The unitary board is responsible for all the aspects of 
the company’s activities. All the directors are working to achieve the same goals. This 
includes anti-corruption activities. Of course, when corruption creeps in, which obviously is 
usually dirty in character, the ‘‘benefits’’ are usually laundered to enable the culprits to enjoy 
their loot.  
In a dual board system, there is the presence of both a supervisory and executive board of 
management. However, there is usually the presence of a clear separation of functions. The 
supervisory board is responsible for the direction of the business while the management 
board is responsible for the running of the business. Here, another interesting thing is that 
members of one board are prohibited from being members of the other one. There is a clear 
distinction between management and control.
276
This type of board structure is dominant and 
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can be found in some European Union countries like Germany, Austria and Denmark. And 
employees are allowed to have representatives in the supervisory section, but this pattern 
varies from country to country. However, in this thesis, the author has decided to use the 
unitary board structure or system in the analysis on how boards can impact on corporate 
governance.   
For the display of effective corporate governance, that will hinder corruption, the board of 
directors headed by the chairman makes sure that they put ‘‘strategic positive’’ things in 
place. One of these is the presence of board sub-committees. Arguably, the most important of 
these committees is the audit committee. There are others like the remuneration and the 
nomination committees. But for ease of analysis, we shall focus on the audit committee. In 
the United Kingdom, there was the Smith Review audit committee. This was a group that was 
appointed by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) as far back as 2003. The committee was 
of the opinion that while all directors have a duty to act in the interests of the company, the 
audit committee has a particular role, acting independently from the executive, to ensure that 
the interests of the shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and 
internal control.
277
             
What the review did was to define the audit committee’s role in corporate governance in 
terms of defining their role, ‘‘oversight,’’ ‘‘assessment’’ and also ‘‘review’’ in the corporate 
set-up. In fact, the audit committee must satisfy themselves that there is a robust and 
appropriate system of control in place in the company. It must be noted that the committee do 
not themselves engage in monitoring activities. Once there is a robust assemblage of capable 
corporate characters, this will provide an excellent check on negative activities in the 
company. It has what the writer describes as a ‘‘positive trickledown effect.’’ By this, it is 
submitted that issues of bribery and corruption will be reduced to the barest minimum in that 
corporate organization. 
It is the role of the audit committee to make sure that they review the scope and the outcome 
of the audit. They must try to make sure that the objectivity of the auditors is always 
maintained. This will also involve the review of the audit fees that are paid for non-audit 
work and the general independence of the auditors. In fact, they provide a very useful nexus 
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between both the internal and external auditors and the board. They must ensure that all 
relevant issues related to the audit are relayed to the board.
278
 
The audit committee role may also involve reviewing the arrangements for the staff that raise 
complaints about negative incidents going on in the company.
279
Some of these incidents 
when eventually and properly investigated do sometimes lead to uncovering of the fraud. 
These people are usually called whistleblowers. A whistleblower called Sherron Watkins 
made her concerns known to Andrew Fastow who was the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) at 
Enron, a United States defunct energy company, and to the firm’s auditors, Arthur Anderson. 
This was about the fraudulent financial irregularities that went on in Enron. On account of 
this, the US authorities after investigation indicted Enron about the massive accounting fraud 
perpetuated by its directors in the company.
280
Some countries have passed legislation backing 
whistleblowers. In her own case, it did not come as a surprise that she was fully covered by 
the Whistleblower Protection Act 1989.
281
  
We have to note that for the whistle blowing to be legitimate, it must contain any of the 
followings: must be in public interest, the incident is a criminal offence, eg fraud, someone’s 
health or safety may be in danger, risk or actual damage to the environment, a miscarriage of 
justice, the company is breaking the law, eg does not have the right insurance, and you 
believe someone is covering something.
282
In fact, in the United Kingdom, this is contained in 
Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998 (PIDA 1998) that came into force on 2
nd
 July 
1999.
283
Interestingly, PIDA has been copied across various jurisdictions as a model in 
protecting whistleblowers.
284
  
In Nigeria, a country that has been menacingly for a very long time besieged by corruption 
and money laundering; the government in a bid to turn this tide, recently introduced the 
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Whistleblower Act. This was in 2016. The former minister of finance Mrs Kemi Adeosun 
indicated that the aim of this policy is to enable patriotic citizens to report criminal acts such 
as mismanagement of public funds or misappropriation of public funds and assets, like 
properties and vehicles; financial malpractice and fraud. To encourage and motivate 
Nigerians to participate in the scheme, the policy stated when there is a voluntary return of 
stolen or concealed public funds or assets on the account of the information provided, the 
whistleblower may be entitled to anywhere between 2.5 percent (minimum) and 5.0 percent 
(maximum) of the total amount recovered.
285
            
A whistleblower was paid £880,000 (at the conversion rate of 450 naira to a pound £) for the 
information the person provided that led to the recovery of large amount of foreign currency 
stashed away in a flat located in a high-brow area of Lagos State - No. 16 Osborn Road, 
Ikoyi, Lagos.
286
The writer, summits that whistle-blowing is a good mechanism. It will keep 
employees on their toes because they consciously realise that they are being watched by their 
fellow colleagues at work and other members of the public. The beauty of this is that you are 
not too sure of who is watching you. Therefore, if the board via the audit committee are able 
to set the mechanism to put this in play, it is highly likely that the incidents of fraud which 
includes corruption of which most of the fraudulent money realised would end up being 
laundered will be reduced.  
Over £1 billion pounds has so far been recovered through the above policy in 
Nigeria.
287
However, what they do with the recovered funds in Nigeria is a different issue. 
There have been suggestions and allegations, that ‘’even recovered loot is looted’’ in Nigeria. 
That may not be far from the truth given the ‘‘corrupt reputation’’ that Nigeria has been 
associated with in the past. They have not done well in TI Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
Nigeria is ranked 144 out of 180 countries and had a score of 27 out of 100 in 2018.
288
That 
said, the fact on the ground is that, President Buhari administration in Nigeria has sensitised 
the general public about the dangers of corruption. Indeed, many arrests were made and 
corrupt matters charged to court. However, the people are interested in seeing these matters 
dispensed as quickly as possible with convictions and confiscations where necessary.       
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When the bubble burst in BCCI, there were numerous incidents of fraud, corruption and 
money laundering in the bank. It has been suggested that had there been an earlier mechanism 
or whistle blowing law in place, the scandal leading to the collapse, could have been known 
much earlier. The collapse put in jeopardy, some US$8.7 billion in international trade 
because it complicated payments for export contracts managed by the bank.
289
In BCCI, there 
was an autocratic corporate governance environment. No one dared to speak out for fear of 
repercussion despite regular instances of illicit activities that occurred. It was this case, 
together with earlier disasters like the capsize of Herald Free Enterprise in 1987, the Piper 
Alpha explosion in the North Sea and the Clapham Junction crash in 1989 that provided the 
necessary contextual background to the emergence of PIDA.
290
Additionally and 
comparatively with the past, whistle blowing is increasingly seen as a fundamentally positive 
force with growing support for its core objectives of deterring and eliminating corporate 
wrongdoings in many jurisdictions.
291
            
Corporate ethics as anti-corruption therapy  
Another important area that the board of directors should focus in the corporate set-up to 
prevent or drastically reduce the incidence of corruption is corporate ethics. Underlying the 
very foundation or roots of corporate governance and the provision of its moral compass is 
simply ethical behaviour. Surprisingly, the ethical behaviour of companies is rarely 
recognised as a solid cornerstone of good corporate governance. But in many ways, ethics 
underlies much of business behaviour. This is irrespective of the fact that it may be at board 
or staff level, and also regardless of that company’s geographical location, size, or industry. 
The manner business decisions are arrived at, matters strongly from both an ethical and 
pragmatic standpoint. This is not only applicable to OECD companies but is inclusive of 
companies from developing countries that may be involved in regional trade.
292
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The fact is that there are robust anti-corruption laws in very powerful countries. The USA has 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA) and there had been an enactment of the 2004 
Revised U.S Sentencing Guidelines that is applicable to corporate defendants.  More so, the 
UK has in place, the Bribery Act 2010 that came into force in July 2011. The above laws one 
can say, have possibly made the boards to take additional responsibility of directors’ ethics 
compliance and training to reduce liability risk.  
 Some of these laws have extra-territorial capability that places legal responsibility on both 
small and large firms for the attitude of their suppliers plus distributors in global value chain. 
The after effect of the enforcement of these laws has had the impact of putting a hefty 
pressure on companies to seek effective non-corrupt companies to deal with in their 
businesses. This has had the effect of strengthening the internal anti-corruption and bribery 
mechanisms of companies. Internal compliance must be a key element of the board’s 
approach to risk management. The point the writer is making is simply that there are now 
embedded in companies compliance systems, robust ethical codes against corruption and 
bribery that are there not merely for ‘’box ticking.’’ The board of directors makes sure that 
these codes are respected in practice.   
Presently, most companies have started looking inwards, and fashioning out ways to make 
sure that they are not contributing or encouraging the climate of corruption. And a way of 
demonstrating this anti-corruption corporate posture is that the board of directors through the 
company’s ethical codes sends out a strong message and also leads by example, 
demonstrating ‘’from-the-top-to-bottom’’ attitude against corruption. The idea is simply that 
the board makes sure that the relevant national and international commitments for leadership 
against corruption trickle down through the whole company to the very last employer on the 
shop floor. Needless to say, where the external institutions are weak, the combination of 
corporate governance and ethics do play a much more rudimentary role to facilitate repeat 
business transactions.  
The writer, is of the view that it was the ‘‘surprising’’ corporate collapse of Enron that 
invigorated or triggered very serious attention by more companies over the establishment of 
ethical subcommittees and ethics code in firms. There was massive fraud and corruption in 
Enron. Of course, the directors indirectly hid massive loses and laundered money. 
Surprisingly, many corporate governance codes are just silent on any explicit mention of 
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ethics committee. This is not good given the frequent unethical behaviour and breaches (fraud 
is a typical example) perpetuated by some of the company’s employees.  
It is on account of the need to be behaving more ethically in business relationships, that some 
institutional shareholders are being exhorted to engage more with their investee companies - 
to act more as share holders. It all boils down to the fact that the management of ethical 
matters can be viewed as a form of risk management. And corruption and fraud fit 
comfortably in this template.  
 Companies that have been found negligent or convicted of fraud or other ‘’anti-corporate 
governance activities,’’ do get a mitigated sentence. This is largely in most of the cases, due 
to their being compliant and setting up of ethical committees and ethical codes in their 
organisation. Ethics program may involve a very small cost but in future it saves the firm a 
lot of money. A. Crane and others indicated that in the United States, for example, 
corporations can significantly reduce their fine once they have been found guilty in criminal 
procedures by showing that an effective ethics programme was in place.
293
   
The importance of ethical code has also been subtly reemphasised by J. Steven and other 
authors. They formed the opinion that the extent to which ethics codes are actually used by 
executives when making strategic choices as opposed to being merely symbolic is unknown. 
Financial executives are more likely to integrate their company’s ethical code into their 
strategic decision processes if (a) they perceive pressure from market stakeholders to do so 
(suppliers, customers, shareholders, etc); (b) they believe the use of ethics codes creates an 
internal ethical culture and promotes a positive external image for their firms; (c) the code is 
integrated into daily activities through ethics training programs.
294
                   
Business ethics and good corporate governance one can surmise are deeply rooted in the 
foundations laid out in global universal values. We have to note that Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)
295
has established a global consensus on the applicability of shared 
moral principles across various polities. Many of these principles are now reflected or found 
in some land mark documents on ethical business behaviour. And they abhor corruption. 
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Some of these instruments include but not limited to the followings: OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention 1997, United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC), World 
Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative, Transparency International 
Initiative Business Principles for Countering Bribery, International Chamber of Commerce 
Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery (ICC Rules 2005)
296
plus the UN Global 
Compact 10
th
Principle, to mention but a few.          
When companies adhere to the ethical codes or principles devoid of bribery and corruption, 
the effect is that these companies attract investors. The investors are willing to pay extra for 
well-governed companies. The Global Investor Opinion Survey that was conducted by 
McKinsey among more than 200 professional investors that collectively manage 
approximately US$2 trillion in assets in 31 countries, including Russia, revealed that a 
significant majority of investors are more than happy to pay a premium for well-governed 
companies. These premiums, averaged 12-14 percent in North America and Western Europe, 
20-25 percent in Latin America, and over 30 percent in Eastern Europe and Africa.
297
 
Additionally, UK Institute of Business Ethics found that companies that were implementing 
ethics training programmes did better than those that just professed only a commitment to 
only business ethics devoid of implementation.
298
It is the submission of the writer that it is a 
fact of corporate life, that when companies are publicly associated with bribery and 
corruption, it corrodes seriously on their reputational value. And one of the outcomes is 
simply this - a high propensity for loss of commercial deals or businesses. Of course, we need 
no reminding, that ‘‘excellent governance reputation,’’ is one of the most treasured assets for 
corporate survival.              
Adherence to ethical corporate behaviour may reduce corruption and it is a sign of good 
corporate governance. It is an important risk mitigation tool that can translate into very 
palpable benefits to the firm. Evidence of this was demonstrated in a study by Standard and 
Poor (S&P) 500 firms by Deutsche Bank that indicated that firms with strong or improving 
corporate governance outperformed those with poor or deteriorating governance practises by 
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about 19 percent over a two year period.
299
Additionally, a study conducted by Harvard and 
Wharton researchers found that 1,500 U.S-based firms with better governance had faster sales 
growth and were more profitable than their peers.
300
 
The author believes and is convinced that there is presently a growing recognition that when 
there is a corporate culture that encapsulates, encourages ethical behaviour and integrity, the 
effect is that robust corporate governance will be enhanced. This situation, will naturally 
translate into reducing the incidents of sharp practices in firms. Of course, sharp practices 
fuel money laundering in the bid to hide the gains because the proceeds have been 
illegitimately acquired.               
Frankly, and on the flip side of issues, the commercial world has witnessed cases of corporate 
collapses and massive financial losses that emanated from firms that had very weak or non-
existent corporate ethical cultures as pointed out above. This also included very lax 
governance behaviours. They experienced the presence of bribery, corruption and even staff 
intimidation as a result of powerful chief executive officer/s. We have to note that companies 
like human beings do not exercise a consistent moral behaviour. With significant growing 
transparency and accountability in a globalized economy, well-governed ethical organizations 
will highly likely acquire sound business advantage in the international business sphere.              
The crucial role of non-executive directors in the convergence dilemma                      
We have to be aware that legally, all directors are jointly responsible in the eyes of the law 
for the shortcomings in the corporate set-up. This is as far as their fiduciary duty is 
concerned. It may be fair to infer that non-executive directors are simply the mainstay of 
robust corporate governance. The right ones have to be appointed by that particular company 
to make this happen. Of course, when there is corporate stability and efficiency in the 
company, this will act as antithesis to fraud and corrupt activities in the company.  
Non-executive directors’ role in the company is two dimensional. Firstly, and most prominent 
of these two in the last one and half decades in the corporate world, is that they act as a 
counterweight measure to the executive directors. The essence is that the presence of the non-
executive directors would help to ensure that there is no one person or group of people that 
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will have an overbearing influence on the decision of the board. The second one is the 
contribution that non-executive directors make in the overall leadership and company 
development.
301
         
The writer posits in this segment of this thesis, that it is important that when non-executive 
directors are appointed in the corporate set-up to help stabilize the firm and combat the trend 
of corruption and money laundering, it is crucial that these appointments are made on merit. 
More so, the non-executive director/s must have an excellent background in compliance 
related matters in the corporate setup. And this is what they will bring on board to checkmate 
fraud in the company. Apart from their key contributions to the affairs of the board, non-
executive directors must be assigned to the key committees like the audit committee. They 
will be able to monitor the company’s financial reports to detect fraud. It is from here that 
their expertise will be felt and as a result, a positive trickle-down effect that minimises 
corruption will be noticed. Most of the booty got from corruption and fraud are laundered 
hence the convergence question.  
We have to bear in mind that when the Cadbury Report came out in 1992, it emphasised the 
massive contribution that non-executive directors bring to the table:  
‘’The committee believes that the calibre of the non-executive members of the board is of 
special importance in setting and maintaining standard of corporate governance.’’302 
Aside this, the OECD Principles, also echoed the importance of non-executive directors more 
particularly in monitoring financial reporting. It implored boards to assign sufficient number 
of non-executive board members that are capable of exercising independent judgement to 
tasks where there are potential for conflict of interests. Typical examples include financial 
reporting, nomination and executive remunerations.
303
Financial reporting can be doctored or 
fiddled to hide fraudulent activities that help to fritter funds away from the company through 
the laundering process.                  
The UK Code also recognises the swift importance of non-executive directors in the 
corporate set-up more especially in monitoring financial statements. The Code emphasised 
that the non-executive directors, should always try and satisfy themselves on the integrity of 
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the financial information. Additionally, the company’s financial controls and systems of risk 
management must be robust and defensible.
304
 
The writer points out that the message this Code sent out is simple - fraud can be hidden in 
companies by presenting false financial reports by the accountants. The money that is 
fraudulently made will eventually be laundered to camouflage the fraud and enable the 
perpetrators to spend the money in the legitimate economy. But the presence of capable non-
executive directors in the audit committee that are financially very literate by their training 
has a very good potential to checkmate this happening. In reality though, the aim is to reduce 
corruption in the corporate circles from the contributions of non-executive directors.      
A. Muravyev et al in a study of the UK companies, find a positive link between the presence 
of non-executive directors who happen to be executive directors in other companies and the 
positive accounting performance of those companies. They indicated that the effect is 
stronger if these directors are executive directors in firms that are performing well. There is a 
positive effect when these non-executive directors are members of the audit committee. 
Overall, the results are broadly consistent with the view that non-executive directors that are 
executives in other firms contribute to both the monitoring and advisory functions of 
corporate board.
305
Needless to say, excellent non-executive directors will always add very 
positive qualitative anti-fraud posture in companies. This will definitely check the frittering 
of the firm’s financial resources that usually happens through very dubious manner.      
4.3 Corporate governance theories and visible linkage to the convergence scenario. 
In this segment of this chapter, we have to bear in mind that in the corporate setup, the aim or 
objective of every company is to keep afloat and generate sufficient money from the 
business. One of the fundamental reasons to set up a business organisation is profit 
maximisation. However, behind the above aim, there have always been some theoretical 
permutations that have given rise to the idea that the company or firm as the case maybe, 
germinated from a ‘‘theoretical perspectives.’’ Granted that the company may have 
‘‘germinated’’ from these, it does not mean that the people that have been given the 
responsibility to ‘’look after’’ the company should be doing this in a ‘’careless manner.’’  
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This section will showcase the fact that of all the theoretical permutations, the agency theory 
aside from others has been the most dominant one that has been used. The writer, in the 
analysis, will be using this theory to bring to fore the difficulties it has brought into the 
company setup. The author will seek to justify or convince the reader that the agency theory, 
though prominent in playing a part in the company set-up, is also to blame in most corporate 
failures that suffered from a lot of fraudulent practices in their demise. The author will be 
using the case of defunct Enron in the USA prominently and repetitively in the analysis.  
The reason is simple: the facts and circumstances that were dominant in the demise of Enron 
are emblematic of key areas of the agency theory and others. This is irrespective of the fact 
that Enron demise happened more than fifteen years ago. But it still has the crown of being 
decorated as the ‘’greatest corporate bankruptcy’’ in USA history. It was not only Enron that 
was identified with issues of corporate theory in their demise. There were the cases of Arthur 
Anderson, WorldCom, Tyco International, Quest Communication, Computer Associates in 
USA and others places. The fact here is that fraud and corruption took place. As a result, 
money was obviously laundered in order to hide the source, thereby justifying the 
convergence question that is central to this thesis.                   
Back ground metamorphosis  
The first recorded non-financial institution that was established in the 17
th
 century was the 
Dutch East India Company. It had a diffused share capital
306
 with over 1000 investors, 
leading to an important issue of corporate governance: how their investment was to be looked 
after without misappropriation. Massive financial scandals followed in the French Mississippi 
Company and English South Sea Company in 1720.            
Adam Smith in the late 18
th
 century took a dim view of the corporate set up.
307
He stated that 
as directors of such joint-stock companies are the managers of other people’s money rather 
than their own, it cannot be expected that they will safeguard it with the same vigilance as 
partners of a private partnership. They will often see small details as unimportant and hence 
not pay attention to them. Negligence can follow.
308
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The author submits that this has close relevance to this thesis. There is no full-proof-
guarantee that when you leave an ‘‘outsider’’ to look after what does not belong to him, he 
will exercise an ‘’optimum attention’’ to do this with the aim of actually protecting the 
interest of the owners. As a result, there is the tendency that sharp practices will be present. 
This possibly means that some of the money generated through this venture has very strong 
potential to be hidden or undeclared. This same undeclared money will eventually resurface 
to present a legitimate stance.                  
In the United Kingdom, incorporation with a limited liability status was eventually granted in 
1862. Due to this, there was a rapid surge by people to incorporate companies. However, 
there were numerous incidents of early collapse of these companies evidenced by incidents of 
massive fraud.
309
   
It was likely in the emerging markets of the United States of America that what we now see 
as a robust form of corporate form that matured early towards the colossus it later 
became.
310
The pattern or form that characterised the formation of the USA largest enterprises 
in the twentieth century was this: entrepreneurs would found a business, succeed and 
eventually make the business grow with money raised from the banks. The business went 
public and issued new stocks. For some of the firms, the stock market raised capital for them. 
Others role was to provide an exit rout to the founders and their heirs when they intend to 
cash out or diversify. Although, the descendants sometimes were involved in the management 
of the companies by taking over from the founders, sometimes, they hired managers for this 
purpose. Some heirs sold off their stakes and the managers raised new capital in public 
markets. However for many other companies, the stock market initial role was neither to raise 
new capital nor to directly allow for initial exit when the founders diversified, but to finance 
the massive mergers at the end of 19
th
 century.
311
                  
A. Chandler made an influential analysis of how the ‘‘visible hand’’ of management 
eventually took over the proposition of the ‘‘invisible hand’’ of management earlier on 
propositioned by the notable great economist Adam Smith. With the advent of new 
technologies in the USA and the world, it became evident that individual entrepreneurs 
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lacked the requisite tools to make things happen. The task was very gigantic as exemplified 
with the construction of railroads across the USA.
312
 
On account of the above, the ownership and management soon separated. The capital that 
was required to build railroads was obviously more than that needed to start a plantation, a 
textile mill or even a fleet of ships in the USA. This made it very difficult for a family or a 
single entrepreneur to build a railroad. Even the many stock holders or their representatives 
could not actually manage this. The administrative tasks were to say the least very complex to 
manage. This could only be done smoothly by some fulltime salaried managers. It was only 
in the raising and allocation of capital, setting of financial policies and the selection of top 
managers that the owners of railroads had a real say in railroad management.
313
               
 Gravitating towards the convergence question at this stage of evolution, still presented the 
dominant question of how these managers were able to manage the firms’ resources without 
recourse to fraud. This was and still is a big issue in the corporate set-up. There were 
incidents of fraud. Needless to over emphasis, the extra money they made, was conveniently 
laundered or transmuted into the ‘‘legitimate economy,’’ hence the relevance to the central 
term of my thesis. It has been noticed by the author that whatever tempo or evolvement of the 
corporate theoretical stage, there is always the issue of some managers trying to cut corners 
and enrich themselves illegitimately to the detriment of the owners.             
In the twentieth century, the work of prolific writers like A. Berle and G. Means was possibly 
one of the most influential to analyze the evolvement of corporate governance. There work 
focussed on the idea that the growing concentration of economic power plus the increased 
dispersion of stock ownership had made the public firms in which there was the presence of 
separation and ownership, central to the economic activity in the USA.
314
It took almost a 
century in 1932 for the above authors to add their input on the first salvo fired by A. Smith in 
1838 about the possible problems in company ownership and control.
315
          
Suffice to say that the translation of possibly of about two-thirds of the industrial wealth from 
individuals to the ownership of very large public funded institutions virtually changed the 
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lives of property owners, individuals and the methods of handling property tenure. This 
basically meant that there must be a new form of economic organisation within the larger 
economy.
316
Interestingly, it was their classic effort that was accredited with influencing the 
legal and economic theory plus some US laws. But the law setting up the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was influenced by the Wall Street crash and subsequent US 
Congress efforts. Their work one can say was also very influential to the practical 
achievements of President Roosevelt’s New Deal that happened from 1933 to 1940.317 
Of course, it may be possibly right to say that the whole thing hinged on how managers 
controlled the assets to the overall benefit of some passive owners. The author posits that it is 
the work of A. Berle and G. Means that could possibly be used as a foundation of a new 
corporate governance theory - agency theory. Surprisingly, this potential was not quickly 
noticed by other subsequent writers.  
It is my submission that whatever postulation put forward by various writers, are all directly 
or indirectly contending on how managers manage the resources. The problem that is usually 
encountered is the diversion of the firm’s resources to other corrupt uses. When this happens, 
the proceeds will be hidden. The next natural course of event is for the managers or the 
culprits to reintegrate their ‘‘fraudulent gains’’ into the legitimate economy. And this is done 
by laundering, tacitly approving the convergence question that is the subject of this thesis.              
Agency theory and nexus to the convergence matter 
The development of corporate governance came from various disciplines. And the theories 
often postulated by different people emanated from different academic disciplines like 
finance, economics, accounting, law, management, and organizational behaviour.
318
We also 
should not be tempted to lose focus of the fact that agency relationship covers other areas like 
the company and its creditors, the employer and the employee.  
Another important thing to bear in mind is that whatever the theory that is out there, may not 
be applicable universally due to the diverse nature of the global economy. In this thesis, we 
are focusing on the Anglo-American corporate set-up, which tilts towards the maximisation 
of profit and also protection of minority shareholders.  
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It is fair to state that the background of the agency theory started with the work of A. Beale 
and G. Means. It is usually identified with companies that are set up with the characteristics 
of separating the owners and the control mechanisms. In fact, the theory later emerged from 
the seminal inputs of prominent authors like A. Alchian and H. Demsetz
319
and M.C. Jenson 
and W.H Meckling in particular.
320
The firm was explained as a nexus of contract that is 
located among individual factors of production. Agency theory explained that the company is 
a scenario of some constantly renegotiated contracts by individuals that have the aim of 
maximizing their contributions.
321
 
The essence of the agency theory is predicated on the problem of the management and 
finance. Here, the managers would raise funds and try and put them to a productive use or 
may even cash out their ‘‘interests’’ in the company. The financiers also need the managers’ 
‘‘special gift of management’’ to make positive returns to the funds invested. In principle, 
both sign some pacts that will elucidate what the managers will do with the funds, and the 
modality to divide the returns between them and the financiers. The problem here is that 
unforeseen contingencies are hard to decipher. It is then difficult to get ‘‘a complete pact.’’ 
This prompts a situation, where the managers are now allowed to have a say in the ‘‘residual 
decisions.’’ This is a right to make ‘‘substantial discretionary decisions’’ without recourse to 
the financiers. Interestingly, and from this point, there is no guarantee that decision would be 
made in ‘‘good faith.’’ And it concerns much of the constraints that the managers will put 
upon themselves or the investors put on them to reduce misallocation and induce the 
financiers to provide more funds.
322
      
In this agency set up, the shareholders are regarded as the ‘‘principals’’ in whose interest the 
company should be run. The managers are seen as the ‘‘agents.’’ The shareholders are 
usually classified as ‘’residual risk bearers.’’ It means that before they get their return on the 
funds that they have put in the company, other stakeholders should have been ‘‘settled.’’ This 
is irrespective of the fact that the shareholders contributed handsomely to the ‘’fund base’’ of 
the firm or company.  
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We have to note that in this theory, there are a number of drawbacks. This is hinged on the 
opportunism of what may be classified as self-interest of the agent. Let us take for example, 
the so called agent may not actually act in the best interest of his so called principal or may in 
fact act only on a partial capacity to his principal’s interest. The agent may have different 
‘‘risk appetite’’ compared to his principal. He may use his powers to his own pecuniary 
advantage against the principal’s interest.323  
There is also the problem of imbalance information between the agent and the principal, 
fondly identified or tagged ‘‘information asymmetry.’’ The principal is perhaps always 
identified as having in his possession fewer level of information and therefore at a 
disadvantage. Perhaps some people may begin to wonder how this fits into this thesis. The 
writer submits, that when the owners of the firm or company as the case may be, allow the 
managers to take control of the firms by way of management, some of these managers have 
very close proximity to different levels of information needed to defraud the company. They 
will make use of the information to the detriment of the shareholders. When they make this 
money, they will not want people to notice. They will devise different ways of hiding this 
loot which may include devising various forms of obscure financial vehicles in order to 
eventually end up using the illegal proceeds. They cannot get round this without being 
involved in laundering to reuse the money.          
In the context of control to minimise or avoid corporate lapses that brings in negativity in 
firms, agency theory adds a good momentum geared towards minimising the agent/principal 
issues. How this is true in reality is a ‘‘different cup of tea’’ as there are instances of 
corporate collapses with ‘‘Enron issues.’’ The expenses that are incurred to checkmate this 
going ahead are known as ‘‘agency costs.’’ 
M. Blair did indicate that managers are supposed to be the ‘‘agents’’ of a corporation’s 
‘‘owners.’’ However, these managers are supposed to be put under the radar to make sure 
that they do not abuse their powers. It is all these expenses, inclusive of the ones used to 
discipline the ‘‘messengers’’ to checkmate abuse that are classified as stated above, agency 
costs.
324
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E. Fama emphasised the irrelevance of ownership in a company as far as agency theory is 
concerned. The ownership of the money used to set up the firm should not be confused with 
the ownership of the firm. Each factor in the firm is owned by someone. The company is 
simply the set of contracts that covers the manner inputs are joined together to give rise to 
outputs and the manner receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. In the ‘’nexus of 
contracts’’ perspective, ownership of the firm is to say the least an irrelevant matter.325     
Other relevant theories connected with the convergence question         
We have had a possible encouraging view concerning the agency theory and its connection to 
the issues of corruption or fraud. This may be seen from the perspective that the managers 
abused their position on account of their contractual positions and advantaged assessment of 
information available to them.  
Very interconnected or closely viewed with the agency set up is the theory that has been 
classified as transaction cost economics (TCE). The work in this was expounded by the input 
of O.E. Williamson.
326
The agency theory is all about ‘‘the nexus of contracts.’’ TCE sees the 
company or the firm as a governance structure. O.E Williamson built on the earlier work 
done by R. Coarse in 1937 which presented an economic explanation why people choose to 
form partnerships, companies and other business concern instead of trading in a bilateral 
manner through contracts in the markets.
327
 
There was a justification in this theory for large firms or companies that usually provide their 
own internal capital markets. Here, the cost of any ‘‘improper action’’ by the managers may 
be reduced by what is termed erudite and excellent governance structure instead of realigning 
some incentives and then price them out. It may be interesting to ascertain what is meant by 
‘‘improper actions’’ by the managers. One does not need to look far to infer, that this simply 
involves ‘‘hidden misconduct’’ by the managers. It is likely a case of some corrupt activities 
that usually brings ‘’additional benefits’’ to the managers’ pockets that will eventually be 
reintroduced into the lawful or legitimate economy. 
P. Stiles and B. Taylor have pointed out that the agency theory and the TCE theory are both 
concerned with managerial discretions. Both assume that the managers are given to self-
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interest-seeking, moral hazard and that managers operate under ‘’bounded rationality.’’328The 
writer surmises that this means in the context, that the people entrusted with the management 
matters are likely to put in a ‘’non-maximised-effort’’ that is not in the interest of the owners 
or shareholders. And the author may be possibly excused from classifying this attitude as one 
that is tainted with corruption on the part of the managers. But the truth of the issues is that in 
this instance, the ‘’agent’’ usually takes advantage and get involved in illicit activities. The 
recurring decimal is simply that the managers whenever there is some window of 
opportunity, there is the tendency, some of them engage in corruption that brings into the 
context, ‘’dirty money’’ into their pockets.  
We should not lose sight of the fact that there is another relevant theory that has relevance to 
the issue of corruption in the corporate setup. This has been classified as the stakeholder 
theory.
329
Here, the idea is that a wider group of constituents are focused on. The issue here is 
that it is not only the shareholders that are supposed to be granted or rather given greater 
attention by the ‘‘agents’’ or managers as the case may be, but rather a more enlarged 
‘’interest groups’’ such as the employees, the providers of credit facilities to the firm, 
customers, suppliers, government plus the local community. The result or end product of 
paying attention to only shareholders is that their interests are usually seen to be very 
paramount to the ‘’agents.’’          
The writer points out that when the managers’ focus is on the larger constituent, the interest 
of the shareholders becomes less visible. But this does not mean that they do not get back 
some of their dividends after all other people have been settled. In other words, the 
shareholders in this context are known as ‘’residual risk bearers.’’ This means before the 
shareholders are paid, the agents must have settled other people like loan creditors. It can be 
interpreted as a situation where the shareholders have a vested interest and ensure that the 
larger society is also taken care of beneficially. It does not mean that many companies do not 
still focus on ‘’maximising the shareholder value’’ and concurrently, focus on the larger 
constituency.      
The situation may arise where the shareholders and the stakeholders prefer different 
governance mechanisms. In the Anglo-American type of governance that has been tapped in 
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some less developed economies like Nigeria and Ghana,
330
the emphasis is on the shareholder 
value. This comprises a board of directors that is made up of both executive and non 
executive directors mostly elected by the shareholders. However, in certain places some 
stakeholders like employees are by law, have their representatives on the company board - 
Germany is a good example.
331
        
Notably in this theory, it has been argued that the people responsible for managing a 
company must first of all take note of the interests of all the people in the company - 
stakeholders. However, the theorists have not been able to present a convincing case on how 
this can be achieved, for example by trading off one interest group with the other. Here, there 
may be no defined measurable objectives. The effect then culminates in leaving the managers 
unaccountable for their actions.
332
M. Jenson
333
believes that enlightened maximisation of 
value is identical to enlightened stakeholder value. The same structure is used in both. It is 
the belief or expectation that the requisite trade-off between the stakeholders will be 
successful if the managers use the long run value of the company or firm. 
The writer does not agree with this view. To begin with, where were the ‘‘managers’’ in the 
case of Enron? The company managers were aware that there were various stakeholders like 
the employees, the larger communities and others. Yet the company still found it convenient 
to behave in such a manner that completely jettisoned the stakeholder theory. It is no longer 
news that Enron was projected as a ‘’new model’’ in the USA of how a modern firm should 
be run, before it collapsed. It was showcased as a ‘’second to none corporate structure’’ in the 
Anglo-American corporate set up before the bubble burst. There have been suggestions that 
other jurisdictions, notably located in the ‘‘common law axis,’’ were beginning to find a way 
to mimic what Enron was supposed to exemplify. The company made enormous profit by 
defrauding the investors. There was glaring falsification of financial reports and the setting up 
of special purpose entities (SPEs) used to dock the regulatory radar. The state of California in 
the USA had a very negative dose of this ‘‘Enron treatment.’’                              
                                                     
330
This is not surprising as the United Kingdom was their colonial master. The tendency is to follow the United 
Kingdom model.  
331
This is referred as ‘’Codetermination,’’ and it applies to both private and public companies provided there 
are more than 2000 employees. It is deeply rooted in German corporate governance traditions.        
332
M. Jenson, (2001), ‘‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,’’ 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.14, No. 3 pp. 7-21.     
333
Ibid  
 126 
 
The author submits that it was due to the fraudulent activities of the managers in Enron that 
the company collapsed. The company betrayed not only its shareholders, but its employees 
and customers. It was part of the reason that the USA promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002 (SOX) by the 107
th
 USA congress.
334
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) were held 
accountable for the financial statements of their firms and could end up twenty years in 
jail.
335
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA uses this legislation in 
civil suits to crack down on CEOs. SOX also addressed the corporate scandals in WorldCom, 
and Arthur Anderson - the company that acted as Enron’s auditors.336          
Another significant theory is the stewardship theory. The theory draws its strength on the 
assumption underlying the agency and transaction cost economics (TCE). Writers like L. 
Donaldson and J. Davis in their opinion cautioned against ‘’swallowing’’ the agency theory 
in its entirety. The locus of their paper is that the agency theory emphasized the control of 
managerial opportunism by having a chairman that is totally independent of the CEO. The 
company uses incentives to bind the interest of CEO to that of the shareholders. They stress 
that the stewardship theory is for the combination of the two roles (CEO and the board 
chairman). This will help the shareholder returns. The essence is to give greater control to 
managers to take autonomous executive actions.
337The ‘’psychological state’’ of both the 
agent and the principal is also a crucial factor here. The manager may ‘‘decide’’ to act as an 
‘‘agent’’ or a ‘’steward,’’ while the ‘‘principal’’ can also ‘’elect’’ to allow the ‘’agent’’ do 
so.    
The author does not buy into the views of the above authors in the stewardship theory. They 
have taken a more relaxed approach to the issue that there should be the separation of CEO 
and Chairman in the company. My take, is that this has the potential to create a very powerful 
‘’agent’’ that can be very dictatorial in the management of the firm. This will give rise to 
autocratic style of management. This has the potential to materialise into a situation of 
‘‘sealed lip management.’’ Indeed, there is the likely tendency that others may be afraid to 
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confront the ‘‘agent’’ that has these powers when fraud occurs. And this provides 
unnecessary edge to the ‘‘agent.’’ It is an avenue to possibly engage in corrupt activities 
knowing that you are very powerful.   
So far, the writer has outlined the four major theoretical perceptions about corporate 
governance and their interconnectivity to the possible corruption question. These four are the 
agency, transaction cost economics (TCE), stakeholder and stewardship theories. However, 
amongst the lot, there is the prevailing view that it is the agency theory that has had the most 
profound effect, hence the emphasis on it. However, it is good to note, that there are other 
theories that may have also been credited as having ‘‘less impact’’ in their theoretical 
assessments. The author will mention them in a cursory manner. They include - management 
hegemony and class hegemony theories, resource dependence, path dependence, institutional 
theory, and network governance theory. The writer therefore submits, that the crucial noted 
issue with the theories is simply that whenever there is a ‘‘little loophole’’ with the ‘’agent,’’ 
or managers, the tendency is that they are likely to engage in ‘‘sharp practice.’’ What this 
translates to is simply, that they generate ‘’undisclosed wealth,’’ which usually ends up being 
‘‘transmitted’’ into the formal economy. Of course, the ‘’agents’ criminal ingenuity,’’ is 
usually brought into play to cheat the company.      
4.4 The essence of corporate governance in financial institutions: the bank as a model 
and implications in the convergence matter.   
In the preceding segment of this dissertation, emphasis was laid on the various major 
theorizations that may have impacted corporate governance. The salient point being that the 
‘’custodian of the company’s governance structure’’ would eventually when the opportunity 
creeps in, most possibly, will find a way to increase the ‘‘contents of his pocket.’’ Of course, 
this is usually to the detriment of the owners. It has been pointed out in this thesis that there is 
need for a positive corporate governance presence in companies to help checkmate the 
‘‘negative attitudes of managers.’’ The basic thing to note is this: it is arguably better to have 
a more intrusive form of governance in financial institutions with particular reference to the 
banks than there is in other generic companies for reasons that the writer will elucidate in this 
segment.     
More so, we should also bear in mind, that in generic companies and financial institutions, 
the ‘‘managers,’’ when they succeed in defrauding the firm, will eventually, launder the 
proceeds. The reader may be surprised at my continuous emphasis on this. The reason is 
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simple - it goes on to justify the convergence of ‘’dirty money’’ with corruption, irrespective 
of the manner used to corruptly enrich the ‘‘agent’’ in the above circumstance.     
Why accord special attention to banks?  
The writer posits that the financial institutions with particular reference to the banks should 
be accorded a ‘’special status’’ as far as ‘‘corporate monitoring’’ is concerned. They are 
special in the sense that the people entrusted to manage them, (mostly applicable to the 
directors) have to exercise the fiduciary duty. Of course, this is applicable to other non-
financial setups. But the distinctive difference with the banks is that this fiduciary task is 
more expansive in the industry.
338
The managers of banks, as well as having a fiduciary duty 
to their depositors, who in all honesty, are exposed to risks of losing their money (risk 
averse), are also confronted with their duty to their shareholders (who are also risk prone). On 
account of this, the issue of trying to solve the task of ‘’owner messenger issue’’ or 
‘’principal agent matter’’ that is fundamentally aimed at maximising the shareholder value is 
not appropriate.
339
           
The banks as a whole are the main or most important source of external finance in the 
economy, with particular reference to the small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This 
therefore puts them in a very strategic position to allocate capital and also in the corporate 
governance (CG) of non-financial companies in certain jurisdictions. The banks’ participation 
in the governance structures of the non-financial firms in the Anglo-American axis is not 
particularly visible. This is in contrast with jurisdictions like Germany and Japan where big 
banks hold large shares. This enables them to be institutional investors, and consequently, do 
have a say in the management of those firms.                                         
We should not forget that the banks are in the forefront of the payment system. Therefore, 
when we have systemic crisis, it is usually very costly to the society. If there is protection for 
depositors, this will usually help to dampen the effect. However, this increases the moral 
hazards
340
and possible adverse selection on the part of the depositors on which banks to 
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deposit their money. The above, will make the government to take drastic steps to protect the 
tax payers.
341
 
It probably, goes without saying that ‘‘excellent regulation’’ and ‘‘supervision’’ of the 
banking sector must form part of its corporate governance. These, will make it more difficult 
for the ‘’agent’’ or ‘‘manager’’ as the case may be to manipulate the system and gain 
massively from it. The absence of robust bank governance structure can lead to systemic 
crisis. If managers are unrestrained in compliance matters (this is part of governance issues in 
my opinion and possibly other people) by taking unnecessary risks to make more money, 
without taking into account the ‘’externalities’’ to the larger society, this may be a passport to 
bank failures. Hence, the particular attention to systemically important banks (SIBs).  
Funny though it may sound, the lax control in the failed Investment Bank, Barings, can be 
attributed to lack of corporate and compliance issues that eventually contributed to its 
collapse in 1995. The collapse was substantially caused by one man.
342
He traded fraudulently 
and incurred massive losses in betting on futures contract that was linked to the Nikkei 225 
stock index - more than £850m was lost. The Bank of England (BoE) on this occasion 
decided not to bail the bank out and allowed it to fail. Prior to above, it was BoE that bailed it 
in 1890 when it defaulted in its highly leveraged loan portfolio to the then Argentina 
government. There had been instances that the ‘‘Bankers Bank’’ stepped in to rescue banks 
due to their systemic importance. In the 1980s, the US authorities came to the assistance of 
Citibank and Chase Manhattan banks when it was apparent that they faced huge losses on 
account of the excessive lending that they granted to many Latin American countries (also 
referred to as Latin American sovereign debt crisis). This was done with the support of both 
the IMF and the World Bank. In the UK, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) was rescued with 
£45b in October 2008.
343
                             
The domino effect of bad governance in the banks can generate what is known as ‘’creditor 
runs.’’ In ‘‘bank runs’’ people will be tempted to withdraw their money from the banks. Only 
the very first creditors to withdraw their money may receive a payout in time and in 
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full.
344
Here, the readily available liquidity will be exhausted in time. This can even be started 
by a very small group of depositors or other banks in the inter-bank market. As a very 
practical issue, once a run is started, the three notable bank creditors - depositors, 
bondholders and other banks will be withdrawing their money.
345
 
There were bank runs by small depositors in the United Kingdom’s Northern Rock. The 
‘’down fall’’ of Lehman Brothers and the eventual take-over of Merrill Lynch were all 
attributed to imminent runs by banks in the inter-bank market. The availability of depository 
insurance can serve as mitigation to these runs. But its effectiveness, in this respect, will 
depend on the exact details of the policy taken out. Prior to the 2008 unforgettable global 
financial crisis, most depository insurance companies were geared towards taking care of the 
‘‘small depositors.’’ But with the ‘‘Lehman issue,’’ most countries were forced to make 
readjustments that enabled banks to issue bonds that were backed by states. For example, 
banks in the USA were and still being backed by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). 
 In Nigeria, this is the responsibility of Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). The 
idea is to avoid minimal disruption to the financial setups or markets and calm the general 
public. Sometimes, the bank can be ‘‘calmly’’ taken over to secure depositors funds and also 
to save jobs when the institution is under capitalised. There may be the feelings that this will 
also lead to ‘’bank runs.’’ In September 2018, the licence of Skye Bank in Nigeria was 
revoked by the regulatory authority Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the bank was 
replaced by another bank known as Polaris Bank Ltd. NDIC assured that the depositors’ 
money was safe. This calmed frayed nerves in that country.
346
Interestingly, the minister of 
finance in Nigeria has called for the prosecution of the directors of defunct Skye Bank on 
suspicion of stealing.
347
This may be a timely reminder that the authorities are willing to act 
when things go wrong.                                   
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In the United Kingdom, directors that have fallen short of their fiduciary duties as enshrined 
in the UK Company Act 2006
348
will usually when caught by the long arm of the law face 
consequences. This could be disqualification. If it is a criminal matter, they will face criminal 
liability. In October 2018, two directors were convicted by the court in London for taking 
kick-back from a company. The two directors were top executives of the now defunct oil 
company Afren and were found guilty of fraud and money laundering. Osman Shahenshah, 
the former CEO of Afren and Shahid Ullah, took $45 million from a secret deal that they 
made with their company’s business partner in Africa (Nigeria). SFO director L. Osofsky 
said the directors, Shahenshah and Ullah: 
‘‘failed in their duties as company directors, abused their positions, and lied to their board, 
....instead of acting in the best interest, they used Afren as personal bank account to fund an 
illicit deal, with no regard for the consequences.’’349 
The message is clear and simple - when directors fraudulently abuse their positions, they will 
not go free. 56 years old Osman Shahenshah was sentenced to a total of 16 yrs in prison, 
while Shahid Ulay, 59 got 14years.
350
                    
Aside banks’ systemically very important status351and their early vulnerability to runs, they 
are heavily regulated entities. These regulations are arguably basically directed to check-
mating the amount of risks they may take and to minimise, the effects on the tax payers.       
Other compressed matters arising 
It has been shown that the core corporate governance matters that came up during the last 
financial crisis were mainly related to lax board issues. There were question marks about 
leadership and oversight of risk management
352
in those banks and financial institutions that 
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failed or were witnesses to sever stress.
353
These are vital in banking. The banks are in the 
business of ‘’risk taking’’ to make their profits. A situation where some of the ‘‘managers’’ 
in order to circumvent the system and possibly make ‘’hidden money’’ by ‘‘foul means’’ is 
not a welcome development. Risks are taken without adequate consideration for the interest 
of ‘’other people.’’         
As a result, there has been regulatory control to contain this because it does not make any 
sense for the ‘‘agents’’ to be taking a deliberately ‘‘blind folded’’ attitude to manage risks in 
the name of making better profits. As at the time of writing, the functions of the board in risk 
management and certain aspects of executive and non-executive directors has led to the 
fruition of Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV).
354
         
The board functions of regulated credit institutions, including banks, are now unequivocally 
to comprise of: a) the overall responsibility for strategic objectives, risk strategy and internal 
governance; b) the responsibility to make sure there is integrity in accounting and financial 
reporting; c) the responsibility to ensure compliance with laws and regulations; d) the 
oversight of disclosure and communications in the company; e) the responsibility to make 
available oversight of senior management; and f) the periodic review of all governance 
arrangements.
355
 
CRD IV makes provisions for all directors to critically challenge senior management.
356
The 
directors (they are part of ‘‘agents’’ paradigm in the writer’s opinion) are to be independent 
in their discharge of functions. Should we now take this to mean that this is a move from a 
formal independence as such? However, empirical study has indicated that it is alright to 
have formal independence status on mitigation of risk-taking in financial firms.
357
In the UK, 
there is the view that the non executive directors have an important role to play in challenging 
critical company executive decision making.
358
Part of the reason that ‘‘Walker Review’’ 
came into play in the UK in 2009  was to specifically address corporate governance issues in 
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banks and other financial institutions that may have contributed to the last financial crises. 
The board functionality and risk management were some of the issues identified. Some of the 
recommendations can still be applied to non financial companies.
359
  
The UK Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 introduced the senior persons regime 
(SPR). The Act laid emphasis on the managers that are in a position in the bank and are seen 
to hold very significant portfolio to make decisions that may have the risks of very serious 
consequences to the bank.
360
These persons can be approved or given the stamp of authority to 
function as such by a regulatory agreement that will indicate the specific responsibilities that 
they will handle. This can also be altered or amended in future with the regulators if the focus 
or area of responsibility changes. The Act was mainly based or guided by the 
recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Reform in the UK.
361
 
The Act is an avenue to punish the senior persons that have contravened the Code of Conduct 
that is applicable to them, and are knowingly involved in a regulatory contravention by the 
said financial institution
362
(although to prove knowledge will require a significant amount of 
evidence).  
 ‘‘Agents’’ in financial institutions are also part of the board. In fact, they have the legal 
obligations to exercise their fiduciary responsibility under company law, as directors under 
ss172–174 of the Companies Act.363It is aimed to checkmate ‘‘corporate excesses’’ by the 
firms. On the other side of the coin is the regulatory law, exemplified by the UK’s Financial 
Services (Banking reform) Act 2013. A situation has arisen where both the corporate law and 
the regulatory law are all pointing towards the same direction: to contain the activities of the 
directors and by implication ‘’agents.’’  
Perhaps, it may be right to posit that we are entering (or already entered) a new phase of 
‘‘containment’’ against the ‘‘agents’’ to checkmate them with both corporate and regulatory 
laws. My take is simple - both approaches should be accommodated to ‘‘checkmate fraud’’ in 
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financial institutions. To quote a proverb, “it does not matter where a bullet is fired from; the 
important thing is that it hits its target.’’364The targets here are the fraudulent ’’agents’’ that 
eventually launder their ‘’spoil’’ to cheat the system. A situation has reached in the corporate 
governance of banks, where we may be witnesses (possibly, we are witnesses already) to 
regulatory liability taking the ‘’upper hand’’ over company law liabilities. We are watching! 
And applicability of the two to address the issues should not be seen as being improper.   
The truth is possibly that the regulations and the corporate law should be welcomed. It does 
not matter even if this is directed towards the financial markets. We should not forget that 
these regulations will enhance reputation, trust and integrity. As pointed out by R. Alexander, 
a situation where the investing public or suggestively the depositing public does not have 
confidence in the financial system, the effect will be that they are not likely to invest in them. 
Institutions and their professionals must make sure that they operate with integrity.
365
     
4.5 Conclusion  
It may be an undeniable element in this section of the thesis that aside other matters, the 
issues of ‘‘checks and balances’’ have repeatedly resurfaced in different ways. The possible 
primary aim of the checks and balances, have been geared towards limiting or stopping the so 
called excesses of the ‘‘officers’’ that are entrusted with the operation of the firm or company 
as the case may be. And this has been demonstrated by the legislations or laws that were 
issued by the relevant authorities. Some of these are still corporate or regulatory in character. 
In other words, they are encapsulated in corporate or regulatory laws.  
From the manner that things are happening in the corporate circles, with particular reference 
to financial institutions, the author predicts that in the near future, the corporate and 
regulatory laws will be amalgamated. Already, there is really no difference: a lot of company 
law is now regulatory in outlook. The essence will be to curb the fraudulent activities of the 
‘‘agents’’ entrusted with the responsibility of moving the firms, including financial 
institutions, forward. These include the activities of the members of the board of directors and 
others entrusted with the running of the legal persons, as well as those to whom management 
functions are delegated.  
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More so, it has been indicated that the board of directors play a crucial role to suffocate the 
occurrence of corruption in legal persons. Focus was directed to the importance of good 
display of ethics or ethical matters. The writer agrees with this. In other to add additional 
momentum to this, it is submitted that additional drive is needed in this area. By this, I mean 
that the authorities should start from a very early period in the society to address this. If it is 
possible, even from a kindergarten stage of a person’s life, ethical ‘‘behavioural 
mechanisms’’ must be taught in different stages of a person’s academic journey. By this the 
concept of what is right should be learnt properly. Gradually, the individual, it is hoped as he 
progresses academically before maturity, may be able to transmit this into the larger society. 
It is my hope that the moral principles that can govern a person’s behaviour in conducting 
various activities will be learnt. The suggestion may sound elusive or a long term project, but 
it is worth embarking on in my sincere observation.                    
The issue of whistle blowing was identified as an avenue that can be used to report 
infractions in corporate organizations anonymously. This is covered by legislations in some 
countries. In the UK, the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 1998 covers this. The USA 
also has a similar legislation. The feeling is that they probably do not go far enough to cover 
whistleblowers. It is suggested that the various jurisdictions amend their law to specifically 
allow for a stated monetary emolument for the individual that ‘’blew the whistle.’’ The 
‘’whistle’’ if finally proved to be authentic or correct should attract a minimum of fifty 
percent (50%) of the recovered sum. This should also be applicable to financial institutions 
with special focus on the banks. The percentage may look astronomical to some people. But 
the truth of the matter is that some individuals are likely to be motivated to report what they 
believe is an inappropriate act to the authorities. I am aware there may be instances of 
frivolous reports. But at the end of the day, it is highly likely, that this will yield the needed 
results.  
On the other side of the thinking spectrum is the fact that instead of ‘’losing’’ the money to 
the culprits, it is better to motivate whistle blowers to report the ‘’incident.’’ At least if 50% 
of the recovered sum goes back to the organization or the government as the case may be, it 
is better than not getting anything back from the culprits via the report initiated by the whistle 
blower. With this, it is highly likely that the whistleblowers will be motivated, protected and 
ready to take the risk of reporting the corrupt incident, comfortable with the fact that he is 
protected by the law plus the anticipated largesse or windfall. 
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At the moment in European Union, only 10 EU countries have a comprehensive law 
protecting whistleblowers.
366
The good news is that on 16
th
 April 2019, the European 
Parliament voted in favour to back the Whistle blower law in EU. All that needs to be done is 
for it to be approved by Council of Ministers, then transposition will take place over the next 
two years.
367
It covers a wide range of policy areas and inclusive of money laundering, 
banking and tax avoidance issues. When it comes into play, it is envisaged that it will save up 
to £9b in public procurement. People that want to report corruption in both private and public 
sectors can go directly to law enforcement or regulatory bodies. It is my suggestion that the 
‘’50% rule’’ be included.    
Additionally, in some jurisdictions with reference to Nigeria, memberships of some crucial 
corporate committees are not on merit. This, in some instances is applicable to the external 
auditors as well. In certain cases, this will depend on favouritism. It is suggested that the 
authorities should be bold enough to tackle this by exhibiting a robust corporate and political 
will. The after effect of not tackling this may eventually lead to ‘’corporate corruption’’ and 
the resultant effect of hiding the proceeds; and eventually undergo the laundering process.       
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CHAPTER 5 
The efficiency of the combative mechanisms         
5.1 Introduction 
Structural approach  
So far in this thesis, the writer has tried to present a number of issues relating to ‘’dirty 
money’’ which typically also involves corruption. The previous chapter highlighted the 
importance of the role that corporate governance can play in corruption matters. Without it, 
the tendency will be that there is likely to be a situation where the people entrusted to ‘’look 
after’’ the corporate set up will take advantage and abuse their roles. This occurs in form of 
engaging in activities that are totally incompatible with ‘’fair play.’’ When this occurs, the 
‘‘officers’’ enrich themselves, and also eventually engage in ‘‘washing’’ their illicit 
acquisitions.          
This is highly damaging to a country. Putting a halt to this, or at best reducing this therefore 
becomes a priority. The author is aware that such issues will not be eliminated completely. 
The truth is that whatever legislation that is out there, is directed to check the momentum of 
the negative anti-social activity.
368
This is why there have been some forms of ‘‘anti-unjust 
enrichment mechanisms.’’ And these, can come in various forms.  
The writer will endeavour, with regard to the above, direct the reader’s attention to the issue 
of ‘’soft laws.’’ The role it may have played and likely still playing to reduce the incidents of 
accumulation of ‘’dirty money’’ by various means will be highlighted. Indicative examples 
and explanation of what ‘‘soft law’’ is and its connection or importance to the convergence 
question in this thesis will be harped on. The fact that there are other sources of law that have 
also impacted on the control of bribery will be mentioned when appropriate. These can be 
called ‘‘hard laws.’’    
Also of importance to the issue of ‘’dirty money’’ that will find its way into the legitimate 
economy, will be the role that is also played by Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 
which has issued various pronouncements that impact on the subject of this thesis. These are 
usually done through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The author will 
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focus on some of the pronouncements of this committee that are of particular relevance to the 
subject of corruption or bribery in banks and measures that can be taken to reduce them.  
This committee, issued the first anti-bribery or corruption ‘’soft law salvo,’’ from which 
other notable ‘‘soft law bodies’’ built upon. They are therefore arguably the pacesetters. 
Their ‘‘pronouncements,’’ are seen in financial circles with special reference to the banks as 
a sort of ‘‘good mechanisms’’ that can be used to move the banking activities to a positive 
level and are generally adopted by the country’s regulatory financial apparatus (usually the 
central banks).                                  
Also introduced is the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), generally seen as the 
most effective organization dedicated to the reduction of money laundering and terrorist 
financing. Initially when it was set up, the focus was on drug money laundering. It picked the 
‘’anti-money laundering soft law momentum’’ from the initial pronouncements of BCBS - 
1988 Statement of Principles.     
The author will also inculcate the issue of the financial institutions with particular focus or 
reference to the banks making ‘‘stringent checks’’ on customers that they are about to enter 
into business relationship with, sometimes known as customer due diligence (CDD) or know 
your customer (KYC). This has metamorphosed into an acceptable mechanism that can be 
employed to wage war against ‘’under the radar transactions.’’ The initial checks have 
therefore become very necessary provided that they are properly done without deliberately 
‘’looking the other way’’ by the officers involved. 
Also noteworthy are the activities of two of the key International Financial Institutions (IFIs): 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the World Bank), set up as part of the reconstruction efforts after the 2nd 
world war. Although there are other respectable IFIs, our focus will be on the IMF and the 
World Bank due to the ‘’unique products’’ that they have brought to the convergence table. 
The impetus or the ‘’added value’’ they have uploaded to tackle the convergence question 
will be analysed. There may have been signs that the two organizations have employed a 
‘’tactical back door style’’ or ‘‘carrot and stick approach’’ directed towards achieving their 
objectives or intention when carrying out their activities.  
The writer will also provide a tactically compressed analysis or view on the activities of the 
Financial Intelligent Units (FIUs). These units are part of the Egmont Group. Their activities 
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have provided the required or necessary financial intelligence needed to subvert the harm 
done to the society by the issues of ‘’dirty money’’ that are ‘‘washed’’ by the perpetrators for 
integration into the formal economy. Their continued presence in various jurisdictions, has 
contributed in harnessing extra information needed to check the malaise; although the 
emergence of the FIUs in some countries has presented a significant financial burden on 
them. We shall also have a look at the Wolfsberg Principles and how far they have 
contributed to stem the tide of money laundering. There may be the argument in some circles, 
that their activities may be classified as being sort of duplicative of other initiatives 
engineered possibly by other organizations. Their members have increased over the years. 
They are more than 12 powerful private banks.               
The contributory essence of the Vienna Convention and Palermo Convention will also be 
highlighted as they are regarded as important precursors to other initiatives in the 
containment of money laundering. Of similarly great importance is the impact that the 
European Union Directives have had. The contributions they have made to reduce the 
circulation of ‘’dirty money’’ will be elucidated. 
5.2 The essence of international soft law interplay in the convergence dilemma. 
Any discussion or analysis of the essence of soft law and the role it has played in controlling 
corruption may be inchoate without firstly linking it within the context of the examination of 
the sources of public international law. This is important. It is a fact that most international 
rules or standards for financial institutions have actually evolved from a sort of nonbinding 
and ‘‘freely consensually’’ given mandates. This may also be seen to be in the context of the 
inadequacies that can be associated with sources of public international law.   
We may now turn our attention as indicated above to the sources of public international law 
and eventual ‘‘gap closing’’ by soft law to control corruption. In fact, there is an increasing 
feeling or recognition that traditional sources of international law are not adequate or clinical 
enough to explain and describe the normative developments of various areas of the interstate 
relationships.
369
The traditional sources of international law are embedded in Articles 38 (1) 
(a)-(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
370
The contents of the above 
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Article are always seen as definitive statements with regard to the sources of international 
law. However, the two most cited sources of international law are treaties and customs.
371
    
Treaties in international law usually create binding legal obligations that are specifically 
between states. These may come in form of multilateral, bilateral or even regional 
agreements. Many of these may contain specifics for the way disputes that may arise between 
the state parties are to be addressed. Differently stated, there are usually provisions for state 
responsibility
372
to be invoked in most of these treaties. This happens or occurs when there is 
a breach of obligation under that treaty that may result in liability and/or reparations as the 
situation demands. And this may depend on the subject of the dispute brought forward.                          
As things presently evolve, there is the feeling that the general sources of international law 
have become inadequate or not very convincing to solve or rather explain certain matters in 
the financial sectors or institutions and even between nation states (this can be in the context 
of international relations). The above observation can rear its head in the various sectors of 
the economy. These may include but not limited to the banking sector, the telecommunication 
industry plus the perceived prudent regulation of some big firms or the multinational 
industrial organizations. In these areas, it is possible that different multilateral nonbinding 
legal codes play significant (they have actually played this out) part in directing the conduct 
of the countries. The author’s attention in this is in the financial and corporate organisations 
with particular reference, sometimes, to the banks.  
It is probably obvious that in the financial sector, there is the non-presence of the traditional 
sources of international law that may have helped to tidy things up and to fine-tune financial 
standards. It is as a result of this, that many countries around the globe consented to 
implement certain standards generated by organisations from outside the scope of the 
traditional customary sources of international law. The implementation and possible 
acceptance of the various segments of the ‘‘Basel tutorials,’’ can be categorised as a 
significant pointer to the inadequacy of the traditional customary sources of international law. 
This, the author will provide further explanation later. Of course, we have experienced the 
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germination of the ‘’OECD pronouncements,’’373which is also in the mould of the ‘‘Basel 
tutorials.’’ It is on account of the gaps exhibited or created in the traditional customary 
international law platform, that these other sources reared their heads. These sources, one is 
happy to observe, are not in the ‘’hard law domain.’’ This may be debatable from a different 
perspective.  
The potency of soft law in prompting binding norms and principles          
The concept of international soft law as earlier indicated can be referred to include those legal 
norms and principles, including the codes of conduct, and also those transactional orders of 
state behaviour. These have to be accorded recognition in either a formal or an informal 
agreement that are seen to be multilateral. One can therefore, indicate that it is on the basis of 
the above, that it may possibly be right to stick to the observation that soft law usually 
presumes voluntary consent of the parties to carry out the stated issues enumerated in the 
arrangement. This may be with the intention of adopting it into national regulatory laws as 
the situation may demand. But the important thing to note here is that the agreements do not 
have the stated ‘’opinio juris’’ as in customary international law source/s.      
It is well known fact that international organizations, formal ones like the United Nations 
(UN) as much as the informal ones like the G8 and others, more and more make use of the 
rules that their original drafters do not consider to be ‘’legally binding.’’ These will have all 
the textual characteristics of the binding international treaties or resolutions of international 
organizations.
374
 
One is aligned to the observation that the international soft law exhibits the characteristics of 
being flexible. It is an avenue for states to embark on measures or steps focussed on 
regulating very sensitive or complex areas of international interactions between countries. 
The result, may be seen or classified as that soft law has the strong potential to fashion out 
the right mix of issues between it and the ‘‘hard law’’375in regulating a specific problem area. 
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The probable result will be that the soft laws will eventually be very noticeable in facilitation 
of the development of standards that will guide financial supervision. This can be anti-bribery 
standards in banking. Interestingly, these are done in such a way as to at least give an 
impression, even if it is in theory, to be seen to protect the states’ sovereignty or independent 
status. Of course, it will be surprising to see a nation that will like its sovereign status to be 
violated, however weak the state may appear to be seen. They will always want to be seen to 
be ‘’flexing their muscles’’ in international relationships with other countries.    
There may be some very evidential circumstances, where the soft laws will end up being 
promulgated or legislated into the national laws of countries the way it suits them. These are 
usually done by the countries sometimes to avoid some ‘‘international regulatory sanctions.’’ 
OECD issued its Convention on combating the bribery of foreign public official in 1997. This 
is a soft law mechanism. It also has its recommendations that came out in 2009 on tax 
deductibility of bribes of public officials. Prior to this, bribery money handed out to secure 
contracts were later deducted as business expenses by the people or companies involved. In 
order words ‘‘bribery money’’ had ‘‘tax deductable status.’’ Some of these companies were 
involved in transacting businesses in foreign jurisdictions with particular reference to the 
developing economies or less developed countries (LDCs). OECD as an economic block or 
organization was not comfortable with this idea and actually frowned at this vehemently, 
hence in 2009, it issued its recommendation on Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public 
Officials as indicated above.
376
  
Some hid under the impression that bribery was a way of life in developing countries (again 
this is debatable because it depends on which section of the developing country you are 
focussing on) and therefore, it was justifiably correct to ‘‘grease the elbows’’377of public 
officials in securing contracts. The impact, this had on other non-OECD states was for them 
to be seriously persuaded to find a way of reflecting the essential provisions in their local 
legislation. At this juncture, it is pertinent for us to remind ourselves once more about the 
subject of this thesis which has focussed on converting the corrupt proceeds into legitimate 
use by the culprits through money laundering.  
The ‘’legislating’’ of OECD anti-bribery convention that is a soft law into national legislation 
in one form or the other will help dampen the velocity of the ‘’dirty money’’ process. The 
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national legislation may have been done or in certain instances embarked on by some of the 
LDCs due to the fear of being denied market access into the OECD countries. You can 
imagine what it means to be denied economic or commercial interaction with many of the 
world’s most advanced economies. The consensus is that, the consequence/s will be 
economically devastating to the countries.         
Closely related to the ‘’OECD Convention’’ is also another soft law mechanism - the FATF 
provisions. Countries do not like being left behind in the implementation of the 
recommendations that are usually issued by this organisation. Although, it has a soft law 
status, but contravention of its recommendations, usually attracts very negative commercial 
or financial global consequences to the defaulters. They are not comfortable when FATF 
‘‘barks’’ in their usual way through peer review assessment. FATF can recommend that 
‘‘defaulters’’ be excluded from entering financial relationships with banks or ‘’other bank-
like-set-ups’’ located in developed countries. In fact, the adherence to FATF 
recommendations that has a soft law status, the author submits is the ‘‘beginning of wisdom’’ 
in financial circles.      
We should always bear in mind that the concept of soft law has been seen from various lenses 
by the academia and has ‘’suffered’’ from being analysed from various perspectives. It only 
goes to indicate its complexity possibly when looked at as a social science concept. 
Nevertheless, it may not come as a surprise, that on account of the above, international 
lawyers have therefore called into play, legal doctrines that directs attention to the main 
elements of the legal system. These include rule precision, quantum of obligation, delegation 
of authority that is used to apply compliance, and the sanctions involved.
378
All these, are 
flexible in nature and not static; and at the end, depends on the degree of their application by 
the states or organizations involved.    
When the rules are not precise, there is the tendency for the addressee to behave in such a 
manner with regard to the soft law to avoid compliance. There are usually provisions that are 
seen to be ambiguous in the agreement between the parties. The absence of precision will 
therefore be a window or excuse for the state to interpret it the way that suits them. In a 
sensitive area like banking regulations, parties could possibly involve themselves in going 
after vague agreements with the intention of avoiding their commitments and to interpret the 
                                                     
378
K.W Abbott,  etal, (2000) ‘’The Legalization of International Soft Law.’’ International Organization 54, no. 3 
401-419. The three elements of precision, obligation and delegation were used by the authors to assess the 
degree of legalization of a certain set of international rules or norms.   
 144 
 
issues in a manner that protects their interest. The writer notes, that if there is much precision, 
this may not be to the advantage of a party. It is better to have a little bit of ambiguity, more 
particularly, when a party or state may not be in a position to know how this can be 
interpreted in future. So a little bit of ‘‘ambiguous indulgence’’ will be recommended. It 
enables a party to wriggle out of contentious or very tight situations.   
When you have a look at the issue of obligation, it may extend from a legally binding one and 
to even some few ambiguous contents that are designed to be hortatory in content. At the end 
of the day, they are seen not to generate ‘’specifics that can be enforceable.’’ However, they 
are toned into very ‘‘soft forms.’’379The idea will be to create a sort of nonbinding 
commitments that can generate at most an ‘’accommodated pressure’’ but will in all honesty 
lack the needed binding international legal obligation in a very strict manner. But when this 
attitude is compared to obligations under international law, at least the states or the 
international bodies or parties involved actually have the competence to do so. And the 
parties must or do acknowledge that the source is authentic, authoritative and above all 
should have enforceable capacity.
380
Both precision and degree of obligation can be seen to be 
correlated. 
There is a third dimension to the legal system which is delegation. The settlement of 
grievances may be dependent about how the parties are willing to accept a third party to 
fashion out amicable acceptable solution. It is a fact that in public international law, the rights 
and the obligations that the parties have are usually used by the arbitral tribunals and judicial 
bodies as legal basis in arriving to their settlement for the parties. Contrast the above with 
dispute or ‘’settlement of differences’’ in soft law. Issues are usually mediated upon by the 
participants involved themselves. A situation where you find out that third-party-dispute 
resolution is lacking; it now falls on the relevant international organization and states to use 
soft and hard law international standards or norms to deal with the situation.
381
 
There is the provision of sanctions to address or evaluate the state’s legal scope in its 
international obligations and commitments. The issue of administering sanctions can either be 
in form of a directly or indirectly executed format. This will usually come into play if the 
indicated acts are deemed to be incompatible with the stated soft law. Here, certain benefits 
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may be withheld or there will be the imposition of penalty to the state or its citizens including 
its legal persons. But suffice to note that sanctions that have been attracted due to the 
enforcement of rights that arose under international law are not applicable in the soft law 
context. What this implies is simply that ‘’state responsibility’’ will not arise in a strict sense. 
The liabilities that are made available under that scope of international soft law can come in 
‘‘soft manners.’’382 
This can require the culprit to conform using a particular procedural style like reporting, 
consultation and sometimes a negotiation that is seen to be mandatory. The essence will be to 
harness a tangible manifestation of an honest assessment of that particular soft law. The 
sanction will usually have the capacity to influence the economic or financial conduct of that 
state or organization. There was a time when Austria, used the system of anonymous 
passbook in banking process (in 1999/2000). This angered a soft law body - FATF. The anti-
money laundering body was not happy with this. Austria was placed in their ‘‘bad 
book’’383and was subsequently threatened with sanctions. This was to come in the form of 
recommending that Austria be suspended from doing business with OECD countries. The 
good news during that period was that Austria subsequently adhered or positively responded 
to the demands of this soft law body.
384
 
This demonstrated the vast influence a soft law can have to sway certain financial issues 
more particularly when it involved the laundering of money. The fact is that some of the soft 
law bodies with special mention of FATF has over the years, cultivated a lot of respect from 
countries around the globe to necessitate the carrying out of their financial pronouncements 
or recommendations. Whether this respect is usually ‘‘voluntarily’’ given is a different 
matter. Countries are expected to adhere to these pronouncements without even questioning 
the ‘‘legitimacy.’’385The writer will later indicate why this has been the case.   
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However, conceptually, international soft law has the ability and strength as far as regulations 
in banking and other financial institutions are concerned; to make available, an opportunity 
between the hard and soft laws to solve matters. In banking, the particular soft law that has 
emerged involves arguably consultations and also negotiations among the parties in 
fashioning out the acceptable formulae amongst the national regulators.
386
 
Aside the fact that most states implement some soft laws into their respective national 
legislation, some notable economic blocks have agreed or committed to implement some 
financial regulatory soft laws within their block. The European Union (EU) is a typical 
example of the above. The EU has been implementing the various ‘’Basel Accords’’ into the 
union with their various Directives.
387
    
However controversial the issue of soft law may be, we have to continue to bear in mind that 
their contributions in influencing the regulatory template in financial institutions, was 
recognised by leading international financial lawyers.
388
For example, J. Gold, during his 
evaluation of whether some IMF regulations on currency could be regarded as soft law had 
this to say:  
‘’The essential ingredient of soft law is an expectation that the states accepting these 
instruments will take their contents seriously and will give them some measure of respect. 
Certain other elements are postulated. First, a common intent is implicit in the soft law as 
formulated, and it is this common intent, when elucidated, that is to be respected. Second, the 
legitimacy of soft law as promulgated is not challenged. Third, soft law is not deprived of its 
quality as law because failure to observe it is not in itself a breach of obligation. Forth, 
conduct that respects soft law cannot be deemed invalid.’’389     
It is important to note that the above author’s assessment of what a soft law should look like 
has been applied in international banking regulations. This will suffice if the particular 
instrument or report has at least a quasi-legitimacy attached to it. And it is evident that the 
instrument has a collective intent derived from the participants.
390
This is understandable and 
it would be unreasonable to expect those that have not participated in the initial formation of 
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the soft law to be willing ‘’performers’’ of the contents. However, some countries have found 
themselves in this bracket as far as financial regulation is concerned.
391
 
Indeed, the issue of ‘’soft law’’ and the role it has continued to play, both directly or 
indirectly, to checkmate the tidal waves of corruption, will be with us for a considerable 
length of time to come. Therefore, the reader should not express much surprise, if this 
resurfaces in subsequent section/s of this chapter. It is actually on account of the issues 
involved in transposing certain ‘‘pronouncements’’ into national laws that has made it 
difficult to shy away from the debate surrounding the soft laws.       
5.3 The role of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in the convergence issue     
We have above had an insight into the role that has been accredited to soft laws in fashioning 
out some recipes to counter corruption. This occurs mostly through legal persons with 
particular reference to financial institutions, mostly epitomised by the banks. The banks have 
over a long period of time acted as intermediaries or as one of the gatekeepers in financial 
circles. They have actually cultivated the impression that the economy cannot in the real 
sense of the word, do without them. In truth, they are key players in any economy and as such 
the relevant authorities should as far as possible do the needful in monitoring and keeping 
them in check. By this, ‘‘negative activities’’ will be minimised in these legal persons. As a 
result, corruption and its other ‘’subsets’’ will possibly, be reduced drastically in financial 
circles and the society as a whole. It may be unreasonable to expect that corruption that 
brings with it money laundering will be ‘‘completely wiped’’ off the slate. The sensible 
approach would be to expect in the society for criminalities to be reduced, even if this is 
achieved through ‘’some sort of indirect mechanisms.’’  
This links with the role that BIS plays in reducing corruption and money laundering via 
‘’indirect pressure.’’ Originally established in 1930392 as the ‘’Central banks Banker,’’ the 
Bank has played a key role in promoting economic stability. The bank gradually changed its 
role to tally with the economic tides of the period. Since the 1930s the bank has cultivated the 
cooperation of central bank governors. This has been evidenced by the regular meetings in 
Basel by central bank governors and experts from central banks and other agencies. As a 
result of the above cooperation, BIS was able to develop its own research in financial and 
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monetary economics. This research has aided in a very tremendous manner the dissemination 
of both economic and financial knowledge that can possibly be said to have also aided the 
fight against money laundering and corruption.  
The bank focussed during the 1970s and 1980s on managing the trans-border capital flows of 
countries. This was as a result of the oil crisis and the international debt crisis of the period. 
Interestingly, it was the crisis that we had in the 1970s that triggered the interesting issues 
that concerned the regulatory supervision of the internationally active banks. This eventually 
led to the emergence of the Basel Capital Accord in 1988 and subsequently its revision to 
‘’Basel II’’ and presently ‘’Basel III.’’  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)  
Amongst the most important of the BIS’s various committees is the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision - BCBS. This is an ‘‘indirect mechanism’’ that the central banks of 
most countries listen to when they make their ‘’pronouncements’’ and thus another ‘‘tool of 
soft law’’ within the financial institutions with particular reference to the banks.  
Some of the pronouncements have focussed on the way banks are to be regulated and 
governed, including how to improve the banks’ corporate governance mechanisms and 
indirectly focussing on how to combat fraud and to suggest ways on how the banks should 
have sufficient reserves to keep them afloat when there are downturns in their business 
environment.  
This committee is therefore possibly the primary global standard setter for the prudential 
regulation of banks. In fact, it provides a forum for the regular cooperation on banking 
supervisory issues. Its 45 members comprise central banks and bank supervisors from 28 
jurisdictions. It came into existence in 1974 as a result of the aftermath of disturbances in the 
international currency and banking markets.
393
   
The Basel Committee has become one of the most influential international financial standard-
setting bodies. Tellingly, it initially focussed on the G10 countries but has now expanded to 
focus or include all the jurisdictions where international banking activities are carried on. It 
has issued three key frameworks: Basel I, II and III. The regulatory capital reform package is 
a reflection of how the G20 in tandem with Financial Stability Board (FSB) plus Basel 
Committee clearly operate as a non-hard-law making entity. The aim is to promote sound 
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prudential regulatory benchmark on banking practices that will not be characterised by a 
casino-like or style business model that substantially contributed or worsened the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
394
While a higher capital level was considered as a welcome 
anecdote, almost none of the big or mega banks that could not find their feet in 2008 crisis, 
stumbled due to capital inadequacy but rather due to a lack of liquidity and an equally large 
deficit of confidence due to financial frauds as amply demonstrated in the GFC.
395
This thesis 
previously indicated that where there is a demonstrated evidence of fraud, the natural 
tendency is for the perpetrators to hide the benefit. They therefore launder the corruptly 
received benefits of the fraud. So what the BCBS brought to the table as anti-corruption tool 
is that the regulatory authorities utilized its adherence to reduce corruption in the financial 
circles.  
Possible reasons why polities adopt or use BCBS to control corruption or fraud 
One of the reasons the committee was called into play by its originators was to make sure that 
the banks have sufficient capital to withstand turmoil in the financial sector. It is also good to 
always bear in mind that the countries that have ‘’agreed willingly’’ to adopt this have 
actually in the real sense of the word little or no choice than to ‘’flow with the dictates.’’ This 
is particularly applicable to the countries that are outside the G10. Critically, the use of 
sanctions by the international organization has in the writer’s opinion clearly undermined the 
so called voluntary nature of the BCBS adaptation. The rules are not enforceable in 
international law but are clearly sustained by certain number of both market and official 
measures which have contributed to make them sanctionable and still retain their soft law 
status.
396
   
Most countries have little or no choice than to toe the line of adhering to the ‘‘Basel 
pronouncements.’’ This has been possible due to the fact that these countries are exposed to 
certain pressures or disciplines. The essentiality of market discipline readily comes to mind. 
Here, its primary objective will be to indicate that if countries comply with international 
financial standards, there is the tendency that funding or running costs are likely to be 
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reduced by the country and its financial setups. But this was criticized by P. Kenen
397
on the 
basis that the observations of the Financial Stability Forum 
398
(FSF) which was later replaced 
by Financial Stability Board (FSB) that suggested that the market participants and the Rating 
Agencies (RAs) are more concerned with the total compliance or adherence with 
international standards and less with the progress that a nation made towards implementation.  
There is official sector discipline. This can take the form of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)/the World Bank assistance. It has been noticed that the IMF used the Basel Principles 
and classified them to be the benchmark for a good banking regulation. The IMF members 
are usually evaluated under the IMF’s Article 1V for surveillance programs. The IMF 
evidently has discretion to make compliance to BCBS as a parameter for good banking 
regulation. Not only that, they can use compliance to BCBS pronouncements as a condition 
precedent before they can consider a country as being fit to be granted financial aid. The IMF 
permits a country to draw from its rich General Resources Account up to a specified amount 
over a certain period. As previously indicated, the member country will give something in 
‘’return.’’399The member country is usually ‘’directed’’ to adhere to what can be classified to 
be ‘‘prudently clean focussed best international behaviour’’ in banking circles. This will 
usually mean that they have to follow the BCBS banking ‘’pronouncements.’’    
The World Bank has in its stead sent out the signal that it would use or rather has used the 
Basel Accord as a sort of bench mark in its lending programs. Indeed, the World Bank once 
indicated that it expects that the international community is likely to expect all countries to 
adopt and implement the Basel Committee recommendations.
400
The Bank negotiates 
conditions in its Financial Sector Adjustment Loans. Indeed, the equation is fairly simple. If 
you want a loan for developmental matters in your country, you have to go to the World 
Bank. It is like a quid pro quo setting. Differently put, financial or lending favour will be 
granted to countries that go to the World Bank for financial assistance, but it must be in 
return for something from those nations - you have to abide by the BCBS ‘’pronouncements’’ 
to get the World Bank’s money. For example, the World Bank did adopt in the past, Core 
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Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 1997 (BCBS 1997) as a condition for releasing 
their money. Irrespective of the fact that the World Bank has continued to use financial sector 
adjustment loans in influencing a country’s development regulatory policy, it started as far 
back as many years ago (actually from the 1990s) to utilize conditionality programs less in 
prudential regulations but more for banks’ privatization and recapitalization programs.401 
In financial circles, another respectable reason that can be put forward as to why countries 
take up BCBS standards is the issue of market signalling. It may be expected and a likely 
valid point, that many countries on account of reputational reasons would want to be seen to 
have adopted the ‘‘Basel pronouncements.’’ They see this as a mark of excellent regulatory 
practice within their financial institutions. They also believe that it would enhance their 
chances in interacting favourably with other market participants by helping them to access 
the low cost-funding from banks and the capital markets. In short, some of the countries 
would want to present a sort of ‘’we have arrived stance’’ to the world that they now have in 
their stead a sophisticated apparatus and that they have the approval of the G10 countries.  
Behind the scenes in the above market signalling, national regulators may have the feeling 
that they may not in actual fact save costs by adopting BCBS, but they would want to get 
involved with this just simply to signal to others that they are now very sophisticated. This 
attitude is laughable but that is the reality on the ground. And whatever version of the 
requirements that is expected of them, a solution would be for the countries to try and 
implement the version that may be less harsh.
402
   
Another reason may be the issue of trans-border spill-over of negativities. Here you are 
probably going to generate matters of bad externalities from lax jurisdiction that evidently 
has a more relaxed financial atmosphere than that of the G10 countries. Some banks will now 
have the tendency to move to the environment that has a lax regulatory atmosphere. This can 
be called regulatory arbitrage in financial circles and this is what the BCBS will seek to 
reduce or avoid. There is the fear that the area with the relaxed financial regulations may end 
up being the dumping ground of underpriced financial assets. This will not be good for the 
overall financial global banking setup.   
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We may quickly consider the factor of restricted access to the markets. This is important and 
arguably and realistically a valid reason for the banks in the non-G10 countries to be eager to 
adopt and accommodate the BCBS ‘‘pronouncements.’’ The fact is that a national authority’s 
decision to restrict its own market access is highly likely to influence other (United States of 
America fits this bill) countries to adopt International standards. Of course, the country must 
be seen to have solid international financial clout to persuade other less sophisticated 
financial countries to follow suit and ‘’fall in line’’ with what is required of them to do. When 
the ‘’Basel I’’ came up, the Core Principles and the Capital Accord described ‘‘being 
adequate’’ to be in tandem with compliance with Basel Committee. In the European 
Economic Area (EEA), the Second Banking Coordination Directive allowed members to 
restrict access to third-country banks whose home country banking mannerisms fell short of 
EU standards.  
Interestingly, in the US the Federal Reserve is granted the power to issue licences to operate 
banks to foreign banks. But this is on the condition that they have to be subjected to, on a 
consolidated basis to a close scrutiny in terms of supervision by their home country 
regulators.
403
They must be sufficiently capitalised and also excellently managed. The US 
authorities can withdraw banking licences of foreign banks operating in the US if they feel 
that those banks are not adhering to what the US classifies as good international standard. Of 
course, the US authorities will expect these foreign banks to adhere to international standard 
like those that are issued by BCBS. This therefore increases the importance that is attached to 
Basel Committee pronouncements.      
The US, the UK, and the EU have laws in place that are mirrored towards stipulating that for 
foreign banks to gain access into their jurisdiction and operate their banking, they must be 
seen to have adhered to the BCBS standards. The implication of this, is that the supervisory 
regimes in the non-G10 countries will be seen to be adequate if they embrace or adopt the 
‘’Basel pronouncements.’’ Financial Stability Forum (now changed to Financial Stability 
Board) captured the above this way when it stated that national authorities should be 
encouraged to give greater consideration to a foreign jurisdiction’s observance of relevant 
standards as one of the factors in making market access decision.
404
The relevant standards 
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here include but not limited to the ‘‘BCBS pronouncements.’’ And in fact some of these 
when they are made, if the national banking authorities adopt them, and the tenets are 
practiced by the banks, will assist in checkmating corruption. An example is the BCBS 
guidelines on corporate governance.
405
 
Governance plus compliance issues matter a lot in reducing corruption even in non-financial 
institutions. It is my submission that some of these Principles (they are 13 Principles) of bank 
governance put forward by BCBS in its entirety, will surely be very beneficial in curbing 
excesses in the way the banks are run. For instance, Principle 1 emphasised the importance of 
the board’s responsibility. The approach on corporate culture and values as indicated in 
paragraph 29 of Principle 1 urged that acceptable and unacceptable behaviours have to be 
defined. The firm should disallow such behaviours that could lead to any reputational risks, 
fraud, anti-competitive practices, bribery, corruption and money laundering or the violation 
of consumer rights to mention but a few.
406
 
When this is achieved, there is highly likely to be a positive impact in checking the corrupt 
activities that go on in the banking sector. Of course, this transmits to the society as a whole 
due to the important role that the banks play in the economy. The authorities will be taking a 
great risk if they ignore the banks. It will be to their peril. And we are all witnesses, to the 
negative outcomes during the various financial crises with the effect of the 2008 still 
lingering around the society.   
In addition, in December 1988, the committee issued a Statement of Principles.
407
This was 
done by the committee in full recognition that criminals do infiltrate the banking institutions. 
They see them as primary targets to be used to launder criminal proceeds. It was here that 
major concern on customer diligent identification was raised including other issues like 
legislative compliance, high ethical matters or standards of conformity, record keeping and 
systems, staff training and cooperation with national enforcement organs without the breach 
of customers’ confidentiality. This pronouncement was the galvanizing push that other 
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subsequent non-hard-law bodies adapted as a foundation to prepare their anti-money 
laundering literature or pronouncements after 1988. This presented a solid foundation or 
resource platform for subsequent anti-money laundering organization to develop their 
literature. Readily and with special reference, FATF comes to mind. Also other 
pronouncements like Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) - Customer due 
diligence for banks, and General guide to account opening and customer identification 2003 
are equally very important.              
Regulatory cost/s is a reason. It a well known fact that designing a regulatory apparatus or 
regime can incur a lot of financial costs for the countries involved. This is so due to the fact 
that high expertise is usually required for regulators and staff to fashion out the regulatory 
policy. Most non-G10 countries with particular reference to some developing countries may 
find it very difficult to provide the funds to set this up. On account of this, there is the 
possibility, that a global regime will be viewed as being less expensive because it has been 
taken off the shelf even when implementation and enforcement may still present additional 
burden to some countries.
408
    
The voluntary nature that has long been attached to the adherence of the BCBS is not actually 
in the real sense of the word so. The non-G10 countries with particular reference to the 
developing ones were ‘’forced’’ to accept these norms that are not necessarily suitable to 
their ‘‘economic and financial banking local practices.’’ These countries have not been 
allowed to be part of the inner caucus that makes the decision. They are ‘‘forced’’ to follow 
the dictates of the G10 on the outcome due to the fact that they are aware of what would 
befall them if the reverse is the case. This in my opinion calls for the examination of the 
legitimacy of these pronouncements. How can somebody that is not part of the decision 
making body be ‘’forced’’ into accepting these pronouncements. It does not embrace equity 
and fair play. The development one can say has not been an inclusive one. Of course, other 
opinions abound.  
5.4 The relevance of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as a necessary player 
The background and formation 
                                                     
408
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It is on account of globalization, that some economic and financial barriers were softened to 
enable quick transfers of goods and services in various sectors. There were instances of 
corrupt activities and criminal ventures that generated a lot of ‘’under the radar incomes.’’ 
However, there was the problem of the illegally generated money that was laundered across 
the globe, having the probable ability or very serious potential (actually studies have 
indicated that disruption is real) to disrupt the economy if not checkmated. The relevant 
global authorities were obviously alarmed and concerned about the disruption that money 
laundering would cause to both national and trans-national economies. We have to remember 
that the laundering of money is the convergence point in this thesis.  
To add credence to the possible fact that disruption is real, the IMF’s executive board once 
indicated or emphasised that money laundering is ‘‘a problem of global concern’’ that 
threatens to undermine the stability and integrity of financial markets.
409
The comment made 
does not surprise some, as it has been noticed that combating money laundering has become 
IMF ‘’core responsibility.’’410The amount of criminal money that is laundered across the 
globe from criminal activities which of course includes drug related matters is very vast. It is 
very difficult to state categorically the specific amount. However, certain reports have 
indicated that this could be in excess of billions of US dollars a year.
411
It was noted or 
estimated (by the World Bank) that the proceeds of corruption of which much is laundered 
has in actual fact equalled loses of between twenty to forty percent (20% to 40%) of the 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in developing countries.
412
Also in Africa alone, 
there is the estimate that the cost of corruption and money laundering has been put to more 
than US$ 148 billion per year. This is believed or thought to be a representation of 25% of 
Africa Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
413
But we have to warn ourselves that these figures 
presented, are just estimates. It is on account of the fact that the process is very opaque, that it 
is difficult to put down a specific amount that is laundered, but one thing is certain, it is a 
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colossal amount. We should bear in mind, that the fact that some of the figures come from the 
World Bank or the IMF do not make them critique free.   
It is as a result of the negativities associated with the issue and threat presented by money- 
laundering to global financial stability (initial efforts was on drugs) that a group of countries 
known as the G7 came up with the formation of FATF in 1989.
414
The G7 countries that had 
interest actually prior to the formation mandated a task force:  
‘‘to assess the results of cooperation already undertaken in order to prevent the utilization of 
the banking system and financial institutions for the purposes of money laundering, and to 
consider additional preventive efforts in the field, including the adaptation of the legal and 
regulatory systems so as to enhance regulatory judicial assistance.’’415 
The consensus was that the problem ‘’has reached devastating proportions.’’416The FATF is 
located or shares the same office with OECD in Paris. As of 2018 it was made up of 35 
member jurisdictions plus 2 regional organizations. The organisation represents most major 
financial centres in the world.
417
 Without much possible contradiction, the FATF is the only 
international body that was set up or established that is solely dedicated to the fight against 
financial crime. In its bid to contain this, it expanded into regional bodies located in strategic 
regions of the globe. These are known as Financial Action Task Force Style Regional Bodies 
(FSRBs). They are nine in number namely - Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
(APG), Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) based in Port of Spain, Trinidad 
and Tobago; Eurasian Group (EAG) based in Moscow, Russia; Eastern & Southern Africa 
Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Central 
African Anti-Money Laundering Group (GOBAC) based in Libreville Gabon; Latin America 
Anti-Money Laundering Group (GAFILAT) based in Buenos Aires, Argentina; West Africa 
Money Laundering Group (GIABA) based in Dakar Senegal; Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) based in Manama Bahrain; and finally, Council 
of Europe Anti-Money Laundering Group (MONEYVAL) based in Strasbourg, France 
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(Council of Europe). They all constitute a global network to combat money laundering, 
financing of terrorism and the financing of weapons of mass destruction.
418
      
FATF initial mandate when it was set up in Paris in 1989 in response to the growing threat 
posed by international money laundering was to examine money laundering techniques and 
trends. Other reasons, included but not limited to setting out measures to combat them and 
then to review the action taken at both national and international levels. In fact, as terrorist 
financing has risen up in the international agenda, the FATF’s role has naturally and 
incrementally extended to encapsulate Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF). And as of 2012, its 
remit was extended to include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).
419
We should note that laundering of money that FATF is poised in tackling involves 
illegitimate source of funds whilst terrorist financing is concerned with the illegitimate use of 
the funds. FATF as a result of the post 9/11
420
terrorist event in the USA had to incorporate 
anti-terrorist recommendations to accommodate the dictates of that event.                     
Indeed, FATF was initially designed to broadly cooperate in a cross-border or trans-national 
manner anti-money laundering efforts. And to put in place standards that would make 
countries to embrace both legal and regulatory steps that would prevent their financial set-ups 
from being used for criminalities.
421
This anti-money laundering outfit recognises the 
monumental issue of money laundering plus other financial crimes as a serious threat to the 
continuous systemic wellbeing of the global financial systems. It is on account of this, that it 
directed its area of focus, not only to drug related matters but to other areas of crime that the 
culprits would want to disguise the profits, with the aim of reusing the gains. 
Initially, serious attention was directed to the matter of drug dealing and as a result, the 
general public may have had the impression, albeit erroneously, that money laundering was 
synonymous with drug dealing. Indeed, money laundering scope extends beyond this. And is 
inclusive of other financial or economic crimes that have the potential or ability to permeate 
and simultaneously impact the stability of the banking, securities and the insurance markets. 
The writer, is quick to point out that there are ways that money laundering if allowed to 
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continue, can negatively have a detrimental effect on the financial system with special 
reference to the banks. A typical example is the use of alternative payment systems like the 
use of smart cards and the internet banking when not properly monitored.                              
We should also be aware that initially, there were the serious issues of the Offshore Financial 
Centres (OFCs). Some of them posed (although it can be said now that the gap has been 
closed by legislations) serious threat to the financial system due to inadequate regulations. 
They encourage regulatory arbitrage in some instances and lack the required tools to do 
proper customer identification. Indeed, there was a time that there was increase in the number 
of jurisdictions due to the integration of the financial systems that did offer services that were 
devoid of the required control or regulation. So, the coming into play of FATF one can 
honestly submit should be seen as a welcome relief to help control the financial excesses that 
occur due to money laundering.                                
FATF coercive status   
Part of the principal issues, is simply, that when corrupt money is generated, the perpetrators 
will engage in money laundering to enable them disguise the proceeds and enjoy the fruits of 
their perceived labour. It is very difficult to separate corruption with money laundering. They 
complement each other. Once the money reaches the money laundering stage, there is the 
convergence of the central term of this thesis. Indeed, one of the institutions or organizations 
that can be used to minimise or prevent the laundering gaining ground is through the use of 
the FATF Recommendations. But the interesting thing to note here is that FATF as a body 
does not have the legitimate status to actually enforce its mandate in true legal sense.       
It must be noted, that FATF is simply a ‘’soft law organization.’’ But the curious or 
interesting aspect is that it has been given ‘’sufficient teeth’’ to attack non-principal members 
(and mostly non-members) from the developing world from the support it got from some 
International Financial Organizations (IFIs).
422
Apart from this, the core members of this body 
are also part of the OECD and basically the members of the developed world. The trajectory 
is like this: for the non-principal members to access support from the recognizable global 
financial institutions, they are made to agree to accept as part of pre-conditions, the contents 
of FATF Recommendations.
423
To be fair in the analysis, this is also applicable to the 
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principal members, but the only difference here is that not everyone is part of the decision 
making organ and certain matters may be possibly masked by their peer review process put in 
place by the organization.        
FATF, can use its internal mechanism of labelling a country as non-cooperative to 
demonstrate its ‘‘coercive tendency’’ or can call into play one of its potent recommendations. 
The organization is made up of not less than 130 members worldwide and all the members of 
OECD are automatically FATF members. You can imagine what it will look like if a nation 
is excluded from conducting financial business with all other members of the above group. I 
guess no one will be willing to be caught in ‘‘anti-FATF web.’’ The truth is that FATF has a 
sort of incremental coercive mechanisms that it uses to bring an earring member to abide by 
its recommendations. The ultimate one is expulsion,
424
but FATF has not actually used this 
coercive tool. It can use the recommendation that would notify other members to closely 
monitor any financial transaction with another recalcitrant member.
425
 
The above readily calls for attention whilst FATF recommendations were metamorphosing, 
how some countries got some ‘‘doses of FATF medicine.’’ As far back as 1996, Turkey was 
involved. Turkey, still possibly nurses the intention of joining the European Union. After 
what looked like FATF had used other options to make Turkey pass a law to prohibit money 
laundering failed, the organisation resorted to issuing a press release. FATF advised their 
members to be wary of entering financial transactions with Turkey. And they were advised to 
closely scrutinize these financial relationships with businesses and individuals based or 
domiciled in Turkey.
426
The public reputational setback or opprobrium this brought to Turkey 
was sufficient for that country to immediately change their mind and comply. Turkey not 
only enacted anti-money laundering law, it also complied with other required standards.
427
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In Austria in 1999, the government or the banking institution was involved in a system of 
banking secrecy. Simultaneously at that time they were also investigated for being in serious 
breach of the EU money laundering Directive by European Commission. It was not a good 
period for them. Consequently, in 2000, the FATF brought in their sledge hammer. FATF 
wanted to suspend them from OECD unless Austria agreed to perform two things. One was 
for it to immediately indicate that all matters concerning the system of anonymous bank 
passbook must be suspended forthwith before June 2002 in tandem with the then 40 
Recommendations. Secondly, Austria must put in place a legislation that prohibits opening of 
anonymous passbook bank accounts and must eliminate or wipe off all existing anonymous 
bank accounts. The government finally caved in and responded to FATF demands.
428
              
The ‘‘good catch’’ is that we are aware that FATF may not have the power to sanction erring 
non-members. But it can direct its members to stop or review their financial relationships 
with banks in the jurisdiction of the non-member. It can call into play its R21.
429
This was the 
case with an offshore jurisdiction known as Seychelles. Here, the government enacted a law 
which basically encouraged money laundering. This was called the Economic Development 
Act (EDA).
430
This law granted immunity from any criminal prosecution to the ‘‘so called 
investors’’ of $10m or more in approved investment schemes! Not only this, their assets were 
protected from government compulsory acquisition or sequestration (taking over of assets). 
Laughingly, an exception to the above immunity was only applicable to drug dealing or acts 
of violence only in Seychelles. What came next was that on account of FATF warning, this 
attracted international attention or ‘‘anti-Seychelles-feelings.’’ Many governments advised 
their financial institutions not to enter into financial transactions with them. Of course, the 
pressure was sufficient for them to rescind the negative legislation.    
Indeed, the ‘’devilish purpose’’ of the above EDA was captured clearly in the words of the 
then FATF President, R. K. Noble, then US Treasury Under-Secretary for Enforcement:  
‘‘the clear design of the Seychelles law is to attract capital by permitting international 
criminal enterprises to shelter both themselves and their illicitly-gained wealth from pursuit 
by legal authorities. Drug traffickers and other criminals can enjoy the spoils of their illegal 
activities secure in the knowledge that Seychelles authorities will protect them. This poses a 
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grave threat to efforts to combat money laundering and maintain the integrity of the world’s 
financial systems.’’431 
The implication of FATF action, illustrated the fact that when it stings, it can be financially 
venomous and reiterative of its coercive status. And this is clearly very helpful in tackling the 
convergence question at any point in time, the writer submits.               
On the above, it was also indicated that: 
‘‘nasty noises from abroad has had their effect...The initial batch of interested ‘’investors’’- 
some South Africans, Italians and Britons among them - have fled, many leaving high piles of 
large and unpaid hotel bills behind them to show the height of their calibre.’’432     
Indeed, as indicated, as far back as 2000 the FATF used its coercive tool of ‘‘identify and 
shame’’- the list of Non Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs). These were 
jurisdictions noted for not participating in the general move towards financial regulations plus 
greater international cooperation. As pointed out, they were countries that offered financial 
services under strict banking secrecy and without control and regulation by the authorities. Of 
course, the NCCT initiative proved to be successful. At least, it got the countries to address 
the issues through legislation and infrastructure.  Of the 47 countries that their systems were 
initially reviewed as at 2000 and 2001, a total of 23 were listed as NCCTs. This number 
reduced to 15 and by 2001, there were only eight. And by the end of 2007, the list was 
empty.
433
 
On a critical perspective, the writer notes that the NCCT was seen to be a sort of blunt 
instrument characterised with less tact. In fact, countries were either on the list or were not. It 
made no distinction between the various levels of deficiencies.
434
It was as a result of this that 
FATF replaced it with a friendly and acceptable mechanism of coercion known as 
International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) as far back as 2007. This group has instead 
aimed to engage erring countries in dialogue with the intention of making them to improve 
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AML and CTF regimes.
435
The result is still that no country engaged, has demonstrated its 
willingness to be caught in ‘‘FATF cobweb of shame.’’ They have always wanted to comply 
and indeed, have actually ‘’complied officially.’’                 
Nigeria was not spared with the FATF possible hammer on suspension. Nigeria Financial 
Intelligence Unit (NFIU) operated under the auspices or possible close supervision of that 
country’s corruption agency EFCC. As a result of this, Nigeria got suspended by the Egmont 
Group.
436
FATF subsequently wrote Nigeria and informed them that as a matter of necessity 
and deep concern, NFIU must be separated from EFCC. If not, FATF would have suspended 
their proposed visit to Nigeria as at 2017. The Nigeria government quickly got the message, 
passed a legislation that separated the NFIU from the EFCC.
437
And part of the galvanizing 
tonic or fillip to do this, is or rather was the electioneering anti-corruption posture presented 
by President Buhari administration.  
The administration made the issue of tackling corruption and money laundering to be its 
principal focus. In any case, whether the war was won should be judged by history. At the 
time of writing, there were negative responses from some people and organizations on how 
the corruption war and money laundering was fought in Nigeria. There was the impression 
that it was selective and partial. For you to be shielded, you had to cross-carpet to the ruling 
party. And instances of this abound as typically evidenced by the cross-carpeting of Godswill 
Akpabio. He was a former governor and the opposition minority leader in Nigeria senate (he 
was in People Democratic Party) from the oil rich state of Akwa Ibom. He crossed the floor 
to the president’s party - All Progressive Congress (APC).  
It has been alleged that in his own case, he deposited close to £2billion pounds in three banks; 
namely Polaris, Fidelity and United Bank for Africa (UBA) located in his state capital. In 
these three banks, there were no records of who the depositor was. They were just unrecorded 
deposits which the three bank managers kept in their respective bank vaults. It was as a result 
of discrete investigation by officials of the regulatory authority of Nigeria - Central Bank of 
Nigeria, possibly and evidently after a tip off, sent auditors to the banks. The managers were 
not able to present a credible explanation on why they kept such huge unrecorded cash in 
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violation of known banking practices in their respective vaults for about four good years. The 
findings will be passed on to the prosecuting authority.
438
At the time of writing, the 
allegations about his corruption and money laundering issues were ‘’put in the cooler’’ by the 
corruption prosecuting authority in Nigeria- EFCC. Indeed, people are watching to see how 
this is going to pan out!             
The implication of FATF action could have had very serious negative impact on Nigeria who 
has not had a comfortable position in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking done by 
TI (it ranked 148 out of 180 as at 2018). FATF indicated that non-compliance would 
definitely have an effect in the mutual evaluation that Nigeria would undergo in future. It 
would have meant that Nigeria would have been at cross-purposes with FATF 
Recommendations. FATF antecedents with erring members, indicate that countries will end 
up on the wrong side of the template and the embarrassment accompanied with reputational 
financial negative implication is usually massive. The message then was and is still very clear 
- the respect of FATF 40 recommendations is the beginning of wisdom if some countries 
want to belong to the international financial circle.   
FATF can really cajole countries with its big stick by threatening to suspend a member. The 
organization is fully aware of the negativities or financial consequences that this action can 
attract to a country, hence the effectiveness of the ‘’indirect coercive style’’ in checking 
money laundering. From whatever angle one looks at it, these actions will go a long way in 
checking the negative matters in the convergence of “dirty money.” Come to think of it, when 
laundering is confronted through the adherence of the relevant FATF recommendations 
which have undergone various updates to keep pace with the global changing scenarios, the 
society will be better.  
The tool of mutual evaluation that FATF uses is a very significant cohesive and coercive 
mechanism to put the countries in check. R. Sansonetti, flows with this observation when he 
indicated that this process is one of the cornerstones of FATF and has proven to be the most 
successful element of its activities.
439
The truth is that countries prepare for this evaluation 
and will not want to be caught off-guard. FATF visited the UK in October 2018 for this 
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mutual evaluation. Prior to this, the UK had one in 2007. In December 2018, FATF indicated 
that the UK has a well-developed and robust regime to effectively combat money laundering 
and terrorist financing. However, it needs to strengthen its supervision, and increase the 
resources of its financial intelligence unit.
440
                                                     
5.5 Customer due diligence (CDD) as an unavoidable recipe in the convergence question 
The writer has tried to draw the reader’s attention to the importance of the application of 
FATF ‘‘suggestions’’ in combating money laundering. FATF has 40 recommendations 
presently, which effectively since 2012 had subsumed the previous 9 special 
recommendations into the present condensed 40 recommendations. Since the formation of 
FATF in 1989 it has gone through various transformations. The society is not static and 
commercial interactions are bound to change in tune with the dictates of the time. As it 
changes and laws and legislations come into play, both legitimate and criminally minded 
people flow through the same legitimate financial channels to conduct their activities. Some 
of these ‘‘antidotes’’ were all geared to check the ‘’purity’’ of the ‘’profits’’ that people or 
criminals make in their business or financial activities. Of course, the financial institutions 
with special attention to the banks have a strong role to play here. The reason is possibly very 
simple to grasp. The banks are in most cases, the first line of legal person that the culprits will 
want to deposit their loot or gain.
441
            
The banks will not fold their hands and be adamant without trying to at least ascertain the 
‘’quality’’ of the customer. The writer posits that if the bank feels that it is unnecessary to 
ascertain the quality of their customers, this will be arguably to their peril. This scenario, 
therefore, presents the essence of financial institutions being prudently engaged to find out 
who they are dealing with. It is on account of the dangers inherent in the above, that FATF 
has indicated in its usual manner, the importance of engaging or scrutinizing the quality of 
the customers when the banks are at the point of starting financial relationship with them.  
This is embedded in FATF recommendation 10.
442
          
FATF sets international standards to be met by countries, financial institutions and even 
designated non-financial businesses and professions with the intention of combating money 
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laundering and terrorist financing. It is as a result of this that FATF has set out requisite 
customer identification requirements. The intention is to prevent anonymous business 
interactions with the purpose of increasing transparency with the financial services offered.
443
 
FATF Recommendation 10 when perused with its interpretative notes indicates what are 
required to undertake the exercise. These help in sorting the convergence issue. The banks are 
expected or required to prudently engage themselves in doing the followings in terms of 
CDD: when they are establishing financial relationships; carrying on occasional transactions 
that are certain limits (USD/EUR 15000 now EUR 10,000) or certain wire transfers; if there 
is a suspicion of money laundering and finally if there is a suspicion or doubts about the 
previously obtained information about the customer.   
From CDD’s perspectives, it is mandatory for the banks to undertake certain processes in 
order to tackle the convergence question in this thesis. They should in all honesty identify the 
said customer and must use a reliable source of document, data or information. If there is a 
beneficial owner,
444
the bank must make a reasonable move to know who this person is and 
must be satisfied. The ownership and control structure if the beneficial owner who is not a 
natural person must be understood. Again the direction or the purpose of that business must 
be known by the bank. Additionally, the CDD exercise must be continuous in order to keep 
tab on the financial relationship between the bank and the customer. This should include the 
source of the business funds.
445
These measures have to be done on a risk-based system or 
approach. And it is the responsibility of the bank to gauge the risk-level in order to ascertain 
or know how to handle the particular banking relationship.               
We need to warn ourselves, that the fact that the stated standards have been met (in this 
context by the banks), does not necessarily or possibly guarantee that a proper identification 
has been undertaken. But when these are adhered to by the banks, this will have a positive 
impact in reducing the convergence question, the writer submits. What this means is simply 
that there may be instances where both natural and legal persons slip through the net of CDD 
possibly on account of connivance with corrupt bank officials (instances of this abound with 
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special reference to Nigeria) to establish a working relationship with the bank. The public is 
aware of this and it is not a secret in the Nigeria financial sector.       
Applying standard/enhanced and very simple CDD       
From FATF perspectives, as far as R10 is concerned, this implies that when banks are 
interacting with their customers, it entails that there must be a standard CDD that must be 
applied. Variation on this standard will depend on the particular situation. Interestingly, 
FATF is silent on particular standard measure that the banks are expected to perform. 
Perhaps, a quick perusal of FATF guidance document on this may be helpful:  
The FATF Recommendations do not specify the exact customer information (referred to by 
certain countries as ‘identifiers’) that business subject to AML/CTF obligations should 
collect to carry out identification process properly, for standard business relationships for 
occasional transactions above USD/EUR 15,000. Domestic legislation varies, although 
common customer information tends to consist of name, date of birth, address and an 
identification number. Other types of information (such as the customer’s occupation, 
income, telephone and email address, etc) are generally more business and/or anti-fraud 
driven and do not constitute core CDD information that must be collected as part of standard 
CDD - although such information could appropriately be part of an enhanced CDD for 
higher risk situations.
446
          
However, it must be kept in mind that even if the standard checks have been done, an 
enhanced CDD has a strong potential or may involve a more scrutinizing exercise about it. 
The transactions need to be closely and prudently monitored. This is on account of the 
riskiness that may be attached to that. In the circumstances that the risks are classified to be 
some how low (whatever that means in the eyes of the banks), the banks can undertake to use 
a more ‘‘relaxed’’ approach to mitigate the relevant risk. They are not expected to limit the 
nature of the simplified measures or standards.
447
Once there is a suspicion of the presence or 
a sign of money laundering, or terrorist financing activities, a simplified CDD is 
automatically not applicable.
448
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There is the question of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs). PEPs were described and first 
targeted in 2003 by FATF.
449
There have been admittedly a lot of controversies surrounding 
this. Banks are expected to trigger their enhanced CDD mechanisms when dealing with 
foreign PEPs. The impression, (not really very correct per se because there are numerous 
PEPs out there that are clean) is that they are considered to be of higher risks in financial 
transactions with the bank.  
The author posits that the fact that you are classified as a PEP does not literally mean that you 
should be precluded from conducting normal banking transaction with your bank or a 
financial institution. The signal it usually sends is that PEPs have greater opportunity to 
engage in corruption because of their position and possible easy access to funds. However, it 
does not mean that because you are a PEP you are automatically a corrupt person that 
engages in money laundering. This is not necessarily correct or right and we should try to 
distance ourselves from this negative mind set.         
In instances involving wire transfers, it is expected that they are to be excluded from the 
confines of the generally based risk-measures.
450
However, the banks are expected to employ 
a bit of simplification if the amount involved is not that high. Less than USD/EUR 1000 is 
seen as acceptable. This can be termed a sort of de minimis threshold. Here the customers’ 
identity need not be unnecessarily put under a stringent spotlight and limited information is 
usually accepted.  
Clarifying FATF’s identification and verification process and its purpose 
One may be excused to digest the impression that because the FATF has indicated that the 
customers should be made to undergo CDD, therefore the process should be seen to be very 
smooth.  As a starting point, FATF failed to specifically define what is its own understanding 
of the term ‘’identify’’ or ‘‘identification.’’ This may have led to conjectures on the part of 
the banks when they attempt to identify a customer.                
In the context of FATF (there may be the possibility that some people may disagree) it simply 
means to establish a prospective customer’s specific or unique identity. FATF is not only 
concerned with identifying a customer, but is also involved on ‘‘verification’’ of that 
customer. In all honesty, this simply means in FATF terms the authentication of the 
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identifying particulars of the customer.
451
The financial institution (bank in this context) is 
legitimately expected to refer to the reliable, independent documents, including information 
and data to check the customer’s particulars. We have to bear in mind that the process of 
identification and verification are very clearly inter-related. But they are separate 
processes.
452
     
To clarify, the process of identification is usually completed when sufficient information has 
been provided that would enable the bank to establish who the customer is. Verification 
processes on its own are then done with the intention on the part of the bank to get assurance 
that some of the information or all got on the person is in the real sense of the word correct 
and that they are who they have claimed to be.
453
FATF in its recommendations, do usually 
advice banks to avoid accounts that are anonymous or have fictitious connotations linked to 
them. But the surprising dimension to the above is that they do not actually have a clear focus 
or clarity on the concept of anonymity. The result is that you may come across situations 
where FATF representatives have actually used the terms ‘’anonymous’’ and ‘’not correctly 
identified’’ to purport the same meaning. Of course, this has the potential to generate a bit of 
difficulty in the process.   
However, CDD does not end with just identification and verification of the customer. It is a 
continuous process that starts from ‘‘birth to death’’ in the relationship with the customer 
immediately it has been established. It is to know your customer throughout the duration of 
the relationship. This was given legislative backing and made to be on risk sensitive basis.
454
      
Information the bank collects and FATF/BCBS possible differences on profiling    
Prior to 2003 CDD was referred to as ‘‘Know Your Customer’’ (KYC). It is pertinent to note 
that in financial circles, CDD and KYC are more expansive than mere verification. FATF’s 
CDD principles are more attuned or refer to customer profiling. It is focussed on monitoring 
the customers’ activity to ensure that the transactions do not deviate from the banks’ 
knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile and of course, their source of funds 
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when necessary. But we should be aware that it was BCBS that was the pioneering body that 
engineered anti-money laundering issues in the financial circle as far back as 1988 when it 
released its literature. 
BCBS views profiling as being the central issue or substance with regard to CDD and 
customer risk mitigation. This is very important. From their perspective, the usual 
identification and verification should not only be seen as recording of the customers’ correct 
name. This must include getting sufficient or significant information aimed at drawing the 
right business and risk profile of the said customer.
455
Profiling will in the real sense, should 
be of great assistance to the banks in ascertaining the level of the risk and the way to mitigate 
it. Here, the deviating transaction patterns of the customer can be easily dictated. When this 
occurs, the Financial Intelligence Unit will not be surprised to receive their reports.  
BCBS stated the information required for profiling that can be obtained from the customer for 
the purposes of CDD - the legal name and any other name, correct permanent address, 
telephone number, fax, and email address, date of birth, nationality, public position held 
and/or employer’s name; an official personal identification number present in an official 
document (passport, ID card, residence permit, social security record, driving licence) that 
has the customer’s picture, the type of account and the nature of the banking relationship and 
finally the signatures are needed.
456
It is usually the expectation that the bank must draw from 
the above information to assess the customer’s profile. However, where there is suspicion of 
a higher risk profile, the bank is expected to employ more stringent enquiries - like the source 
of income or prior banking history or relationship.
457
The expectation on all these is that it will 
in one way or the order impact on slowing down the tempo of money laundering. It is 
important we keep this in mind whilst progressing into further analysis.                               
There is possibly no doubt that the BCBS guidance has shaped the current practises and also 
the supervisory expectations. There was a time that the process of customer identification 
services was put under a survey. This was in 2013 among some (six) developing countries. 
The survey reflected on the extensiveness of the BCBS impact on the countries with regard to 
the standard risk-profiling. Interestingly, South Africa which participated was found to have 
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used just the barest minimum of information compared to other countries.
458
The BCBS it 
should be noted still emphasis on profiling as a very important step in risk-taking customers. 
This is understandable and in tune with the expected fraudulent activities this can potentially 
open up.         
The writer notes that the 2013 FATF guidance on financial inclusion went as far as 
discussing the minimum particulars that a customer should furnish for profiling. According to 
FATF, details like customer’s occupation, income, plus the contact details do not make up or 
constitute the core CDD information that must be collected to make up a standard 
CDD.
459
Contrastingly, BCBS does not concur with this approach. They are for a more robust 
and inclusive information.
460
The author is of the opinion that it is going to be a disservice to 
the spirit and intended purpose of the ‘‘profiling exercise’’ to open an account for a customer 
and fail to ask about his profession and his present or intended income. They all jell together. 
The writer therefore suggests that it is in the best interest of FATF to reconsider their style.     
A perusal of FATF’s ‘’relaxed’’ CDD is in variance with that of BCBS profiling style. BCBS 
is in favour of gathering sufficient, robust and enough information from inception or 
beginning of the relationship. If, it is noticed that there is threat of higher risk, additional 
steps should be employed. Contrast this with FATF’s style. It allows for just upfront, towards 
mainly product-inclined profiling for just limited information on situations when risks are 
assessed to be on the lower strata. This possibly indicates that there are risks no doubt, and 
that monitoring of the required transactional activities will have the ability to fail in a 
simplified CDD. Of course, this occurs when there is not sufficient information to embark on 
customer profiling. The result would be that the ability of the bank to monitor suspicious or 
unusual banking activities is bound to suffer.
461
Interestingly, FATF has spotted this potential 
scenario but is yet to furnish guidance or the way forward to get over this issue.  
It is therefore suggested that the general impression from the existing circumstances, could be 
that the FATF does not in actual fact, unlike BCBS, regard profiling and extensive collection 
of the customers’ identifying particulars as central to general CDD. There is the impression 
that it does not recognize its value in relation to customers that are seen to be of higher risk. 
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However, this may not be the case with customers classified as being lower-risk or standard-
risk customers. We should also take cognizance that in situations where the bank has very 
few information on the customer, the capability of the bank to confront potential or real 
fraudulent threats in relation to identity fraud, will heavily depend on the quality of the 
information that the bank has. This may be seen as a common sense approach.               
In 2012, FATF adopted a risk-oriented approach that embraced a simplified CDD for lower 
risk scenarios. However, BCBS in that same year came up with a more stringent approach. 
This was contained in its Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 2012.
462
It 
indicated thus:  
‘’supervisors should determine that banks have adequate policies and processes including 
strict customer diligence (CDD) rules to promote high ethical and professional standards.’’ 
It is my submission, that the above is not particularly clear on the subject or concept of ‘’a 
very tight’’ CDD rules as possibly envisaged by BCBS. And should in its entirety be 
inclusive or encapsulate a simplified CDD in lower-risk instances. However, one is tempted 
to align with the impression that both FATF and BCBS differences seems to go beyond the 
profiling to a level of the general CDD.          
Indeed, from whatever dimension that may be employed, it is advisable to bear in mind that 
profiling in AML/CTF parlance is simply the collection of sufficient data. This is all about 
the customer and should in the final analysis, empower the bank to be capable to dissect risks 
thrown into the financial ring by the customer and at the same time anticipatively be capable 
of predicting the pattern and conduct. In fact, even when variation does not occur or happen 
the bank may use profiling to manage money laundering and terrorist-financing-risks. 
Interestingly, profiling has been used to determine the likelihood of the repayment of a small 
loan when the customer does not have a credit record.
463
                   
5.6 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as twin-like-mechanisms   
Formation and essence in the convergence matter 
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The fact that the two institutions have come to be classified as very important International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) is no longer news. This is with regard to the respective roles they 
have played and still playing in economic growth and development amongst comity of 
nations through ‘‘assisting on balance of payments issues and developmental financial 
assistance’’ to countries. Institutions play very important roles in economic growth and 
development.
464
Institutions can be seen or viewed as regularities in social behaviour that are 
agreed to by members of the society.
465
More so, institutions may also be seen to be 
specifying certain behaviour in a sort of recurrent situations that are enforced by external 
authorities or by some self-regulatory entities.
466
 
At international level, comity of nations and other sub-state participants or actors as the case 
may be, do create this, viewing it as orientation points to exchange information and at the 
same time try to sort out difficulties. International institutions may be viewed also as a set of 
rules that govern the manner in which states should cooperate and at the same time compete 
with each other. They do this by prescribing acceptable and unacceptable state behaviour and 
practices.
467
    
Most commercial observers, may agree with the fact that various opportunities have been 
created for the economy to grow as a result of financial liberalization and deregulation. As a 
result, and as interactions go on, there has also been evidence of different economic global 
crisis along the way. And in order to contain this, both private-sector oriented bodies and 
international public institutions would want to set standards to contain the situation. Part of 
the solution to contain this has been through the activities of some International Financial 
Institutions that concluded international agreements. But note that some of these agreements 
took various forms. Some were informally negotiated while others were in form of treaties 
with binding obligations accompanied with built-in mechanisms for dispute resolution in 
some of the treaties.  
Due to the number of the international agreements in addition to the institutional 
arrangements, some observers have come to view this as a sign of fragility noticeable in the 
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global financial system. There is the feeling that the presence of various international 
financial institutions that address matters or issues of financial stability have raised the 
concern that there may be need for the international standard setting to be governed by 
principles of global governance for proper direction.
468
  
The fact remains that both the IMF and the World Bank are seen as very important economic 
organizations. They came into existence to help address short-term balance of payments 
issues and developmental loans to countries that needed them to get the world economy up 
and running again through the efforts of the USA, the UK and allied countries. They were 
formed in 1944 in Breton Woods (and can sometimes be referred as the Breton Institutions). 
They no doubt, play an important role by facilitating a sort of collective action among states 
and try as much as possible to assist in enhanced financial stability. 
During their formation, the observation was that the two economic organizations were very 
necessary and still are, as they allow states to address very significant economic problems. 
These included currency stability and long term economic issues. If you assess at it this way, 
in today’s economy which is now globalised to a massive extent, the presence of the two 
economic organizations help states to cut down on transaction costs to get the money they 
need. The nations save money (although some may disagree) by getting credit that may 
otherwise not be available to them if they want to do this on their own. The World Bank uses 
its own goodwill to get money from other developed economies when seeking to address the 
imperfections in the capital markets from western investors. The bank, then turns around and 
lends this money to the developing countries at rates that are considered to be competitive 
which these countries may not be able to get on their own. It is the hope that this facilitative 
role will allow capital to find their way into less developed economies and aid growth and 
development.
469
 
The IMF on its own similarly since its formation contributed some inputs to addressing what 
may be seen as market failures. This could be as a result of less liquidity that may have come 
as a result of ‘’not too enthusiastic’’ attitude by private investors. These private investors may 
not be willing to provide short-term-loans to IMF member nations who may not be able to 
access money from them to address this. It is important to note that the members of the IMF 
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are also the same countries that are members of the Bank.
470
They are comprised of more than 
185 members worldwide. The members of these two international economic organizations are 
entirely made up of states and the organizations have been established by treaties or 
agreements.
471
Flowing from this therefore, they also have international legal personalities. 
And of course, can assert claims under public international law.
472
The two differ from 
international financial supervisory bodies that have been previously pointed out to have a soft 
law status in this thesis. They were not established by bilateral or multilateral treaties or 
agreements and have no legal personality under international law.   
Direct impact on the convergence question 
The IMF and the World Bank have through their various actions been instrumental to 
attacking corruption and money laundering. This has been made possible through the two 
bodies’ Articles of Agreement that established them. For instance, the Articles of Agreement 
of the IMF
473
empowered it to oversee the international monetary system to ensure its proper 
and efficient operation. It does this by exercising surveillance over the exchange rate policies 
of its members. On the other hand, the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement permits it to 
promote economic development amongst its members by making loans available to them. 
These loans may be directed to the followings: economic adjustment programmes, rule of 
law, improving both the public and private sector accountability, including nice governance, 
and most importantly to the subject of this thesis, reducing corruption and financial crime. 
In 2009, the IMF lunched a donor-support fund which was the first in what is called Topical 
Trust Fund (TTF). This was to finance technical assistance in AML/CTF. Countries like 
Canada, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Kuwait, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland were committed to raise $29.2m over a period of five years.
474
       
It is normal for the countries that are members of the IMF and the World Bank to come to 
them for loans. In summarized terms, the two organisations will let these countries know that 
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for them to get access to their request; they must be seen to conform to some international 
standards. In reality, countries are expected to toe the line of embracing the ‘’rudiments’’ that 
have been put out there by the soft law bodies as conditions to access the credit they need. 
Typical examples would be for the countries to embrace the FATF Recommendations and 
BCBS pronouncements that are seen to be stumbling blocks for the advancement of 
corruption and money laundering. In other words, they are seen to serve as international 
bench marks for accessibility of financial loans or aids to less developed countries. This is 
also applicable to developed nations. However, they are the orchestrators of the exercise. It 
may not affect them much.  
There were few amendments to the IMF Articles. The one done in 1978 was crucial in 
helping to achieve surveillance and conditionality. That was the Second Amendment. It is 
probably right to point out that this actually made very important changes and gave the Fund 
powers and oversight over the members’ currency arrangements.475IMF conditionality was on 
the increase over the members.
476
In fact, IMF exercises its surveillance powers on the basis 
of its Article IV while its Conditionality powers are embedded in its Article V. The fund 
states that with regard to Surveillance, the organization is expected to put together a 
‘’machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.’’477The 
basis for the above is found in its Article.
478
 
In recent years, the IMF surveillance status has consisted of its Financial Sector Assessment 
Programs (FSAPs). They lay emphasis in collecting information plus statistics on the 
financial health of member states on the areas that are provided and agreed by member states.  
The information they come up with is in theory, ‘’on advisory basis.’’ It has been noted that 
the countries are not actually bound by the information and statistics that IMF puts out, 
neither are they compelled to participate in the surveillance process. But I think it is in their 
best interest to listen to them. There are two types of surveillance, one is the multilateral 
Surveillance. The analysis is usually produced in its publication known as World Economic 
Outlook. In 1996, due to the Mexican currency crisis, IMF adopted a systematic standard data 
that enabled it to find out each country’s vulnerability to its banking and capital market. In 
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this, IMF monitored various areas including financial crime.
479
There is the second one - the 
bilateral Article IV surveillance. But here, the IMF will do the publication of its findings with 
the consent of that member. This comes up as ‘‘Public information Notice.’’ 
With regard to the analysis on why the countries are very eager to carry out IMF obligations, 
observers should also take notice of IMF’s enforcement tools. The author, points out, that the 
provisions of IMF’s articles are powerful tools in achieving this. Countries that get IMF 
money are very reluctant (at least on paper) not to comply in issues concerning financial 
aspects with corruption and money laundering in mind. The fund brings into play both an 
indirect and direct enforcement mechanisms. The fund can state that a member has failed in 
its obligation to meet up with the provision of the IMF Articles and therefore not qualified to 
use IMF’s general resources.480 In a situation where a member has continuously engaged in 
persistent breach that is beyond a ‘‘reasonable period,’’ the Fund can by a stated majority of 
70% of the members, in its Executive Board exercise the powers to suspend that member and 
can go for the withdrawal of that member from IMF.
481
  
The above is there for the taking and is seen as very draconian but it has not yet been used by 
the Fund. It is a very powerful tool to use as deterrence against members. The greatest sort of 
fear about this comes from developing countries. Therefore, these countries will want to 
comply with the provisions. They have little or no alternatives when experiencing financial 
difficulties unlike some of the developed countries. Some of the developed economies are 
more likely not to seek financial succour from the fund (Japan is a good example of a country 
that refused to draw on the fund when it experienced financial difficulties). 
With regard to the World Bank, the author notes that it has more expansive developmental 
work to do than the IMF. It was established with the Fund in 1944 and was part of the 
‘‘World Bank Group.’’ This consisted of the International Developmental Association (IDA), 
the International Financial Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The 
Bank’s powers are set out in its Articles of Agreement that has three general purposes: 
assistance in economic reconstruction and development, promotion of private foreign 
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investment; plus increase in international trade, economic growth and the living standards of 
the general public. Of course, these are difficult to achieve in an environment where 
corruption and money laundering hold sway.  
The World Bank Articles prohibit it from interfering with the internal political affairs of the 
member countries.
482
And there have been few suggestions that the Bank must be very careful 
in the way and manner that it operates in order not to be seen to be in breach of its Articles in 
dealing with the member states. The Bank is expected to be making its lending decisions 
based squarely on economic decisions and the expected viability of the projects.  
The author notes that from the scheme of events, and activities of the bank, it was never 
mandated with the powers to oversee capital movements. But come to think of it, its role in 
advising countries on how best to put their acquired loans into productive use in enhancing 
proper economic development, may be a tacit suggestion that it may be in a position to offer 
an acceptable platform to regulate finance. This is only an observation by the writer.   
In the 1980s and 1990s both the Fund and Bank’s short-term loans began to forge together. 
They were similar in that they both encouraged institutional reforms including areas that are 
anti-corruption in out-look. A. Newburg noted that there were ‘‘few signs of cooperation and 
conditionality’’ that existed between the two organizations.483The bank was involved in what 
was to be known as the ‘‘new conditionality’’ which made people to believe that it may be 
stepping out of its original mandate. The author submits, that from whatever angle one may 
look at the issues concerning the IMF and the Bank, the emerging countries or the developing 
countries still try as much as they can to conform to the dictates of what the two institutions 
want as conditions for their ‘’assistance’’ in attacking corruption and money laundering. 
Without this, they will not be able to access their facilities.                  
To add credence to the fact that the two economic organizations had separately and jointly on 
occasions put in efforts to combat corruption was evidenced as far back as 2001. In 2002, the 
IMF and the World Bank started a joint assessment program specifically that was about the 
international standard that both FATF and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors 
(OGBS) initiated. OGBS changed its name to Group of International Finance Centre 
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Supervisors (GIFCS) after thirty one years of its formation. And they have observer status 
with FATF and very close working relationship with Basel Committee.   
Admirably and jointly, the requests from more than one hundred (100) countries to help them 
develop and at the same time build good institutional infrastructure that would stand the test 
of time in fighting money laundering and terrorism was met with positive response. These 
international standards were specifically geared towards fighting money laundering. Of 
course, the two organizations had in mind that this was as a result of corruption,
484
hence the 
relevance to the convergence problem. In truth, part of these requests included the 
recognition that Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) should have very important role to play 
in the fight against specifically money laundering and counter terrorist financing. Both the 
Fund and the Bank as indicated above provided technical assistance to some developing 
countries. And the belief is that this will continue in future for a considerable length of time.  
5.7 An assessment of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and Wolfsberg Principles  
From the previous segment of this thesis, both the IMF and the World Bank have continued 
to play significant role in the global economy. Their efforts have continued to raise divergent 
views amongst financial and development observers around the globe in the role they have 
played and possibly will continue to play in the war directed to corruption and money 
laundering. However, as the wheel of economic development across nations continue to 
expand, there arose the need both domestically and trans-border for a coordinated financial 
information flow that should take the form of ‘’guided financial intelligence’’ gathering.  
Businesses are conducted around the globe with the intention to make profits. But most of the 
channels used in conducting legitimate transactions are also used for illegitimate commercial 
purposes. Criminals do use the financial systems around the world to conduct their financial 
transactions. It is difficult to deny this fact. The criminals involved in various facets of this 
are also ‘‘very wise’’ and can go to various lengths to try and hide the proceeds of their ‘’so 
called profits.’’ Gathering financial intelligence, on account of the above therefore became a 
very good basis to help in the war against financial crimes in their various modes.       
The Egmont Group as a crystallizing factor in financial intelligence gathering 
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It is necessary, to point out, that there are various organisations that have been set up in such 
a manner, that they have as part of their overall goal, to fight money laundering. Typical 
examples of these organizations are the World Customs Organization (WCO)
485
and 
International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO/Interpol).
486
However, the above group 
(Egmont) has come into play specifically to provide intelligence that will be used to fight 
money laundering. The organization was formed in June 1995 and derived its name from the 
place that the first meeting occurred - Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels. Interestingly, it 
was a joint initiative between the US and the Belgium government. After 1995, the group has 
continued to meet on a regular basis to formalise issues. The European Commission 
commented that this group has become a genuine international forum and also an essential 
element in the international fight against money laundering.
487
        
The truth of the matter is that it was due to the need to gather intelligence in the financial 
circles against money laundering, that there were requests for the establishment of this type 
of organisation. But the form the intelligence unit should take was not specifically 
indicated.
488
The focus was and still is on reporting suspicious transactions to the relevant 
authorities. There were simply calls or requests from different bodies for this to be set up by 
various countries. The emphasis was on financial institutions and private organisations to 
make available suspicious transactions to a relevant body that would scrutinise these and 
hand over to other authorities to help in fighting money laundering.  
In essence and in relation to the subject of this thesis, the idea was and is still that when 
intelligence is gathered through this manner, it will help in checking corruption and money 
laundering. However, it was noticed or observed during the initial process that there were 
issues with cooperation amongst countries. V. Mitsilegas remarked:  
 ‘’it is extremely difficult for an independent or administrative unit to share information with 
a unit that constitutes part of the police of another state. Such an exchange, without sufficient 
guarantees, would undermine one of the fundamental missions of independent units, that is, 
to avoid to the greatest possible degree the communication of sensitive everyday information 
to law enforcement authorities. On the other hand, independent units face problems in 
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consulting foreign police data, as they ‘’do not fit’’ in the international police communication 
system; at the same time, it is impossible sometimes even unconstitutional for many police 
units, as state units, to exchange information with independent, ‘’non-state’’ bodies in other 
countries.’’489                 
It was possibly due to clear recognition of some of the difficulties or teething issues 
encapsulated in the above author’s observations that FATF may have reacted at some point. 
A look at the then FATF Recommendation 32 of 1996 called on its members to react to 
this.
490
Indeed, it has now come to be accepted that the Egmont Group no doubt is now or has 
emerged as the main international platform that has a total focus on enhancing cooperation 
between financial intelligence units. Interestingly, it was in its meeting that was held in Rome 
in 1996 that it eventually came up with what has come to be accepted as the definition of 
what FIU should be - a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, 
requesting) analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial 
information concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or required by national legislation or 
regulation in order to counter money laundering.
491
       
The author submits that it is the coming into play of the fruition of the efforts of the Egmont 
group by way of forging ahead the FIUs that has helped or contributed tremendously in 
checking the volume of corruption and money laundering. It is the information gathered from 
intelligence that is usually forwarded to the appropriate authorities, who would make some 
efforts to confront the criminals by way of prosecution from the information on the STRs. 
Although, we have to also note that distilling these STRs requires a very concentrated effort 
on the part of the FIUs.    
Egmont as a group has had an observer status with the FATF since 2002,
492
and we are 
possibly aware by now of the implications of FATF granting it this status. The group has its 
permanent headquarters in Toronto. The group kept on expanding its horizon. A typical 
example of this was after the horrific terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, the group 
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just like the FATF expanded its mandate on financial reporting to encompass matters on 
terrorist financing.
493
 
Aside above, the group in its bid in addressing the issues relevant in checking corruption and 
money laundering was able to focus on its objectives and by extension, the convergence 
question in this thesis. The objectives included the followings: to expand and systematise 
international co-operation in the reciprocal exchange of information, to increase the 
effectiveness of FIUs through the offering of training and promotion of personnel exchanges 
that would improve expertise of those personnel; fostering better/secure communication 
amongst its members via Egmont Secure Web (ESW); increased mode of coordination plus 
support among the operational sections of the group; to promote the operational autonomy of 
its members; encouraging and promoting FIUs with countries that have AML/CTF in place or 
those that are still at an earlier stage of developing.
494
                     
The formation of this group (Egmont) has enhanced the setting up of national FIUs which 
were specifically done using the definition given by the group. It is fair to say without 
possible contradiction, that this is now universally accepted. Very important organizations 
like the United Nations (UN) has encouraged the process of setting up FIUs.
495
Admirably, 
IMF/Bank have not been found wanting in this aspect.
496
Additionally, there are other 
Conventions (this includes also some soft law bodies) that have recognised the importance of 
FIUs and actually requested from countries that are signatories to them to set this up in their 
jurisdictions taking into account their country’s local content.497                
There are various types of FIUs. The common denominator amongst them is simply the fact 
that they are all geared towards fighting corruption and money laundering. It may be 
acceptable to indicate that the various brands of FIUs may be categorised into four 
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types.
498
These include the administrative, Law enforcement, judicial or prosecutorial and the 
‘‘hybrid’’ types. 
The administrative-type is usually seen to be part of the structure that is placed under the 
supervision of an administration that is not part of either the judicial or the law enforcement 
agency. This type of FIU is seen to be a separate agency but may be placed under a 
substantive supervision of a ministry. The reason is simply to create what is called a ‘’gap’’ 
between the financial sector and also the country’s financial agency that are seen to be in 
charge of financial crimes and investigations in that country. The USA is a good example of 
FIU that is administrative in character - Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCen).
499
It 
has its headquarters in Vienna, Virginia, United States. Another administrative style example 
is Belgium where the FIU was set up devoid of any connection to a ministry.    
The real administrative location may be different. It may be placed under that country’s 
ministry of finance, a regulatory agency or as the case may be under the Central Bank. In 
administrative type, they do not have powers to do investigation and prosecution. They just 
collect the information, analyse and then disseminate. The thinking or the idea of creating a 
‘‘gap’’ is possibly to encourage more reporting of STRs to FIUs. The financial institutions 
with particular focus on the banks prefer this type. They usually shy away from having a 
direct nexus with law enforcement units.                 
In the law enforcement type FIU, the unit will be involved as part of a law enforcement 
agency in that country. In view of its mandate or operation, it is usually expected to be close 
to other law enforcement apparatus in that polity (this includes financial crime unit). It is the 
expectation that it will benefit from the expertise displayed by them including other sources 
of information. It is reciprocated by the fact that the information that the FIU have are then 
accessed with less difficulty by the law enforcement agency. Of course, they can use this in 
any investigation to contain corruption and money laundering. They also have powers of the 
law enforcement agency which includes the power to freeze financial transactions and seize 
assets. Interestingly, the United Kingdom is a classic example of this type. Presently, this is 
done by National Crime Agency (NCA). The UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) is 
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within NCA and its method of operation is mapped out. NCA took over or subsumed the old 
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in October 2013. It was only National Criminal 
Intelligence Service that was a FIU.
500
          
The UKFIU gets or receives more than 460,000 SARs (Suspicious activity Reports) a year. 
These (SARs) are simply the pieces of information that alert the law enforcement agency of a 
potential money laundering or terrorist financing activity. Although the task is very daunting, 
some positives have come out of it in the United Kingdom.
501
The idea has always been 
fundamentally to reduce the cancerous spread of financial crimes with money laundering at 
the forefront.   
The judicial or the prosecutorial FIU can be classified as the type that is seen to ‘‘reside’’ 
within the judicial branch of the state. This is mostly under the prosecutor’s jurisdiction. This 
is highly noticeable in countries that have a civil law legal tradition. Typical example is 
Luxembourg. In this set-up, public prosecutors are usually part of the judicial system. They 
also have authority to control the investigatory bodies and can allow the prosecutors to direct 
and supervise the criminal investigations.
502
It is usually noticed here that such judicial 
powers like seizure of funds, freezing of accounts, detention of suspects, interrogations and 
searches can be quickly conducted. This is as a result of the fact that suspicious reports would 
be confirmed by initial enquiries. Additionally, this type of FIU usually works very well 
where there is a high tendency for bank secrecy laws. This is as a result of the fact that the 
judicial and prosecutorial authorities would be needed to ensure a positive compliance or 
cooperation from the financial institutions. The writer notes, that it is a fact that the 
‘’practical independence’’ of the judiciary inspires a solid confidence within the financial 
circles.  
The last type of FIU is the one known as the ‘’hybrid’’ style.503As the name suggests, it is 
classified as something that is made to exhibit or demonstrate a combination of different 
elements. It is a complete amalgam of the characteristics of the previous types put together. 
In other words, it is a positive attempt to obtain all the advantages associated with the other 
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types. Some FIUs do combine the features of both administrative and law-enforcement types. 
However, others do combine the powers of the police with that of the customs. Irrespective of 
the form that a FIU takes, the fundamental motive is simply to assist in the fight against 
corruption and money laundering hence its significant importance to the subject of this 
thesis.
504
 
Granted that the uniting informal organization is the Egmont group, we should bear in mind 
that Egmont is very much attached to FATF. Therefore, from the previous observations on 
the potency of FATF, by extension, FIUs are very vital components in the crusade against 
money laundering as previously indicated.   
Compressed importance of the Wolfberg Principles        
The author reinstates that there are different approaches that were produced to control the 
scourge of money laundering. These approaches can range from regulatory dimensions to 
financial legal persons coming together in the financial circles with the purpose of issuing out 
some ‘’effective principles’’ (at least on paper) to tackle the scourge. In the late 1990s, there 
was this feeling in the financial circles around the globe that the private banks were very 
passively involved in matters concerning money laundering. This feeling therefore 
invigorated the formation of the group in order to possibly counter this assertion.    
The Wolfsberg Group at present (as at 2018) is an association of thirteen global banks. Their 
aim is to develop frameworks plus guidance directed towards managing financial crime risks. 
These risks are focussed on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing plus knowing your 
customers. The Group is made up of the following banks - Banco Santander, Bank of 
America, Barclays Bank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, 
J.P Morgan Chase, MUFG Bank, Societe Generale, Standard Chartered and UBS. They 
agreed and came together in 2000 in Chateau Wolfsberg in north-eastern Switzerland with 
some representatives of TI. They worked on the initial drafting of anti-money laundering 
guidelines for private banking. As a result, the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles 
for Private Banking came into play first in October 2000, but were revised in May 2002 and 
interestingly and most recently in June 2012.
505
  
                                                     
504
Corruption is one of the predicate offences of money laundering and the two are linked and complement 
each other. Therefore, STRs initiated for either should be viewed as same as the two activities are done in 
‘‘obscurity’’ to evade the regulatory radar.       
505
This is available on https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com accessed on 5
th
 December 2018  
 185 
 
The Principles simply have a ‘‘soft law undertone.’’ But interestingly, banks are expected to 
follow them due to fear of reputational matters. In fact, issues that were published by the 
group are designed to provide financial institutions (FIs) with a sort of industry perspective 
on effective financial risk management. There are ways that the financial institutions do 
usually seek to adapt to their various publications including the Principles. But they must 
bear in mind that there is ‘’no one size that fits all.’’ Each must adjust to the peculiarity of 
each individual organization that must be tailored to meet its risk appetite. It is recognised 
that the risks inherent may be different in different places or regions.
506
  
It is a fact that Wolfsberg issued some remarkable Principles which were periodically 
updated. For example, the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent 
Banking 2014 updated those that were originally issued in November 2002. These included 
matters on due diligence and dealing with PEPs by triggering an enhanced due diligence.
507
It 
is to their credit that they worked on some papers that they intended for the regulators to use 
as guidance when formulating theirs with regard to some areas in banking that are yet to be 
effectively guided.
508
  
The author surmises, that at least on paper, the intentions and the various efforts made by 
Wolsberg Principles, can effectively be said to be relevant to fight the convergence question 
in this thesis. This is in theory and is my opinion. But practically and from what has been 
going on in the banking industry, the author submits that what the members do is simply 
paying ‘’lip service’’ to the contents of the principles. The various money laundering 
incidents that happened in HSBC adds credence to this. Is this bank not a member of the 
Wolfsberg Group? Mr David Bagley, the then head of compliance in this global bank 
resigned his appointment and admitted that HSBC cleaned ‘‘dirty money.’’ This money 
emanated from drugs money and corruption matters from Mexico and Russia into USA.
509
Of 
course, HSBC was fined £26m for money laundering.
510
Additionally, the issue with Iran 
then, included the breach of sanctions.  
The then CEO Stuart Gulliver on July 30 2012 apologised for ‘’mistakes of the past.’’ He 
stated that what happened in the US and Mexico was shameful. The bank was fined $27.5 
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million in Mexico for lax controls in its anti money laundering systems. This was a week 
after the US Senate Committee slammed the bank for letting its clients shift money from 
dangerous and secretive countries. The US indicated that between 2007 and 2008, HSBC 
Mexico operations moved $7billion into the bank’s US operations.511It ended up paying 
$1.9b (£1.2b) in money laundering penalties to US authorities.
512
The author notes that HSBC 
is no stranger to fines. It is submitted that the banks are just paying lip service to these anti-
money laundering principles or checks put in place. They are engaged on what the writer 
calls ‘’cost benefit syndrome.’’ At the time this fine was imposed, it made a pre-tax profit of 
$12.7b for the first six months in 2012.  This looks very interesting as most of these fines are 
like a ‘‘tap on the wrist,’’ considering the colossal profits the banks make. What some do 
when investigation comes up, is simply to set aside a sum of money in anticipation for the 
breach.  
There are other numerous fines that have been imposed by the authorities against various 
banks that are members of this Wolfsberg Group irrespective of their Principles. At about the 
same time, Standard Chartered Bank was also fined more than £187m ($300m) to settle 
charges that it violated US sanctions in Iran, Burma, Libya and Sudan. In fact the NY 
Department of Financial Services (DFS) accused the bank of hiding 60,000 transactions with 
Iran worth $250b over a decade. New York District Attorney Cyrus Vance had this to say:  
’’Banks occupy positions of trust. It is a bedrock principle that they must deal honestly with 
their regulators. These cases give teeth to sanctions enforcement, send a strong message 
about the need for transparency in international banking, and ultimately contribute to the 
fight against money laundering.’’513 
Suffice to say, that irrespective of the anti-risk mechanisms on money laundering introduced 
by the private bankers, money laundering matters keep rearing their ugly heads. And until the 
authorities or regulators review their containment antidote, there may be no end in sight.        
 
                                                     
511
Available on https://news.abs-cbn.com/business/07/26/12/hsbc-fined-275m-mexican-money-laundering-
probe  accessed on 5
th
 December 2018 
512
Available on https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20673466  accessed on 5
th
 December 2018 
513
Available on https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20669650  accessed on 5
th
 December 2018. 
 187 
 
5.8 Vienna Convention 1988, Palermo Convention 2000 and European Union Directives 
as anti-convergence weapons.  
The author is not particularly convinced as to the intentions of the principles put forward by 
the Wolfsburg Group. Their emergence has been marred by the suspicious air of ‘’we pay lip 
service to our rules and principles and when caught, can pay off the fines.” However, the 
authorities (with particular reference to the UN) on account of the negative implications of 
allowing drugs and criminal funds to flourish within the financial system came up with the 
above Conventions and Directives. 
The background leading to the eventual emergence of the Vienna Convention and Palermo 
Convention in the context of this thesis was addressed in chapter 1. But suffice to say, that 
there was an upsurge in the potential problems encountered by the global economy or 
international community that came up as a result of the drug trade carried out by the culprits. 
There was a time that the drug trade was viewed as being synonymous with laundering 
issues. This was eventually tackled by the Vienna Convention.  This Convention as a result of 
the contents therein; it may possibly be correct to be tagged with the title: ‘’mother of all 
subsequent conventions’’ that contained anti-money laundering elements.  
In point of fact, the Convention objectives were directed towards drug-orchestrated money 
laundering issues and the encouragement of members to extend the scope.
514
It was ratified by 
more than 100 countries and came into effect in 1990. And in all honesty, issues like 
confiscation, mutual legal assistance (MLA), criminalization of money laundering, treatment 
of bank confidential matters etc, one can humbly submit are contributory factors to the anti-
convergence focus of this thesis.                       
The Palermo Convention of 2000 is perhaps the most significant non-bilateral treaty which 
has addressed organised crimes and financial crimes. Admirably, the countries (not less than 
189) that are signatories are expected to implement measures that would be anti-money 
laundering.
515
This Convention, the author submits recognised the central issue in this thesis. 
How is this so? The answer resides in the fact that comingling of corruption and money-
laundering was recognised. Corruption proceeds were criminalised.
516
The close interface that 
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also existed between corrupt activities and organised criminal activities was given due 
recognition.
517
    
European Union Directives (anti-money laundering) 
Going by historical perspectives in the political arena within the EU, this global space since 
the 1970s, has always prior to the Directives promoted closeness against crimes by forging 
closer cooperation. Before the Treaty on European Union
518
such matters were addressed in 
form of European political cooperation. Enhanced version of this cooperation was also 
extended in such areas as justice and home affairs.
519
It was later on that such matters as 
customs cooperation, fraud and drug addiction etc that were to be dealt with outside the 
confines of Maastricht were later brought under the same umbrella by the Lisbon Treaty.
520
   
The Lisbon Treaty abolished the ‘‘pillar’’ law structure. This was seen to be slowing progress 
in the EU. V. Mitsilegas captured this succinctly:  
‘’This change has major implications for third pillar law: with the third pillar abolished, 
rules on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters are - in principle at least- 
aligned with the ‘’ordinary’’ first pillar framework - with EU criminal law thus becoming 
‘’communiterised.’’ A closer look at the treaty reveals however that the undoubtedly 
significant ‘’communautarisation’’ of third pillar is far from unqualified, with a number of 
‘’intergovernmental’’ elements remaining.’’521 
In fact, the Maastricht Treaty and later Lisbon Treaty contributed in providing the legal basis 
for some of the different Directives. However, whatever the situation may be, we should all 
bear in mind that the EU Directives on money laundering are reactions in tandem with the 
FATF recommendations whenever the soft law body reacts to the prevailing money 
laundering matters around the globe. Importantly, some of the European Commission 
members along the line monitored the formation of the recommendations of the FATF. 
Actually, they do not want the Commission to lose ground on the progress already made by 
FATF. In reality as indicated above, all the subsequent anti-money laundering Directives that 
are to be implemented by 2020 were simply reactions to the suggestions of the FATF. The 
scenario goes like this: FATF on different occasions reacts to changes in the global scene 
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(inclusive of terrorist threats), the European Union follows suit by responding in issuing the 
money laundering Directives. It is now left to the member states to transpose this into their 
national legislations with a time frame. Member states at the time of writing are expected to 
transpose the 5th Directive by 20
th
 January 2020. We may now take a look in a compressed 
manner at the Directives. 
The first European Union money laundering Directive was in 1991
522
and came into force on 
April 1994. The idea was to prevent the use of the financial system by money launderers. At 
that period, the issue of drugs was high on the agenda. The Directive was designed to achieve 
a level playing field across the EU. The authorities recognised this fact - not only that the 
financial institution be made to adversely suffer; money laundering can damage the financial 
system as a whole across EU. It was a way to prevent the use of ‘’dirty money’’ from being 
circulated in the EU. At this period, this Directive was focused on credit and financial 
institutions. The reason then was that they were considered to be the most vulnerable to be 
used by the culprits. However, member states were encouraged to extend this to other 
organisations or legal persons that were considered to be at risk of being used.  
It was because the drug trade was high on the agenda that this Directive focussed on it as 
elucidated in the Vienna Convention. However, member states were informed or encouraged 
to extend it to other serious criminal matters. In summary, members states were required to 
do the followings: prohibit money laundering, verify customer identification and keep the 
record, report suspicious activities, avoidance of informing the customers under investigation 
(known as ‘’tipping off’’), protection of breach of confidentiality, and maintenance of 
adequate internal compliance control by financial institutions. The writer agrees that the 
above would or did contribute in checking ‘’dirty money’’ to some extent. We simply have to 
keep in perspective that the criminals are always ahead of the legislation. But the authorities 
will keep on reacting to the dictates of the situation.  
It was as a result of the inadequacies inherent in the above Directive, that the second one 
(2MLD) came up to at least curb some of the loopholes.
523
Of particular focus was the 
inclusion of serious crimes in addition to drug trafficking. Secondly, it also included 
professional gate keepers like lawyers and accountants to be subjects of close scrutiny. This 
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of course generated a lot of controversy. Non-financial-sector-businesses were included. 
They included: estate agents, auditors/external accountants/tax advisers, notaries, dealers in 
high value goods/auctioneers, anytime payment was made in excess of 15,000 Euros and 
casinos. It must be noted that states seeking entry into the EU must comply with all EU 
regulations. The UK transposed the above via POCA 2002 and repealed Money laundering 
Regulation 2003.
524
    
We have to note that most times that there is a major occurrence or incident around the globe 
the authorities do react to plug the loophole. R. Alexander indicated that it has become a 
truism that September 11 changed the approach to money laundering control worldwide, yet 
the changes brought in its aftermath continue. First in United States, then in the United 
Kingdom and shortly thereafter, at the Community level in the European Union, now the 
Financial Action Task Force of OECD has acted: the Forty Recommendations it sets out to 
prevent money laundering have been amended.
525
     
The third Directive (3MLD) was issued to replace the second Directive.
526
As already 
indicated in this thesis, FATF made a lot of significant changes to its 40 recommendations in 
tune with global dynamics. The European Commission subsequently agreed that a new 
Directive was needed to replace the first two. It is good to note that the major issues 
concerned the CDD.
527
FATF Recommendations were first issued in 1990. It was 
subsequently revised in 1996, 2001, 2003 and lastly in February 2012 (no further review yet 
as at the time of writing). The essential thing to note is that the EU will always react to the 
FATF ‘’changes’’ by issuing ‘’a Directive’’ to keep in touch with the global anti-money 
laundering soft law body.   
In fact, as a minimum, enhanced due diligence to check money laundering must be done by 
financial institutions in three instances in 3MLD. These include: non-face to face situations, 
cross-frontier correspondence banking relationships and lastly with PEPs.
528
Remarkably, it 
added a new perspective or definition of who a PEP should be. Also the provision of Trust 
and Company Service Providers were introduced under this Directive. Additionally, ‘‘high 
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value dealers’’ were no longer restricted to particular industries.529As is admirably customary 
with the UK, this was transposed as the 2007 Money Laundering Regulation which was 
replaced by the 2017 MLR. And it is fair to state here that the UK has always been ‘’on top 
of the game’’ in its transposition of the EU laws. In some instances, the UK would have a 
domestic law that is already in tune with what the EU wants the member states to do.  
It is pertinent to note that at the time of writing, United Kingdom has triggered Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union
530
 and negotiations on its exit from the EU are still ongoing. 
But for the time being, the UK is still a member of the EU and will continue to implement 
and apply the EU legislation. It has demonstrated robustness behind any policy aims of the 
EU as steered by FATF. Not to do this will compromise the UK’s reputation in corruption 
and money laundering issues. In fact, the UK has already enacted the legislation - Sanctions 
and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.
531
The sanctions part came into effect in November 
2018 but the money laundering part is not yet in force at the time of writing.  
It was as a result of some of the inadequacies inherent in 3MLD that the 4MLD
532
was issued. 
It involved a lot of various levels of CDD and other matters. The idea is for the 
implementation to be a stumbling block to money laundering and terrorist financing in the 
EU. And it is very relevant to the issues of the convergence question in this thesis - 
corruption and money laundering. It came into effect or force on 26
th
 June 2015 and member 
states were required to transpose it by 26
th
 June 2017. The UK transposed this into UK law 
through the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on 
the Payer) Regulations 2017. The writer will comment on this in the next segment. The 
recommendations contained in the 2012 FATF took into account changes in technologies and 
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This received Royal Assent on May 23 2018. It is a significant legislation that is required to plug a gap that 
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Directive (EU) 2015/849 of European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the 
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European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC  
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vulnerabilities that have been essentially mirrored in 4MLD. This eventually was reflected in 
MLR 2017 in the UK.
533
  
One of the key aims in 4MLD is to enhance transparency and also prevent the use of 
anonymity of offshore companies and accounts for the purpose of money laundering. 
Importantly, there is a further shift on the matter of risk-based approach. Some obliged 
entities like credit institutions, financial institutions and trust company service providers 
(TCSPs) are now required to undertake the required or appropriate steps necessary to assess 
the risk of money laundering in dealing with customers.
534
There is an obligation to maintain a 
central register for not only corporate and legal entities’ beneficial535ownership information 
but also for trusts and similar arrangements to trusts.
536
This is to minimise the use of trusts in 
some negative instances where people use it for laundering and terrorist financing. 4MLD 
one can point out, completely overhauled or tampered extensively with the 3MLD. There was 
also focus on CDD that is focussed on a risk-based-approach. 
In any case, the Directive is essential in containing money laundering and corrupt activities. 
But like we have already stated, the aim is to put a massive break on the quantum of the 
above activities. Above gainsaid, the 4MLD is still presently (at the time of writing) relevant 
in different aspects. What the 5MLD has done to contain the issues in the convergence matter 
is to further add additional bites to the 4MLD. It was meant to come into play with the 4MLD 
but the authorities decided that it was not realistic. The Directive was a direct response to the 
terrorist attacks in both Paris and Belgium in 2015 and the issues in the ‘‘Panama Papers.’’537    
In tandem with what the European Commission had in mind, the objectives of the 5MLD are 
to: enhance the present powers of FIUs and at the same time facilitate their increasing 
transparency on trust matters plus company ownerships and prevention of the risks that are 
inherent in the use of prepayment cards and dangers posed by use of virtual currencies. The 
safeguards are to be improved in transactions involving high risk third countries (HRTCs). 
Access to information by FIUs is to be enhanced, evidenced by new centralised bank account 
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registers. Additionally, 5MLD will ensure a centralised national bank account and payment 
account registers or a central retrieval system.
538
        
5MLD welcomes a more sophisticated manner of CDD. It has been established that the 
terrorist attacks in Paris and Belgium evidenced the use of pre-paid payment cards. CDD will 
now be done on such cards and the value was reduced to 150 Euros.
539
This is a welcome 
development as the culprits (terrorists) hide under this guise to commit crimes. Also, the 
crypto currencies
540
are now under the scope of AML regulation. Virtual currency exchanges 
that allow virtual currencies to be converted into fiat currencies (exemplified by Pounds and 
Euros) will be obliged entities under 5MLD. As a result, they are subject to AML compliance 
obligations.
541
There is now a shift in emphasis and crypto currencies are not only seen as a 
medium of exchange but also primarily as asset class.
542
              
5MLD has increased further the role of FIUs from that previously accorded them in 4MLD. 
FIUs can now access the information they need and be able to exchange this information via 
the appropriate cooperation with other law enforcement units or agencies inclusive of the 
ones elsewhere in the EU. Presently, FIUs can do the above without the need of a prior SAR 
from AML-regulated firms. It can be said (possibly rightly) that the powers that the FIUs are 
presently accorded are richly enhanced. This will in no small measure assist in fighting 
money laundering and corruption from the intelligence gathered from the FIUs.  
We should not forget that on matters concerning ‘’high risk third countries’’ (HRTCs), 
5MLD is in line with the 4MLD
543
and prescribed the requirements that firms must apply 
EDD (Enhanced Due Diligence) to firms in HRTCs when entering into business relationships 
or transactions with natural persons and legal entities there. Pakistan was added to the Annex 
of Delegated Regulation (EU)
544
that has detailed the third countries with strategic 
deficiencies in money laundering and terrorist financing. The danger here is that the cost will 
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eventually be passed to the customers. The authorities have powers under 5MLD to stop the 
firms based in HRTCs from opening branches or representative offices in their jurisdictions. 
And conversely, their firms cannot open in HRTCs. The recitals of 5MLD points to the 
importance of letting credit and financial institutions between group members and others to 
have access that are subject to the data protection laws. It is good to note that as usual, the 
United Kingdom via Criminal Finances Act of 2017, initiated such sharing of information, 
provided it is done through NCA.  
5MLD has also widened access to the beneficial registers for corporate entities and trusts - 
this will involve areas where there are tax consequences. Tax evasion is a serious matter and 
involves money laundering. The UK transposition of the above was not very difficult 
considering the fact that it had something on the ground prior to this.
545
With that of trusts, the 
changes have a more significant undertone in doing the CDD. Those that have access are 
obliged entities and legitimate interest must be displayed to gain this. It has been noted that 
this can cause a lot of friction on issues concerning fundamental human rights - right to 
respect someone’s private life. Interestingly, this has been successfully challenged in 
France.
546
However, it does not mean that transparency regarding trusts is not possible. The 
authorities need to take seriously into account the matter of privacy when transposition is in 
place in member countries.          
It is a fact that very little stands long in financial services and same is possibly very true in 
financial crimes. Presently, (at the time of writing) the main piece of legislation will be the 
4MLD as amended by the 5MLD. It will be no surprise that preparations are on for a further 
Directive considering the fact that nothing stands still in financial crimes. The interesting 
aspect is that in whatever guise that they come, they are directed towards curbing corruption 
and money laundering which is the central focus in this thesis.                 
5.9 Conclusion                            
The author submits that soft laws are here to stay in addressing the issue of money laundering 
and corruption. It will never go away irrespective of the shortcomings that have been 
attributed to it. There have been rumblings within the academia that they lack the required 
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legitimacy to be uplifted to the ‘‘hard law status’’ that would have made them to generate the 
required legal obligation expected of the parties. But the truth of the matter, the author 
submits, is that these soft laws have been cleverly formulated by the ‘’rich countries’’ to be 
imposed on the weaker countries that have not had a ‘‘contributory voice’’ in the formation 
and deliberation of the final outcome ‘‘forcefully transposed’’ within their respective 
jurisdictions.  
You may want to question how the BCBS goes about issuing out its ‘‘pronouncements’’ that 
are expected to be eventually ‘’adapted’’ by the financial institutions. The deliberations are 
not open to ‘‘outsiders.’’ And irrespective of the fact that they may require some inputs from 
other countries (developing ones), they are not actually obligated to take these into account 
and ingrain these inputs. In reality, these are ignored. Even with this, when they eventually 
issue the pronouncements, the other ‘’non inner circle countries’’ are expected to take these 
on board. The matter of legitimacy therefore readily comes up as earlier indicated. This is 
also applicable to the FATF but admittedly, there have been suggestions that they are slightly 
more open than the BCBS. However, the fact is still that the core decision making apparatus 
still evades the majority of the members.  
In the above segment, notice was taken of the ongoing role played by the IMF and the World 
Bank. It is the submission of the author that they cleverly formulated some criteria to 
perpetually keep the developing countries in bondage. These loans are tailored in such a 
manner that they are seen to be ‘‘helpful’’ to these nations. The countries will keep coming 
back for more loans. Articles IV, V and VIII of the IMF were designed to promote fear and as 
a result, when the loan is taken out, the countries are perpetually bound to the IMF. The Bank 
has similar Articles. Although, the Bank is seen not to interfere with the internal affairs of the 
countries as seen in its Article 4(10), in very indirect manners, they indeed do sometimes 
interfere subtly (this has generated a lot of divergent opinions).  
The impression amongst financial observers is that the financial institutions with special 
reference to the banks are also part of key economic drivers in the economy. A lot of people 
agree with this due to their intermediating status in the economy. Have we actually tried to 
view their activities in a different manner? It is the submission of the writer, that the banks 
are behaving in such a manner that may be suggestive that they may be seen or viewed also 
as ‘’rogue institutions.’’ My submission may not align properly with some people. Why have 
the banks continuously been fined for violations of the compliance rules? They are always 
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prepared to pay up against infractions of money laundering and other financial crimes. Many 
banks have been caught out in this web and are too numerous to mention (HSBC, UBS etc). 
The fines are getting bigger due to policy change, and I doubt, if they will be able to stand the 
‘’heat.’’    
The banks make a lot of profit and most times this is not commensurate (the fines they are 
levied) with their profit outlay. Is this trend not criminal in its outlook? It looks very sinister 
on the part of the banks and it is high time that the authorities sit up and carry out a 
‘’concentrated attention’’ on them. It is my submission that they are just paying lip service to 
the anti-money laundering legislations and other soft law mechanisms available. The time has 
come for the authorities to sharpen their investigative apparatus and see them as ‘’rogue set 
ups’’ out to continue to defraud the society. The sooner a different view of their activities is 
focused on, the better for the larger society. They know what they are doing is very highly 
deceptive and someone must stand up and speak out. Of course, some people are of the view 
that they are also involved in very ‘‘strong legislative lobbying’’ to make sure that regulatory 
authorities do not see them in this mould. The pattern of their profit making mechanism is 
alarming and deceptive to say the least.            
Despite several interesting anti-money laundering and corruption mechanisms discussed in 
this chapter, money laundering and other predicate indices to the offence are still with us. My 
submission is simply that the present solutions are still not enough to stem the tide of money 
laundering and corruption. More needs to be done as the society is being burdened or dragged 
into reverse momentum as a result of the negativities associated with the situation.      
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CHAPTER 6 
Anglo-American responses to the convergence problems 
6.1 Introduction 
Convergence issues like corruption, bribery and money laundering are not ‘’a recent day 
occurrence’’: they have been there from the beginning of time. The assessment of most 
economic observers is that the society as a whole has been left on their knees as a result of 
this. However, the above assertion has not been left unchallenged from various angles. 
Notably, signals or reactions aside from emanating from some global bodies (exemplified by 
the various UN Conventions and soft law mechanisms) as earlier indicated in this thesis, has 
also emanated from the Anglo-American directions.  
This segment will bring into play the impact of the UK Bribery Act on the convergence 
question. The author will point out some of the salient coercive ingredients contained in the 
Act that is seen to add teeth to the fight against corruption and money laundering in the 
business environment typified by the Act’s frontal confrontation of bribery matters. The Act 
is seen in many quarters as very venomous in tackling the bribery issues with its 
extraterritoriality characteristics. The writer will highlight some of the most important effects 
albeit in a compact manner and some of the conviction/s under the Act will be mentioned. 
The Act’s reactions from external criticisms prior to it notably from OECD and moves taken 
to correct these will be brought to the fore.   
Complimenting the above is the introduction of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 in 
the UK. Admittedly, this is a reflection of the continuous transposing capability of the UK 
authorities. It is just a ‘‘local reflection’’ of the EU law. This again has demonstrated the 
UK’s rapid response and willingness to bring into play within the UK, EU’s 4MLD. The 
contents are tangible reflections of the efforts used to fight the convergence question in this 
thesis - corruption and money laundering. Issues of due diligence in a sliding scale will be 
highlighted and issues of transparency brought to the fore.          
Perhaps, recognising that a lot of damage will continue to be done to the global commercial 
template in form of unacceptable access to business (most companies were bribing their way 
through to gain business deals) arrangements around the globe, the United States decided to 
add their legislation that is seen to have extra-territorial vigour. This came in form of 
enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (hereinafter FCPA). This segment will 
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shade more light on the background and its eventual enactment. FCPA use of both 
prosecutorial and settlement avenues of checkmating corruption and bribery via Department 
of Justice (DoJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will be highlighted. The 
writer will provide some case law examples of FCPA scenarios to buttress the point. More 
importantly, the writer wishes to point out, that the ingredients of the above enactments are 
primarily directed to curb the issues that are embedded in the convergence matter in this 
thesis. And not unsurprising and in line with academic writings, the author will provide a 
summary and possible observations to bring this segment to an end. This is with a view to 
linking it to the general summation of the writing as will be exemplified in the last chapter of 
this thesis.          
6.2 The genesis of the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 as a reactive tiger         
Background and coming into play 
 Historically, it is a fact of life that in every day commercial and non-commercial activities, 
there have been tendencies for some of the participants to distort or influence the established 
order of doing things. This is done by importing or introducing the issue of bribery to gain an 
advantage and expect to influence the established natural pattern of doing the right things. It 
can be seen as a crime of giving another person especially somebody that is in a position of 
authority, money, a gift, etc, so that they will do something that is illegal or dishonest for 
you.
547
Additionally, s.1 of the Act is definitely unambiguous on the definition of bribery and 
is very straightforward - offering, promising or giving an advantage, financial or otherwise, to 
a person where that advantage is intended to induce them to perform their duties in a manner 
that is improper or to reward them for doing so. This is present in every society. However the 
UK in its bid or effort to sanitize the system has been in the forefront (evidentially, the UK 
has been issuing anti-bribery legislation for a long time) of fighting the malaise. It was as a 
result of the above that 2010 Act was promulgated. 
Prior to the above Act, the UK based their anti-bribery laws on the repealed Public Bodies 
Corrupt Practices Act 1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1916 and Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. The present Act 
repealed all the previous statutory and common law provisions relating to bribery. It replaced 
them with the crimes of bribery,
548
being bribed, bribery of foreign public officials
549
and the 
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failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery on its behalf.
550
In fact, all the 
previous anti-bribery legislative enactments were seen to be inadequate and were once 
described as being ‘’inconsistent, anachronistic, and inadequate.’’551The present 2010 Act has 
been described as ‘’the toughest anti-corruption legislation in the world’’ and as ‘’FCPA on 
steroids’’552In fact, the Bribery Act 2010 is a notable statute that brought about a wholesale 
reform of bribery related offences in the UK.
553
The Explanatory Notes of the Act indicated: 
‘’These explanatory notes relates to the Bribery Act 2010 which received Royal Assent on 8 
April 2010. They have been prepared by the Ministry of Justice in order to assist the reader 
in understanding the Act. They do not form part of the Act and have not been endorsed by 
Parliament. The notes need to be read in conjunction with the Act. They are not and are not 
meant to be, a comprehensive description of the Act. So where a section or part of a section 
does not seem to require explanation or comment, none is given. The purpose of the Act is to 
reform the criminal law of bribery to provide for a new consolidated scheme of bribery 
offences to cover bribery both in United Kingdom and abroad...’’554 
The then Justice Secretary Jack Straw, the UK’s former anti-corruption champion was of the 
view that it was difficult for investigators and prosecutors to apply the law sensibly.
555
He 
indicated that from a purely legal perspective, the case for reform was a compelling one. He 
stated that in his role as anti-corruption champion, he also coordinated the UK’s strategy 
against foreign bribery and that law reform was (and still is) one of the key elements of the 
programme, in addition to international action.
556
Additionally, the Law Commission noted 
prior to the Act that the old law was riddled with uncertainty and in need of rationalisation.
557
  
The Commission’s Report suggested that while few would dispute the need to reform, 
consensus on best approach to do so was difficult and that a decade had passed since the 
publication of the initial consultation paper and report on corruption.
558
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Bribery itself can be seen as part of the general corruption nomenclature that is evident in 
many societies including the United Kingdom, hence the various anti-bribery legislations. 
What we have to always bear in mind in a compressed manner is that the contents of the 2010 
Act are there to fight or checkmate the issues inherent in the convergence question in this 
thesis. It involves corruption and money laundering. The various segments of the Bribery Act 
are simply poised as deterrents to the difficult issues of corruption, presenting with it, the 
extraterritorial dimension or reach. This is arguably, what it represents irrespective of 
whatever angle most observers analyse the scenarios in the Act.  
It is fair to state that the Act was possibly partly born out of the pressure the ‘’OECD 
community’’ put on the UK. In fact, in 2007, Angel Guerria the then Secretary-General of 
OECD stated: 
‘’Some countries are sliding back on their determination. Some are still holding back on 
implementing the Convention. They have almost no investigations. They have brought no 
cases to court. They are not being pro-active.’’559      
Of course, the above was directed to countries that have not implemented OECD Convention 
but it was ‘’tactically aimed’’ at the UK. OECD as an organisation was not particularly happy 
with the UK in certain bribery related issues. The way the UK handled the British Aerospace 
Plc (BAE) arms firm investigation issue and based the discontinuance of investigation on 
national economic interest in possible clear violation (in the mind of some people) of OECD 
Bribery Convention
560
was a worry. This investigation eventually ended in a plea bargain deal 
with both the US and the UK authorities.
561
 
The signal emitted, was that (and is still) the UK wanted to correct or clarify some perceived 
anomalies or mindset by some countries that they are after all very serious with bribery or 
corruption matters. And they have since been sending positive vibes across the globe in their 
anti-bribery or anti-corruption efforts. Perhaps, in a bid to continue to buttress the above 
assertion, the UK played a crucial role in the Anti-corruption Summit in London in 2016 
hosted by then Prime Minister David Cameron. The conference dealt with such issues like: 
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corporate secrecy, government transparency, enforcement of international corruption laws, 
and the strengthening of international institutions. All these are pointers to reducing bribery 
and fall comfortably into the convergence issues, the writer submits. 
Distillation of some positive effects of the Act   
It is generally agreed that the Act has added some vigour in its approach to tackle the 
problem of bribery and corruption. Interestingly and noticeable are its extraterritoriality 
characteristics - bribery of foreign public officials 
562
(this is in line with OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention) and its stance on failure to prevent bribery by commercial organisations.
563
 
One is inclined to notice the changes in the substantive law of the UK on account of the 
coming into play of the Act. The Act is a replacement of the available bribery-related crimes 
with new offences. It repealed all the previous laws at common law and under statute. In fact, 
the repealed statutory offences are found in both Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889 
and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. The 2010 Act introduced the failure of a 
corporate body to prevent bribery.
564
There must be evidence of improper performance of a 
relevant function.
565
Of particular importance is the issue of handling corporate hospitality 
which may be an offence.
566
 
We have to note that the intention of the Act is to identify hospitality that is designed as a 
cover for bribing someone. You can still continue to provide bona fide hospitality, promotion 
and other business expenditure. Of course, it must be proportionate to the existing business 
scenario. The Bribery Act guidance issued in December 2012 reaffirms the important point 
that bona fide hospitality or promotional or other legitimate business expenditure is 
recognised as an established and important part of doing business. The SFO will prosecute 
offenders that disguise bribes as business expenditure (hospitality and the like).
567
It must be 
noted that every case scenario must be looked into to see if the ‘’hospitality issue is 
breached.’’ It all hinges on the ‘’proportionality’’ of what has been provided. For instance, 
there will not be a problem if it is found out that a visiting Nigeria minister was provided a 
football ticket worth just £50 to watch a football match in London by a UK company that has 
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been doing business in his ministry in Nigeria. Here, it is envisaged that ‘’common sense’’ 
will prevail on the part of SFO unless it is suggested otherwise. Of course, it will be a 
completely different thing if the value of the hospitality is discovered to be in the region of 
say £100000 or more. Here, you may quickly come to the conclusion that the ‘’hospitality is 
excessive.’’ Note that there is no stated sum of money that is used as a marker to access the 
‘’hospitality issue.’’ This is just an illustration. Even before the Act was promulgated, the 
former Director of SFO Richard Alderman was very sensible in his assessment when he 
indicated that sensible and proportionate hospitality will remain perfectly lawful under the 
Act when it comes into force.
568
 
Of course, a Christmas hamper or an invitation to the corporate hospitality box at a sporting 
event that is sent to an established client will not constitute bribery -- unless it is suggested 
that the client’s representative(s), in entering into a contract with the company concerned, 
performed their duties improperly or that it is hoped that the gift will encourage them to do so 
in future.
569
This could have possibly been the reason during the 2012 Olympic Games in 
London, it was noticed that some companies declined invitation to the games. The writer 
believes that this possibly could have been as a result of the fear of the Act and interpretation 
of the ‘’proportionality’’ issue. The Telegraph stated that it was as a result of the over-
cautious compliance departments of some companies that struggled to interpret the Act that 
there were these restrictions irrespective of assurances from SFO. They dwelled on the side 
of caution.
570
                               
Of great importance in the Act is Section 7. It is a strict liability offence and does not require 
the accused to act in a particular state of mind. It criminalises failure to prevent bribery that is 
committed by relevant commercial organisation. Failure to prevent the conduct will be 
tantamount to committing an offence under ss. 1 and 6 of the Act. This has made companies 
to sit up. But we need to note clearly here that firstly, the prosecution must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that an act of bribery has taken place or occurred. Secondly, this act of 
bribery was evidently committed with the intention of furthering the business interest of that 
corporate entity or company. It is after this that the burden of proof will now shift to that 
company to show that it actually, had reasonable measures in place to prevent the bribery 
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happening. This is important and it is what we have to look out for because if the intent is for 
personal interest of the culprit, it will be difficult for the prosecution against the company as a 
legal person to have a successful outcome.             
As pointed out above, this has led to the increase in enhanced compliance programmes and 
amendments to commercial contracts to take care of this. It is a strict liability offence, so it is 
no surprise that the commercial organisations responded. We have to note that the changes 
have not been limited to criminal law and crimes of bribery. It has extended to the 
amendments of public regulatory law.
571
An entity can put up a defence if it can be 
demonstrated that the entity has put in place ‘’anti-bribery mechanisms’’ in the 
organisation.
572
It does not really matter where the act or offence took place. It can be outside 
the UK shores.
573
  
The second important effect of the Act on issues concerning the convergence difficulty in this 
thesis is section 9 Guidance and revision of the corporate compliance programmes. The 
guidance now contains a detailed provision on what is meant by ‘’adequate procedures’’ that 
would be used to prevent bribery. It contains six principles that may appear to be vague. This 
is on account of the broad spectrum of businesses they do and the circumstances that they 
find themselves. Very close to the s.9 Guidance are the revised corporate compliance 
programmes concerning bribery. Organisations are encouraged to publish their compliance 
programmes for all to see.
574
 
Evidentially, there is no doubt (in the mind of many people) that the Act has made an impact 
in the corporate policies of many legal persons. M. Taddia noted that the Act has been a 
catalyst for corporations to revisit or introduce anti-bribery systems and controls that they 
never had before, putting bribery firmly on the corporate agenda of the UK 
businesses.
575
Tellingly, and in reference to the above, the oil company ExxonMobil made a 
reference to the Act in its website - it indicated that in 2012, approximately 31,000 employees 
took part in anti-corruption training. The training covered the basics of FCPA and the UK 
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Bribery Act.
576
It does not welcome bribery matters in the company - a reflection of the effect 
of the Act.  
The Act, prompted amendments by way of revision or addition of bribery clauses to 
commercial contracts. Simply, contracts have been revised to include anti-bribery clause/s. 
The writer humbly submits that this is good as it fights the convergence issues in this thesis. 
We should bear in mind that specific display of evidence of amendments in commercial 
contracts is less in non-model contracts. However, a good example from the public sector 
exemplified by the University of Bristol UK is a standard anti-bribery clause that it used. It 
indicated that any party contracting with the University is expected to: 
‘’comply with all applicable laws, statutes, regulations relating to anti-bribery and anti-
corruption including but not limited to the Bribery Act 2010 and not engage in any activity, 
practice or conduct which would constitute an offence under the Bribery Act 2010 if such 
activity or conduct has been carried out in the UK and that a breach of the clause shall be 
deemed a material breach and entitle the university to terminate it immediately.’’577         
Interestingly and additionally, educational institutions with particular reference to universities 
in the UK do issue anti-bribery and corruption Policy Statements. This can also be attributed 
to the vigour of the Act. For example, the latest statement on this by Queen Mary University 
of London (QMUL) which was approved by its Council on 13
th
 April 2018 at the time of 
writing (another review is due in April 2021) in paragraph 1.4 indicated: 
‘’QMUL has a zero tolerance policy towards bribery and corruption and is committed to the 
highest level of openness, integrity and accountability, both in letter and spirit. The penalties 
for these offences are severe and can mean up to 10 years imprisonment for individuals 
responsible. In addition, if QMUL is found to have connived in or consented to acts of 
corruption undertaken in its name, the penalties include personal liability for senior 
managers and an unlimited fine, together with significant reputational damage for QMUL 
and could result in other Government-related consequences, such as debarment from public 
(government) tendering.
578’’         
To add vigour to the above, the group sales director of Deltex Medical Ltd whilst giving 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Small and Medium Enterprises was of 
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the view that BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), especially raise challenging 
questions about the Bribery Act, and that his fellow directors have concerns on how they 
operate under the Bribery Act within those countries. They therefore took legal advice plus 
the fact that they have made changes to their contracts.
579
This clearly points to the glaring 
impact of the Act. Whatever the situation may be, readers are implored to note that evidence 
of the impact of the Act as far as anti-bribery clauses are concerned; can actually be discerned 
from the plethora of advice and guidance emanating from law firms on anti-bribery clauses. It 
is there for all to see and is easily accessible in the net.                           
Contrastingly to the above, another effect of the Act is the issue of prosecutions and low 
convictions under the Act. The convictions have not been many as anticipated.
580
The first 
conviction under the Act was the case of R v Munir Patel.
581
The accused was convicted for 
accepting the sum of £500 to avoid putting the details of a traffic summons in the court data 
base. He was sentenced to six years imprisonment. He eventually admitted one count of 
bribery and misconduct when he appeared at Southwark Crown Court. His sentence was 
reduced to four years on appeal because the Appeal Court stated that the initial sentence was 
excessive.
582
He worked at Redbridge Magistrates’ Court, and was of previous good character 
and had pleaded guilty. The appeal court headed by Lord Chief Justice Lord Judge, sitting 
with two other judges in their judgment stated that the appropriate sentence for the crime 
remains a substantial sentence but the sentence should be reduced from six to four years.
583
         
It has been suggested, that the paucity of conviction under the Act has been attributed to the 
fact that the detection of bribery is extremely difficult due to the secretive manner this is 
done. Additionally, most bribery related matters do not produce immediately obvious victims. 
Mostly, the unholy agreement to gain an undue advantage is often retained amongst a close 
number of individuals.  
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Possibly, a more reasonable factor for the low level conviction in the UK (in the mind of 
some people) is the unwillingness of the authorities to allocate more resources to the 
investigation and enforcement. This sounds more reasonable and convincing. Indeed, this 
resources issue was once pointed out by the OECD in the past. That is not to say that there 
have not been some convictions with the hallmarks mirrored towards s.7 of the Act. A 
possible good example of this is the first ever corporate conviction under the Act prosecuted 
by SFO under s7 - Sweett Group PLC case.
584
In this case, a UK-based construction company 
and professional services company, was convicted for the offence of failing to prevent its 
subsidiary Cyril Sweett International (CSI) from paying bribes on its behalf. The unlawful 
conduct took place over a three-year period from 2012 to 2015 in the United Arab Emirates. 
The company pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay £2.25m as a result of the conviction 
from SFO investigations for failure to prevent an act of bribery intended to secure and retain 
a contract with AI Ain Ahlia Insurance Company (AAAI) contrary to s7(1)(b) of the Act. The 
then Director of SFO David Green stated: 
‘’Acts of bribery by UK companies significantly damage this country’s commercial 
reputation. This conviction and punishment, the SFO’s first under section 7 of the Bribery 
Act, sends a strong message that UK companies must take full responsibility for the actions 
of their employees and in their commercial activities act in accordance with the law.’’585          
The Sweett Group decision should be understood as a wake-up call for all European 
businesses with ties to the UK. In order to fulfil their due diligence obligations, they cannot 
simply or just focus on actions that might happen within the UK or the EU but rather also 
concentrate their attention on their entire business practices worldwide.
586
        
Another effect of the Act is the issue of notable expansion in scope of novel prosecution 
policies with regard to bribery and corruption. Here, attention should be focussed on 
corporate self-reporting and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). Without fear of 
possible contradiction, the writer points out that these two have to be quickly recognized as 
after effects of the Act. They apply to offences under the Act. The writer is glad to point out 
that this does not mean that they were initiated due to the coming of the Act. In fact, both 
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predate the Act in some UK jurisdictions and also apply to a wider criminal spectrum than the 
Act.
587
For example, crimes like conspiracy to defraud and cheating the public revenue 
amongst others can be dealt with under DPA. With regard to deferred prosecution 
agreements, there is Ministry of Justice’s (MoJ) Consultation and comment on a new 
enforcement tool to deal with economic crimes committed by commercial organisations. This 
indicated; that although the creation under the Bribery Act 2010 of criminal liability for 
commercial organisation that fails to prevent bribery is a notable improvement and although 
the prosecuting agencies are taking more proactive approaches in identifying and 
investigating serious economic crimes, more needs to be done.
588
                  
In Scottish context, the self reporting was brought into force the same day with the Act. The 
intention possibly was to increase its effect. However, the two, do not apply on an equal basis 
throughout the UK. Self reporting policy issued in England, Wales and Northern Ireland has 
now been withdrawn in the UK. It was evidenced in the 2009 Serious Fraud Office guidance. 
But the current SFO guidance is simply - there is no presumption in favour of civil settlement 
in any circumstance.
589
In England and Wales, the general parameter for prosecutors is 
whether there is sufficient evidence to go ahead and if it is in public interest. Self-reporting is 
somehow still being used in Scotland. In one case, Abbot Group PLC successfully self-
reported itself in Scotland and avoided possible prosecution.
590
It detailed all the corrupt 
payments made by an overseas subsidiary in 2007. In another case in Scotland in December 
2014, an Aberdeen based firm, International Tubular Services admitted benefitting from 
corrupt payments and voluntarily remitted the sum of £172,000 to the Civil Recovery Unit.  
It must be noted that self-reporting and deferred prosecution agreements differ in nature and 
application. It must be voluntarily entered and would have the blessing of the court. In other 
words, the charges lay dormant.
591
In the UK, DPA with a company does not rule out the 
prosecution of individual officers in that company unlike the USA. Interestingly, the DPA 
that SFO entered with Rolls-Royce PLC in 2017 to the tune of £497.25m stood out as a 
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significant pointer in this direction. The agreement with the company followed four years of 
investigation into bribery and corruption. This also continued the investigation into the 
conduct of individuals.
592
This covered a period of over three decades of bribery and 
corruption which was evidenced across the globe notably in the UK, the US and Brazil.                
It is interesting to note that the first DPA agreement since its introduction in the UK in 2014 
ended successfully on 30th November 2018. This was the DPA that SFO entered with 
Standard Bank PLC (now known as ICBC Standard Bank PLC) on 30
th
 November 2015. The 
bank was guilty under s7 offence and did not waste the court’s time. It was approved by the 
President of the Queen’s Bench Division, RT Hon. Sir Brian Leveson at Southwark Crown 
Court. SFO announced that the bank complied with the terms successfully. The DPA required 
the bank to pay nearly $26m in fines and disgorgements of profits, and to pay $6m in 
compensation to the Government of Tanzania. Under the DPA terms, the bank was required 
to commission an external consultant to report on its anti-bribery and corruption controls, 
policies and procedures and to recommend improvements to strengthen its controls, with 
regular reports issued to SFO. Lisa Osofsky SFO Director at the time of writing indicated 
thus: 
‘’I welcome this successful conclusion of UK’s first Deferred Prosecution Agreement. DPAs 
are a way of holding companies to account without punishing innocent employees, and are 
an important tool in changing corporate culture for the better. Under the terms of the DPA, 
the SFO alleged that Standard had failed to prevent its associated person(s) from committing 
to secure a contract to secure a sovereign debt for Tanzania.”593        
The six terms that the SFO agreed with Standard Bank PLC were based on, to wit: 
Cooperation - Standard Bank was required to fully and honestly cooperate with the SFO and 
other authorities investigating the bribes, including disclosing information and materials 
relating to activities by individuals involved. This has occurred throughout the term of the 
DPA. Compensation - $6m of compensation, plus interest of $1,046,196.58 to be paid to the 
Government of Tanzania, this was paid in full in May 2016. Disgorgement of profits - All 
$8.4m fees paid to Stanbic Tanzania and Standard Bank through the secured contract to be 
confiscated by SFO and passed to the UK Treasury, this occurred in May 2016. Financial 
penalty - $16.8m in fines were imposed on Standard Bank by SFO and passed to the UK 
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Treasury, this occurred in May 2016. Corporate compliance programme - Standard Bank 
agreed to commission a review by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) on the bank’s internal 
anti-bribery and corruption compliance procedures, in agreement with SFO, who advised on 
the scope and extent of that review. On completion, Standard Bank was required to 
implement any recommendation and act on advice received within 12 months of the review 
completing, with PWC verifying their implementation with regular reports provided to the 
SFO for certification. This was completed in August 2017.  Costs - SFO costs of £330,000 to 
be paid by the Bank - completed in May 2016.
594
       
Another significant effect of the Act is partial closing of the gaps identified in the UK’s 
international bribery legal deficiencies. In 2008, OECD accused the UK, although it was a 
party to the OECD Bribery Convention, of lacking in its legislation the provision to provide 
an effective criminal corporate liability. Bribery of foreign public official may be committed 
by a legal person and senior corporate officials or managers can now be recognised as the 
‘’directing minds’’ of the company, meeting the requirement for the mental state of an 
accused in criminal law prosecution.
595
C.K Wells once remarked that the UK came under 
pressure from OECD Working group on Bribery, which believed that the identification route 
to corporate criminality which could otherwise apply to bribery offences was wholly 
inadequate in meeting the UK’s obligation under the Bribery Convention.596  
The OECD also raised the issue of the UK not having a specialised bribery authority agency 
to specifically address bribery, the introduction of some extraneous factors used by 
prosecutors and the requirement that the Attorney General must agree to prosecutions. To be 
fair, the first arm of the criticism will remain. The fact is that the Act has not created a single 
specialised authority specifically mandated to only tackle bribery in the UK. But in Scotland, 
it is the responsibility of the Crown Office and the Procurator Fiscal Service that are 
responsible for this. This was provided in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of April 
2014.
597
And in the rest of the UK, the SFO has the mandate to carry out this role.
598
We 
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should be aware that the MoU has gone a long way to ameliorate the OECD criticism and the 
author surmises, that in a way, this is laudable. The City of London Police, FCA, CPS, MoD 
Police and NCA are all part of it.  
Above gainsaid, the prosecutorial-related-criticism that the UK received from OECD about 
the bribery investigation of BAE created a lot of dust. OECD indicated that the UK went 
against article 5 of the OECD Bribery Convention that specifically stated that ‘’national 
interest’’ should not be a factor in deciding about whether to prosecute. But the UK replied in 
style and stated that while it abides by OECD’s Article 5 Bribery Convention, additional CPS 
requirements are twofold in deciding prosecution as required by the UK Guidance in the 
Code for Prosecutors in England and Wales. They are the established evidential and public 
interest tests.
599
To this, the author submits that this is an admirable reason to discontinue with 
the BAE investigation. Additionally, a lot of collateral damage could have resulted from the 
outcome. Firstly, the Saudi Government threatened to cancel all contracts with the UK 
companies and secondly, cancel all intelligence cooperation with the UK on combating 
terrorism.    
The consent of the Attorney General is no longer required before starting to prosecute.  
Section 10 of the Bribery Act contains this. Whatever the effects evidenced by the Act came 
about as a result of the reactions to the criticisms that UK had earlier on received. This is 
good as the improvements together with the contents of the Bribery Act are all necessary 
weapons used in addressing the convergence issues present in this thesis, hence their 
relevance.                  
Compressed post legislative scrutiny  
Indeed with most legislation that is usually in existence in robust legislative environments, 
(The UK is considered as a very proactive legislative and robust environment) it is not out of 
expectation that the authorities do after a while embark on reassessment of the situation. This 
is usually geared towards identifying gaps with the aim of rectifying them and to positively 
move forward with the legislation. It could sometimes lead to abandoning some parts, or the 
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whole of that particular legislation or to give positive accolades to the legislation. It is 
therefore no surprise that the Act which has generated a lot of comments from different 
quarters albeit both positive and negative was subjected to the above.  
In March 2019 the observations in tandem with the above was made by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Act - Post Legislative Scrutiny. Some of the significant areas 
included the followings: On corporate offence of failure to prevent bribery, it recommended 
that the guidance must have a more expansive approach. In other words, it must be expanded 
to provide clarity on which procedures to be followed by the SMEs to help them in creating a 
good defence. It sought more clarity on the issue of ‘’adequate procedure.’’ This should be 
interpreted in their opinion as ‘’procedures that are reasonable in all circumstances.’’ It 
acknowledged the inconsistency that existed between the wordings in the Act and the recent 
Criminal Financing Act 2017 (CFA) that created the offences of failure to prevent facilitation 
of tax evasion.
600
           
On the interesting topic of corporate hospitality, the Committee acknowledged that the 
boundary between it and bribery can be very challenging. It indicated that further guidance is 
needed on what might constitute acceptable corporate hospitality. It acknowledged that the 
present guidance is as clear as possible in the absence of any judicial interpretation. It also 
recommends that SFO and Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) should make available plans 
as to how to speed up prosecutions. Of further interest, is on DPAs. They welcomed it as a 
positive. But they did not go as far as recommending the US style non-prosecution- 
agreements. On bribery of foreign officials, the Committee reiterated the need to provide 
support for SMEs particularly those abroad that may be facing prosecution. It recommended 
that even the smallest embassies abroad should have at least one person with an expertise in 
the local language, customs and culture. The essence would be to contact the official 
representative of the foreign government department on behalf of the UK firm. The 
committee is of the view that a lack of police training and awareness could possibly be a 
contributory factor on why we have low number of prosecutions.
601
      
6.3 The Money Laundering Regulation 2017: A weapon not to be overlooked 
Obviously, the crux of this thesis with regard to the convergence issues is that tackling money 
laundering is a key policing and policy priority. And issues about the ‘’washing of dirty 
                                                     
600
 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id2011719/Idbribact/303/303.pdf   
601
 Ibid 
 212 
 
money’’ has in actual fact led to changes in both substantive criminal laws of nations and the 
creation of some detailed extensive or massive regulatory frameworks. It is actually due to 
the enormity of the problems, that the authorities in order to meet up with containing the 
malaise, that it is no surprise that anti-money laundering mechanisms keep springing up.  
It is on account of the above as earlier on indicated in this thesis, that the regional block – the 
EU issued some of its Directives to contain the problems. It is no secret that the EU reflects 
or watches the ‘‘body language’’ of the FATF. This is usually demonstrated by the EU 
issuing a Directive to reflect the ‘’signs of the time’’ as far as anti-money laundering matters 
are concerned. Of course, the UK is always a willing and diligent player in its monitoring of 
the EU Directives. It may not be possibly considered an over statement to state that the UK is 
always ahead of other EU nations in its eagerness to make sure that the EU laws are 
implemented in the UK. The current (as at the time of writing) 4MLD has now been 
transposed into the UK law as the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of 
Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulation 2017. It is a reflection of 4MLD.
602
It is also 
known as Money Laundering Regulation 2017 (hereinafter MLR 2017).             
The essence of the contents of the MLR 2017 is to help fight ‘’dirty money’’ that the 
criminals use various tactics to launder. In this legislation, there are some salient points that 
the regulation is intended to achieve. Issues like the customer due diligence has now taken the 
risk based style to be dealt with by the relevant persons. They can use mechanisms like 
customer due diligence (CDD), simplified due diligence (SDD) or enhanced due diligence 
(EDD) as the situation demands. It is expected that there must be beneficial registers to track 
down the beneficial owners of corporate entities. However, it is good to note that the UK 
addressed this partially.
603
They are known as Persons with Significant Control registers 
(PSC). 
Aside above, there is the requirement that there must be also a central register of trust. But 
this has also raised questions about the privacy of the beneficial owners with regard to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In fact, in France, the judiciary has frowned at this 
and this was suspended in that country. The truth is that this element of MLR 2017 has very 
serious implications on the human rights of citizens. The writer is confident to indicate that 
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MLR 2017 focussed on the serious issues of transparency and beneficial ownership which are 
serious clogs in fighting money laundering. It is expected that the implementation of the 
facets of the regulations would go a long way in curbing the problem. However, readers 
should not be surprised to embrace further regulations to combat this. The reason is that the 
authorities have the habit of being reactive to these matters. And it is not far from the truth to 
state that the MLR 2017 was enacted as a result of the ‘‘contagion of the Paris, Brussels 
terrorist attacks and the Panama Papers incidents.’’  
 6.4 The US approach to the convergence problems: A look at Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977 (FCPA)     
 Compressed background, effects and prosecutions  
Indeed, the issues embedded in bribery and corruption have been with our society from the 
cradle of civilization or ‘‘from cradle of time.’’ And bribery is always geared to achieve an 
unfair advantage and thereby distorting the level playing ground for issues to take the natural 
cause of events. For some of the readers that are conversant with the Holy Bible, it was even 
stated that bribery is not right when God spoke to the Israelites. It was indicated that justice 
shall not be perverted, that no one should show partiality, bribes should be rejected on 
account of the fact that it blinds the eyes of the wise and subverts the cause of the 
righteous.
604
In fact, Samuel’s children took bribes and perverted the cause of justice.605And 
there were instances where the priests teach for a price, people in authority gave their 
judgement for a bribe and prophets practiced divination for money.
606
The guilty has also been 
acquitted for paying bribe and the innocent deprived of their rights.
607
      
 Other instances where bribery was employed to gain an undue advantage abound. A certain 
woman known as Delilah was offered eleven thousand pieces (11,000) of silver by the 
Philistines to disclose the source of the power of Samson who was very powerful for the 
Philistine to handle. It was in their bid to get hold of Samson through this lady that they 
bribed her.
608
 
The writer surmises, that bribery has always been used by people to achieve a particular aim. 
It is as old as history. Interestingly, when we fast forward to modern era and focus on 
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commercial or business transactions, there is a similar trend in the global economic template. 
On account of this, the USA reacted. And part of the reason was as a result of the significant 
discovery that payments were made to representatives of some foreign companies in the USA 
which did not reflect in the accounting books, that the US authorities ‘’woke up’’ to stem the 
tide.  
There were two issues that actually helped to galvanise the coming into play of the USA’s 
FCPA of 1977. One of these was that during the Watergate Scandal affair (this was during 
the tenure of President Richard Nixon), it was discovered that many US corporations made 
illegal contributions to the domestic political campaigns. After investigation by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC)
609
it was established that this practice was wide spread. It 
also involved officials of foreign companies. It was discovered that these payments were not 
even transparently reflected in the books of these companies. The payments, one can say, 
were misrepresented in the books of the companies with the intention to evade the auditors.  
The second galvanizing episode that gingered the legislation of FCPA was the Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation bribery incident.
610
This Corporation was in serious financial distress. It 
actually received a loan guarantee from the US Congress to the tune of $250m. This was 
made possible to forestall a potential bankruptcy. The essence of the loan was to 
fundamentally improve the ailing financial situation of the company. However, investigation 
by SEC uncovered the fact that this corporation used over £22m of this money to bribe 
foreign officials to boaster its capabilities to gain contracts internationally. When confronted, 
the company defended itself and said that this was what other companies did and gained 
access extra-territorially to contracts and increased their profits.
611
In a bid to get this through 
Congress, the rational for this legislation to combat bribery was echoed in the words of the 
then US President Gerald Ford. He stated that the spate of scandals resulted in an erosion of 
confidence in the responsibility of many of US important business enterprises. And that if 
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you look at the matter in a more general way, the disclosures tend to destroy confidence in 
the US free enterprise.
612
  
Prior to the above, the then US Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson stated: 
‘’Bribery corrodes the confidence that must exist between buyer and seller if domestic and 
international commerce is to flourish. It threatens to poison relationships between the United 
States and nations with which we have long had mutually beneficial political and commercial 
ties.’’613 
The truth is that FCPA came into play in 1977. It contained two significant segments - the 
anti-bribery provisions and a book and records provisions. Simply elucidated, the anti bribery 
provisions made it illegal for US corporations to offer payments to a foreign official for the 
purpose of ‘’obtaining or retaining business’’ or ‘’securing any undue advantage.’’ The 
‘’books and records provision’’ made it an offence for companies who fail to record proper 
transactions in their accounting books. These must reflect the exact nature of the transactions. 
This should prevent companies from hiding illegal payments in such headings like ‘’travel 
and entertainment,’’ ‘‘consulting fees’’ and ‘‘commissions.’’ These are all ways to 
camouflage for bribery, hence, the relevance to the subject of this thesis. The enforcement on 
behalf of the US Government is the responsibility of Department of Justice (DoJ) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It must be noted that the two do usually 
coordinate their investigations. But interestingly, they do act independently and dish their 
own penalties.      
DoJ initiates criminal charges against firms, negotiates settlements and recommends penalties 
which in turn will be approved by the courts. The fines of DoJ usually do reflect the federal 
guidelines. The fines can be reduced depending on the circumstances, to wit: whether the 
culprit is a first-time offender or repeat offender, steps undertaken to curb the issue to prevent 
future criminality and level of cooperation during investigation. SEC has its own enforcement 
authority and penalties that are inclusive of fines and profit disgorgements. To calculate the 
disgorgement, SEC usually looks at the total estimated profit that is earned as a result of the 
bribe. Indeed, if it involves a major capital project, the amount could be huge. In point of fact, 
this can include what is termed ‘’cease and desist order’’- this usually will prohibit the firm 
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from repeating the infraction.
614
Further violations, usually attract very high penalty in tandem 
with the peculiar circumstances.              
This Act has extra-territorial reach to catch the culprits and initially the US companies were 
not happy about it. The reason then was that they believed that it put them in a competitive 
disadvantage with other foreign firms that paid bribes to gain access to lucrative deals abroad. 
For instance, in 1979, the National Construction Association in the US actually estimated that 
the US firms had fallen to number five in ranking behind such countries like Japan, Korea, 
West Germany (before unification) and Italy. It noted that three years earlier, the US was 
number one in that sector or industry. It was observed by a member of a construction trade 
group - Chicago Bridge & Iron that the company in fact lost over $100 million of sales over a 
three year period where they thought that there were serious elements of bribery.
615
It was like 
a football match where the goalpost of one team was massively expanded to enable the other 
team’s chances of winning the game to be brighter. Analogously, it looked like a situation 
where you were supposed to box with your two hands, but one of them was actually tied to 
your back. This was the situation that the US corporations were in.       
In truth, the above observation was actually a true reflection of the global business scenario 
shortly after the FCPA was promulgated. It was only USA globally that had that sort of law 
for a while before others did largely on account of ‘’USA pressure.’’ Indeed, corroborating 
the loss of the US firms’ profits as a result of the Act was a 1981 report by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO). This is an independent nonpartisan agency that works for 
congress. Often called ‘’congressional watchdog.’’ It examines how taxpayer dollars are 
spent and provides Congress and Federal agencies with objective, reliable information to help 
the government save money and work more efficiently.
616
It indicated that over 30 percent of 
US companies had lost their bids in recent years to companies that actually paid bribes and 
edged them out. The report was based on the survey of over 1,000 largest corporations in the 
USA. It concluded that it was the aircraft manufacturers plus the constructions firms that 
were most likely to report very significant impact on the volume of their business.
617
         
To be fair in the analysis, this was what was very prevalent then (and still is presently but 
with ‘’more cautious approach’’ on the part of the companies). It must be noted, that the USA 
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is also a member of OECD. So in order to make sure that at least other nations do not have 
the competitive advantage over the US firms, it was the US pressure that contributed to the 
emergence of the OECD Bribery Convention of 1997 to at least smoothen the terrain. 
Interestingly, the Department of Justice (DoJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) have registered a lot of success in their prosecutions and settlements in this area. The 
cases are so numerous to mention. But the writer will just mention a few. It must be noted, 
the writer submits, that the increase in the enforcement of FCPA could possibly be attributed 
to two issues - firstly, the USA Patriot Act 2001
618
and secondly, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.
619
     
The Halliburton bribery case readily comes to mind. This particular case has cost the 
company a lot of money in fines in the USA.
620
But surprisingly, no one has yet been indicted 
in Nigeria. This could be as a result of the fact that allegedly very powerful personalities may 
be involved. In fact, the Nigeria administration (at the time of writing) has reopened the case 
file again through the corruption agency EFCC. Some people may think that this may have a 
political undertone as it may be seen as an attempt to hunt down political opponents.
621
I do 
not buy into this ‘’rash’’ idea that it is or may be an attempt to hunt down political opponents 
or a political vendetta by the present Nigeria government. We need to view this as a good 
move by the current government to see that justice is done however long it takes and that the 
‘’rule of law’’ must always prevail.  
In Nigeria, as in some other jurisdictions (although not all), there is no statute of limitations 
for a criminal prosecution. It does not elapse in criminal cases and can be started anytime 
once the prosecution has the evidence and facts in Nigeria - indeed it should be so. Again, the 
writer sees this as a good and solid ‘’political will’’ on the part of the government to make 
sure that justice is done. Nobody should be seen to be above the law and this possibly could 
be the message that the government wants to send out by progressing with this case. Some 
individuals accused in Nigeria sometimes resort to ‘’media trials’’ to garner support. This 
should not be the case. Due process must be allowed to take its course. The suspicion is that 
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some of the previous administrations may have ‘’deliberately’’ decided not to ‘’effectively’’ 
go for this prosecution. The writer hopes and is very optimistic that at this time, that this case 
may see the light of the day in Nigeria irrespective of the allegations that powerful 
personalities are involved. We need to exercise patience and observe how this case will 
eventually turn out.    
DoJ and SEC do reach agreements with the accused on how to go about the issues. In 
September 2018, Stryker Corp a Michigan-based medical device company paid the SEC a 
$7.8 million penalty to resolve FCPA books and records and internal accounting controls 
offences in India, China, and Kuwait. It was found that the firm’s internal accounting control 
were not sufficient to detect risks of improper payments that happened in the above countries. 
The Director of SEC’s New York Regional Office Mark P. Berger considered the penalty 
ordered along with the imposition of a compliance consultant as appropriate and necessary. In 
fact, without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Stryker consented to the entry of an 
order requiring the company to cease and desist from committing violations of the books and 
records and internal accounting provisions. This same firm settled its infractions with SEC in 
October 2013 and was required to pay a $3.5 million penalty plus more than $7.5 million in 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and more than $2.2 million in interest. The penalty for its 
second violation in 2018 was understandably higher from SEC.
622
 
In September 2018, Petroleo Brasileeiro S.A - Petrobras, the DoJ and SEC assessed penalties 
and disgorgement of $1.78 billion against Brazil’s state energy company to resolve FCPA 
violations involving bribes to politicians and political parties in Brazil. Petrobras entered a 
non-prosecution agreement with DoJ that assessed a criminal penalty of $853.2 million and 
an administrative order with SEC that required disgorgement of $933.5 million.
623
The SEC 
order found that senior executives of the company worked with the company’s largest 
contractors and suppliers to inflate the cost of Petrobras’ infrastructure project by billions of 
dollars. The companies that executed these projects paid billions of dollars in kickbacks to 
the Petrobras executives, who in turn shared these payments with top Brazilian politicians 
that helped them to get the top level positions in the state owned Petrobras. The firm recorded 
these payments as money spent to acquire and improve assets, resulting in an estimated $2.5 
billion overstatement of assets. Aside this, SEC found that Petrobras false and misleading 
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fillings included materially false and misleading statements to the US investors in a $10 
billion stock offering completed in 2010. This misrepresented their assets, infrastructure 
projects, integrity of its management, and the nature of the relationship with majority 
shareholder - Brazil government. Steven Peikin, Co-Director of the SEC Enforcement stated 
that if an international company sells securities in the US, it must provide truthful 
information about its business operation.
624
                   
United Technologies Corporation in September 2018 paid the SEC $13.9 million to resolve 
charges that it violated the FCPA by making illicit payments in its elevator business in 
Azerbaijan and aircraft engine businesses in China and elsewhere. The company provided 
trips and gifts to various officials in China, Kuwait, South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand and 
Indonesia through its Pratt & Whitney (aviation) division and Otis (elevator) subsidiary. The 
company settled without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings. It simply disgorged $9 
million plus pre-judgement interest of about $919,000, and paid a penalty of $4 million.
625
  
Additionally, Vantage Drilling Company in November 2018 paid the SEC $5 million in 
disgorgement for FCPA violations in Brazil, in connection with bribes a director paid to 
Brazil officials connected to a contract for drilling services. The director paid about $31 
million in bribes through an intermediary. The SEC later found after investigations, in an 
internal administrative proceeding that the company violated the FCPA internal accounting 
control provisions.
626
In truth, in 2018, a total of 16 companies paid $2.9 billion to resolve 
FCPA cases.  
There is no shortage of conviction for natural persons under FCPA. For example, the Hong 
Kong former Home Secretary Mr Patrick Ho was convicted in December 2018 by a 
Manhattan federal jury after a ten-day trial for bribing African officials on behalf of a 
Chinese energy company. The jury convicted him on seven counts that he faced which also 
included money laundering.
627
                        
The cases are many and part of the outcome has demonstrated FCPA’s extra-territoriality 
status in tackling bribery and corruption that involves both natural and legal persons. From 
whatever angle this is analysed, the important thing to note is that FCPA is a very crucial 
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legislation that has exhibited its tenacity to fight the convergence question which is the 
substance of this thesis – ‘’dirty money’’ got via bribery and corruption transmuted through 
money laundering.                        
6.5 Conclusion 
The writer concludes that the issue of bribery which is subset of corruption in every day 
interaction is a massive problem for the society as a whole. This is irrespective of the 
jurisdiction that one finds himself or herself on account of the fact that the world is now a 
‘’global village.’’ What effects one country can easily contagiously transmute into other 
jurisdictions. Flowing from this is the conspicuous evidence that some of the major economic 
global players (perhaps epitomised by the USA and the UK) also recognised this issue. And it 
is on account of the above dilemma, that both jurisdictions reacted at different times with 
legislations geared towards controlling these cancerous situations evidenced by the admission 
of the presence of corruption, bribery and money laundering.   
Indeed, part of the UK’s response was seen in the promulgation of the Bribery Act 2010. This 
one can possibly rightly indicate was as a result of the ‘‘cumulative anti-bribery missiles’’ 
directed towards the UK, notably, emanating from the direction of OECD that pin pointed 
certain inadequacies inherent in the UK’s anti-bribery or anti-corruption legislation prior to 
the Act. True to type, and as evidenced in the contents of the Act, it is generally agreed (by 
most commentators) that there has been a significant improvement on the cautious approach 
taken by both legal and natural persons to avoid falling into the bribery trap. The writer is 
glad to submit, that it is as a result of the Act, that there is an upsurge amongst commercial 
players both nationally and extra-territorially to improve their compliance status in order to 
present more anti-bribery stance in their economic or commercial interactions. This will 
enable them to avoid the bribery web. To this extent, it is a welcome development.  
There is also more awareness amongst commercial players about the importance of playing 
‘‘in accordance to the rules.’’ Although, the bribery investigations may take a long time to 
come through on account of its secretiveness, it is not ‘’a nice cup of tea’’ for the individuals 
and companies that may be culpable. The awareness to avoid this was exhibited by some 
corporate entities during the London Olympic Games when the companies refused corporate 
tickets to attend the games.  
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The MLR 2017, reflecting the 4MLD, has impact in checking the convergence issues and 
demonstrates the UK’s readiness to continue to transpose the EU anti-money laundering 
legislation whenever the situation arises.  
The coming into play of the US FCPA in 1977 presented a very impactful scenario to the 
convergence questions. It completely changed the ‘‘dynamics of extension of the territorial 
hook’’ to make sure that those that offer bribes and distort their books are brought to justice. 
Numerous individuals and companies that fell short of the above legislation were made to 
face the music when caught in the FCPA anti-bribery net. This was evidenced by the actions 
of DoJ and SEC.   
However, the writer submits or notes that irrespective of the various legislative interventions 
exhibited by the UK and the USA in the above, the issue of the convergence matter is still 
with us. More needs to be done. Some of the penalties handed to the companies and 
individuals one can say are mind-boggling. But still the issues of bribery and corruption keep 
on reoccurring as if these legislations are not there. The tempo of checking this must be 
intensified. Perhaps the anecdotes one would suggest may have to be tailored in a way to suit 
that particular region.          
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion       
Summary of key findings 
The issues involved in investigating bribery and corruption are opaque. Perhaps, part of the 
reasoning here is that the issues anchor on the fact that the culprits or the participants as the 
case may be, usually conduct their business or trade ‘’in the dark.’’ In truth, issues on bribery 
and corruption are very secretive in their outlook. In fact, the currency of the trade is 
‘‘opaqueness.’’ And this is why the information in this area of research in most instances is 
populated with estimations. It is on account of this that figures presented as the outcome of 
some findings may be excused for lack of exactness. We need to appreciate that irrespective 
of the fact that these figures are estimates do not actually mean that they are misleading, far 
from it and this should be understood. 
The reader may agree with the writer that bribery and corruption presents multifaceted 
problems to the society. Part of the problem being that because of the ‘’changing nature’’ of 
corruption, there is the difficulty of (up until now) fashioning out a universal agreed 
definition of what it is. It is difficult. R.J Williams captured this vividly. He indicated that the 
study of corruption is like a jungle and if we are unable to bring it to a state of orderly 
cultivation, we at least require a guide to the flora and fauna. This need has impelled many 
writers to find a precise definition which will accurately characterise the phenomenon. Yet it 
is important to note that there are nearly as many definitions as there are species of tropical 
plants and they vary as much in their appearance, character and resilience. The point is that 
the search for true definition of corruption is like the pursuit of the Holy Grail, endless, 
exhausting and ultimately futile.
628
       
R. Alexander aptly captured the corruption template or scenario. He is of the view that people 
should always be on their toes any time the issue of corruption comes up as a crime more 
particularly when it is categorised as a financial crime. He suggested strongly that people 
should make efforts to understand what it actually means. He went on to indicate, that 
corruption can encapsulate various manners of behaving. The style associated with the 
behaviours can sometimes be seen as lacking morals. In certain cases, it could even lead to 
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people being forced to relinquish the job they are holding by way of resignation/s. He noted 
further that even under English law, the said manner of doing things do not actually constitute 
infractions under the law. According to him, it is a very difficult task to categorically put a 
stamp or marker on what we should consider to be this societal problem. The society as a 
whole is characterised by various legal setups and various customs. We need to note, that it is 
hugely as a result of the above, that an agreed definition of what the phenomenon should be, 
is lacking. Irrespective of this, he said this societal issue should be viewed as a situation 
where a person abuses his/her office to engage in an act that is in breach of his/her duty. This 
can also include the demand of some type of favour. In the first place, what the individual is 
supposed to do for you usually is within the remit of his/her official position or job. In any 
event, this needs to be analysed as to how it is connected to the extant law.
629
His observations 
simply go on to show the multi-faceted aspect that the corruption picture presents to the 
diverse society in a chameleonic dimension.  
We need to take cognizance of the fact that the above writer’s appreciation or analysis of 
what corruption should be is in the real sense of the word in consonance with what the 
Council of Europe (CoE) observed in 1995. The CoE it must be noted alluded to the fact that 
it was (and still is) as a result of the various difficulties that usually come up trans-border 
amongst countries that there is this problem of agreeing universally on what definition to 
accord corruption. Of course, this can also be attributed as to why there is the serious 
difficulty in trying to shake off the corruption issues. In reality, there are many multifaceted 
explanations of what corruptions stands for.  
We need to recognise the fact that there are also other definitions. These actually do not 
exclude the ones that were given by various types of legal persons. Of particular interest, it 
has been noted that one of the most recognisable non-governmental-organisations (NGOs), 
Transparency International (TI) was not left behind in coming up with a definition of what 
corruption stands for. It simply stated that corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.
630
In truth, this definition can be classified as being succinct and it is likely that a 
few may argue against this. This definition, one can allude, has included possibly bribery that 
is also classified as being a part of corruption that also has the characteristics of happening in 
that sector of the economy that is seen to be private. This can be classified as being 
advantageous. Tellingly, it is also possibly right to say that the other subsets of corruption 
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and close offences like misconduct in public office, fraud, embezzlement and theft are also 
included. Of course, these offences in their own right can be seen as separate offences that are 
also committed when corruption happens. We need to recognize the fact that TI has a soft law 
status. However, a lot of respect is usually accorded to the observations that this NGO usually 
pronounces. This as a result has necessitated the fact that both natural and legal persons do 
take note of their observations. This is the present situation and may not change in future.  
The World Bank was not left out on this and has indicated that corruption should be seen as 
the abuse of public office for private gain. It must be noted that the fact that the World Bank 
comes up with an opinion, does not in actual fact make that opinion to be critique-free. The 
World Bank recognised the fact that the term ‘’corruption’’ prior to settling with the above 
definition covers a broad range of human actions. The then (now late) World Bank General 
Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata indicated that corruption occurs when a function, whether official 
or private, requires the allocation of benefits or provision of a good or service. In all cases, a 
position of trust is being exploited to realise private gains beyond what the position holder is 
entitled to. Attempts to influence the position holder, through the payment of bribes or an 
exchange of benefits or favours, in order to receive a special gain or treatment not available 
to others is also a form of corruption, even if the gain involved is not illicit under applicable 
law. The absence of rules facilitates the process as much as the presence of cumbersome or 
excessive rules. Corruption in this sense is not confined to public sector and in that sector or 
to administrative bureaucracies. It is not limited to the payment and receipt of bribes. It takes 
various forms and is practiced under all forms of government, including well-established 
democracies. It can be found in the legislative, judicial and executive branch of government, 
as well as all forms of private sector activities. It is not exclusively associated with any 
ethnic, racial, or religious group. However, its level, scope, and impact vary greatly from 
country to country and may also vary, at least for a while, within the same country from one 
place to another. While corruption of some form or another may inhere in every human 
community, the system of governance has a great impact on its level and scope of practice. 
Systems can corrupt people as much as if not more than people are capable of corrupting the 
systems.
631
                           
However, the writer submits, that the positive thing is that irrespective of the various views or 
incongruous tones, exhibited within the academia and beyond, there is the consensus from 
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various quarters, that it is not good for the society and that it is an antithesis to growth and 
development. This was corroborated by the statement of the former United Nations (UN) 
Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. He stated that corruption destroys opportunities and creates 
rampant inequalities and undermines human rights and good governance, stifles economic 
growth and distorts the markets.
632
It must be taken into cognisance that both corruption and 
money laundering are very closely related and can be likened to ‘’Siamese twins.’’ Therefore 
the effect of one can also be classified as being synonymous or congruous as the effect of the 
other. This has already been identified in this thesis. It is recognised that most corruption 
loots do undergo the money laundering process to enable the ‘’acquired loots’’ to be reused 
in the legitimate economy.  
There is presently the consensus that corruption has been identified as a predicate offence of 
money laundering. This is a fact. In truth, it is the consensus that anti-money laundering tools 
can also be employed to reduce the cankerworm that is identified as corruption. This has 
reinforced the close affinity that exists between corruption and money laundering. To help in 
buttressing this, clear evidence has emanated from credible observations from respectable 
sources all in good harmony with regard to the connectivity. Indeed, of particular interest are 
the observations credited to the World Bank and the statements that emanated from United 
Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) to mention but a few. These can possibly be 
said to be very credible observations.                 
The writer strongly submits that it is appropriate to categorically indicate on account of close 
perusal of the contents of this thesis, to state that after all, there is the convergence of ‘’dirty 
money’’ and private to private corruption. We have a real problem on our hands because 
evidentially, facts on the ground have consistently demonstrated a factual or existential 
reality. This is true on account of the fact that the problems may not have been adequately 
addressed. It is not fictitious and I strongly believe that no one has viewed this as being a 
fictitious scenario. It may be right to say (actually it is right to say) that the earlier conception 
of not realising that the issue of corruption and money laundering will eventually find a 
convergence point, may have been hampered by the fact that the two were not initially seen 
to be correlated. There was the tendency to study them as a sort of stand-alone-concepts with 
little or no nexus. They were probably seen as lacking a cogent link between them. However, 
this has proved not to be the case.  
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Indeed, it was as a result of the negative issues associated with the drug trade, other 
criminalities and the corrosive effects they brought into the global arena, one would say, 
engineered the impetus or galvanized the efforts to further delve closely into the issues to find 
a solution. This eventually led to a more critical and forensic observation or examination of 
the problems, with regard to the connectivity of the two concepts. Interestingly, there was this 
remarkable impression in the minds of people that fundamentally, drug dealing was 
synonymous with money laundering. This was the feeling in the 1980s and 1990s as a result 
of the fact that drug dealing or business was at its peak during that time.           
It is submitted that the above scenario is factual, it is a reality. We need to recognise the fact 
that the illicit profits that have been generated through the various ‘‘under the radar efforts,’’ 
had been and is still being craftily reintroduced into the legitimate system and into the society 
with the intension of according them legitimate status. There are numerous proofs about this 
and instances of culpability abound. Various judicial pronouncements on this exist. 
Evidentially and conspicuously it has been taken cognizance that AML regimes or laws can 
also be used to check the serious issue that is known as corruption. The effect is that it has 
accorded more credibility to the writer’s view as demonstrated earlier.         
More so, it may not be right for anyone to continue to dwell or have the assumption that there 
are differences between private and public corruption. A close perusal of the impact or their 
respective input to the general wellbeing of the society in general, does not actually support 
the misplaced notion that they should be treated differently. Each in its own stead evidently 
generates or causes a lot of havoc to the society as a whole. We need to note that the issues of 
globalization and liberalization that brought close affinity into how services and trade are 
utilized, must to say the least, helped matters as this has led to a closer connectivity with 
regard to how services are delivered.  
It is submitted, that this idea should not hold sway or be encouraged to see the light of the 
day. The two are noted to cause very significant difficulties to the society. This is irrespective 
of the direction that it emanates from. Indeed, the advent of globalization and liberalization of 
commercial interactions, one can say, have made for a stronger inclination against separation. 
The observation inherent from International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), has helped to a 
significant extent to justify why the idea should be dropped. It is possibly right to say that 
ICC is a noted advocate of criminalization of private corruption. But it did not distinguish 
between this and public corruption in 2005. It simply indicated that there is no meaningful 
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difference between the two, on account of the fact, that they both distort commercial 
dealings. Therefore, they must be accorded the same treatment in law. Of course, commercial 
ventures adhere to their ‘’pronouncements.’’ The reason is that this enables them to avoid 
serious reputational damage that is potentially inherent in non-compliance by companies. 
Perusal of its Article 1 in 2005 edition indicates that ‘’Enterprises’’ are urged to prohibit 
bribery and extortion in whatever form in order to obtain business at all times directly or 
indirectly. Of course, this also applies to agents in both public and private capacity devoid of 
any distinction. They simply have to be taken serious because it is the world’s largest 
business organization that represents more than 45 million companies in over 100 countries. 
Their core mission is to make business to work for everyone, every day, and everywhere.
633
                  
In the UK, when arguably the ‘’best’’ anti-corruption legislation in the world was prepared, 
which has very robust extra-territorial capabilities, the framers of the Bribery Act 2010, did 
not attempt to distinguish between private and public corruption. The opinion formed was 
that private sector corruption also harms the markets as much as public corruption. This issue 
was glaringly brought into attention by the Law Commission in 2007 in its Consultation 
Paper - Reforming Bribery. In truth, they pointed out that there was no need to establish or 
have two separate offences for private and public corruption. In their assessment, it was (and 
still is) very difficult to establish with clarity the differences that could exist or exists between 
private and public sector functions - they definitely from available facts, comingle. This is 
one of the reasons, when you go through the UK Bribery Act 2010, you will not find this 
distinction. This is understandable, as the close connectivity of both public and private 
commercial relationships in most cases are very difficult to sort out. This gives credence to 
the thinking that the division that may be present between them should be discarded.   
In fact, to induce somebody to act illegally through bribery will always be present. This is 
irrespective of the direction that this comes from. Of course, bribery can still happen, even 
without the process of money laundering taking root. We have to recognise the fact that it 
does not follow, that it is all the illegal money that must undergo money laundering. In 
certain instances, some part of the illegal money may undergo the process. For example, the 
money in question could be paid as what is known as ‘’grease payments’’ or ‘’gold’’ and ‘’art 
works’’ or may even be spent. Additionally, you cannot rule out the fact that it could actually 
be spent using an indirect style. Take for an example, a Russian company could instead of 
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inducing a Nigerian top government official (PEP) with substantial amount of money in cash 
to help in achieving a purpose in a business venture, can equally indirectly, take care of that 
official’s daughter’s school fees and maintenance in a UK university. More so, a company 
could bribe a client by making available a huge lavish hospitality that is not in tandem with 
the 2012 (December) Government Bribery Guidance on hospitality in the UK that the entity 
pays for directly. In fact, bribery and corruption are always done in ‘’secret’’ and this is its 
hallmark as they occur in various forms. Arguably, the above is indicative of the fact that the 
same state of affairs is present in illegal acquirement of wealth either via public or private 
bribery. It is on account of the above that the writer submits that bribery and corruption are 
trans-border and there should be no need to continue to show the unnecessary division 
between private and public corruption.   
Perhaps more potentially controversial in this thesis, is the writer’s submission that we are 
gradually witnessing the possible gradual metamorphosis of the banking institutions to the 
status of ‘’rogue institutions’’ albeit possibly in a very subtle and carefully orchestrated 
manner by the players. This may sound ‘‘Greek’’ to the ears of some people. My observation 
is that irrespective of the laws put in place to contain the occurrence of money laundering, the 
banks still tactically circumvent this. I am afraid that the frequency of the infractions is 
something to be concerned about. This is an area, we need to examine microscopically. In 
truth, there has been a sort of policy change in the approach by the authorities to issue very 
hefty fines for the banks’ infractions.      
The recurring issue in the past was that most of them were willing and able to come up with 
the funds to meet up with the sanctions presented against them by the authorities. Previously, 
the fines were not really, to say the least, very hefty. It must be pointed out here that 
questions were raised on whether the German Bank, Deutsche Bank would be able to afford 
the huge fine that the US authorities could impose on it at some point for mis-selling 
mortgage securities in the US. The bank’s shares have taken a dive on account of the prospect 
of a $14b (£10.5b) potential fine from US DoJ. This could be the largest fine ever emanating 
from the US against a bank. This is aimed to settle allegations dating back since 2005. The 
bank is also facing potential huge fines from ‘‘mirror trading’’ in Russia.634There are signs 
that the bank will find it difficult to survive after these fines as they have struggled to bounce 
back after 2008 financial crisis.  
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Based on the above, the writer submits that it will now be very difficult for the banks to 
continue to put themselves in ‘’deep anticipatory mode’’ and be ready for the fines to be paid 
for these infractions. This is because there has been a policy change by the authorities and 
more hefty fines are now being dished out for infractions. We still need to keep an eye on 
them and close scrutiny should not be hastily discarded. In fact, there may still be the 
suspicion that there could still be this air of ‘’unwritten code’’ amongst the financial 
institutions with special reference to the banks. In point of fact, with the heavy fines on 
Deutsche, and the threat to its viability, it is probably not true that they are still comfortable 
to continue to find the money to pay off the fines. The fines, of course are getting higher. As 
pointed out initially, they may be comfortable to do this in the past. But the issue still 
warrants a close attention.        
The cases are too numerous to mention. The money laundering issues that engulfed some 
major banks across the globe - HSBC, Barclays and StanBank is a big worry (Stanbank was 
fined £102m on 9
th
 April 2019 by Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) for allowing their 
branch in Dubai to be used for money laundering). The British bank agreed to pay $947m to 
American agencies, including the US DoJ. This is over the allegation that it violated 
sanctions against a string of countries that included Iran. Separately as indicated above, it was 
fined £102m by FCA for anti-money-laundering breaches that included ‘’shortcomings’’ in 
its counter-terrorism finance control in Middle East. Interestingly, this is the second largest 
fine ever imposed by the UK regulator for anti-money laundering failures. The US treasury 
department said the latest fines settled ‘’apparent violations’’ sanctions imposed against 
Burma, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, and Iran. In fact, the fines were expected after 
Standard Chartered said in February 2019 that it had set aside $900m (£691m) to cover the 
US and the UK penalties. A further settlement will eventually force the bank to take a further 
hit in its first-quarter-results. The bank thereafter, indicated that it accepted all the 
‘’responsibilities for the violations,’’ ‘’control deficiencies’’ and added that the vast majority 
of the alleged incidents took place before 2012. None of the breaches happened after 2014.
635
      
The writer therefore submits that there is the high tendency that some banks are being subtly 
very deceitful plus the fact that they make astronomical profits. The issue or attitude in the 
past of setting up ‘’contingency funds’’ lying in wait or as insurance for possible fines against 
infractions in money laundering and corruption matters, will not work as hefty fines are now 
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being dished out by the authorities. I hope they should quickly change their attitude, and 
embrace the fact that the tactics will not work, because the fines are presently going up. This 
may sound like a childish or pedestrian reasoning to some people but attention needs to be 
focused on this, the sooner the better. Even with the presence of compliance setups, they will 
still go on and infringe on the rules ‘’silently’’ possibly convinced in the knowledge that they 
have sufficient monetary reservoir to accommodate the anticipated fines.    
There are some robust mechanisms which one can say are encapsulated in the contents of this 
thesis - with the aim of tackling the problems identified at the convergence point. The initial 
approach or perhaps perception is that these mechanisms should be good enough to tackle the 
unfortunate problems of bribery and corruption. The anti-corruption/money laundering 
mechanisms one can confidently admit have come in various forms. However, the facts on 
the ground are no where favourably suggestive that these can contain what is going on. In 
other words, the author is left with very limited options, than to submit that these mechanisms 
are not robustly good enough to engage the problems presented by bribery and corruption in 
the society. More efforts need to be aggressively introduced in the system to counter these 
issues. Of course, the picture presented, is that they look very robust on paper. Hardly, does a 
short period pass (possibly a week) without a case of infraction of bribery and 
corruption/money laundering surfacing. If one takes a look at the data base of FCPA for 
example, (this is extremely informative in dissecting corruption and bribery issues about legal 
and natural persons) you will begin to see the enormity of the situation. The culprits are 
aware that the punishments are there but still they are more than happy to continue with their 
infractions. It is either the punishments are too soft or that ‘‘tick skins’’ have been 
comfortably ‘’grown’’ by the culprits over the years and that they have craftily developed a 
‘’solution’’ to the problems. Perhaps, it is time other countries consider the ‘‘Chinese 
option’’636and change their legislation.  
In China serious harm that involves corruption and large amount (over 1m RMB) will attract 
a death penalty. The ‘’baby milk case’’ is a good example. Here, the Chinese food safety 
officials seized 64 tonnes of raw dairy materials contaminated with the toxic industrial 
chemical melamine. It was the quality watchdog in the Qinghai province that seized this. Test 
samples revealed that the milk powder carried up to 500 times the maximum allowed level of 
the chemical. It was the use of the chemical in 2008 that killed six babies and made 300,000 
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ill. It was suspected that the traders might have bought tainted milk that should have been 
destroyed in 2008 with the intention of processing and reselling to make huge profits. This 
chemical, when added to food products, indicated a higher apparent protein content that 
caused kidney stones and kidney failure. Needless to say, the scandal caused outrage amongst 
consumers and led to international condemnation. Twenty people were convicted for their 
role in this and two others were executed.
637
 
The writer recommends that we should seriously consider this option but should lower the 
monetary threshold to £50,000 in Africa and the UK. In the USA as at 2019, 29 states still 
have death penalty, for example - Texas and California etc.
638
Interestingly, this would be a 
major issue with jurisdictions that do not have the death penalty: for example, 21 US states, 
Canada, most European countries, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It would also 
mean that extradition of suspects from these jurisdictions would be difficult to implement. 
The case of Lai Changxing readily comes to mind. He was only extradited from Canada after 
the Chinese Government gave assurances that he would not be executed. They kept to these 
assurances and when extradited, he was given a substantial prison sentence.
639
His lawyers 
had argued that at least seven of his associates had died or disappeared in China’s justice 
system. They said that he would face torture and execution in China as a scapegoat for high-
level officials that were involved in corruption. China is believed to carry out more 
executions a year than any other country, but in this case, they kept their promise.
640
Feelers 
from the diplomatic circle, had it that had China negated from the assurances that they gave 
to Canada, that could have effectively put a stop on further extradition requests from China. 
The Chinese foreign ministry stated that the trial exhibited China’s firm resolve in fighting 
crime and corruption and that this case showed that China and Canada had and still have 
important law enforcement cooperation.
641
                  
This suggestion is controversial. But my view is that anything that can be done to reduce the 
menace of corruption and money laundering must be taken very seriously. Corruption and 
money laundering are cancerous and kill people irrespective of the fact that there may be the 
erroneous impression that they are victimless. I understand that legislations have to be 
changed to accommodate this. Another option is to make it mandatory in this threshold and 
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for life sentence to be meted to the criminals. In truth, corruption, bribery and money 
laundering are totally unacceptable on account of the massive harm that they unleash on the 
society.                
The reality therefore, is that the authorities should jettison the habit of being reactive to 
bribery and corruption issues. Rather, it is better for them to be presenting a refined and more 
proactive legislative posture. They should not allow the criminals to be ahead of them in the 
game. Sadly, this appears to be what is happening as the signals being emitted from the 
authorities suggest that there is no light at the end of the tunnel. We are watching!    
Additionally, it has been recognised that in every society there is the problem encountered at 
the convergence point in this thesis - laundering taking place due to bribery and corruption. 
Evidentially, there are laws that have universal applicability like the UK Bribery Act 2010 
and FCPA 1977. There are also local laws against bribery and corruption in various places. It 
is a fact, that in some places, with particular reference to Nigeria, when you insist that people 
should be made to take ‘’local Oath’’ when they take office, they ‘’sit up.’’ Local oath taking 
simply means the oath that is embedded in the traditional religion associated with where the 
individual comes from. It has been noticed that when people use a ‘’local oath taking 
mechanism’’ peculiar to where they come from, they abide by this for fear of repercussions. 
They believe in its efficacy more than the conventional Christian or Moslem Oath taking with 
either the Bible or the Koran. My view or submission is that this method will work better in 
Africa because some people accord more respect to their traditional African religion than the 
Western religion like Christianity. I will term this a sort of ‘‘sanctions of moral coercion.’’  
This traditional method of gauging peoples’ honesty works in many places in Nigeria. We 
have to take into cognizance that before the advent of the Europeans in Africa, the ‘’local 
community’’ had – and still have - their traditional methods of checking criminal activities. 
For instance, in Nigeria, with particular reference to the eastern part, there are many fearful 
local deities that the various fragmented communities ‘’obey’’ for fear of being attacked 
supernaturally if they break the local laws. These fearful deities are very peculiar to different 
local communities. For ease of reference, in a place like Awka in Anambra State of Nigeria, 
there is a deity known as ‘’Agbala Awka,’’ in another neighbouring town called Agulu, there 
is a deity known as ‘’Habah Agulu’’ and in Okija, there is the ‘’Okija Shrine.’’ These are all 
related to traditional African religion which some people could term to be ‘’pagan practises’’ 
possibly simply because the processes are not aligned with Western religion like Christianity.  
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This is worth looking into to confront the problem of bribery and corruption. My submission 
simply is that these ‘’fetish processes’’ sends out a lot of coercive and conformist signals to 
the alleged culprits, who would readily admit to the infractions. This should not be confused 
with the impression that the crime committed would be easily admitted to because the person 
could be under duress. The ‘’efficacy’’ of these local deities is what had been passed on from 
generation to generation. And there have been instances in the local communities where 
people readily admitted their guilt due to the fact that they do not want to swear before their 
local deities for fear of repercussion. The point is that if we apply ‘’local solutions’’ reflective 
of the ‘’local jurisdiction’’ this will drastically reduce corruption, bribery and money 
laundering. I am not expecting a solution for one region to be workable in other regions: there 
is no universal antidote to the scourge.  
The writer suggests that further research should also focus on the allegation that the financial 
institutions are allegedly gradually metamorphosing into ‘’rogue set-ups.’’ The sooner the 
authorities realise this, the better for the community. Just as the saying goes, ‘’there is no 
smoke without fire.’’ To treat this with levity has very strong potential to put the society in 
reverse momentum, the writer submits. There is the suspicion that the banks resemble or 
mimic the ingredients noticeable in organised criminal networks whose characteristics can be 
identified as follows - transnational and multi-jurisdictional in outlook, sophisticated, 
operating in a restricted environment; economically motivated, technology based and 
stimulated, gaining of appropriate rewards, structured in organisation, elite criminals, 
criminal activities, complex structures, rooted in corruption, structured hiding of wealth, use 
of facilitators and networking.
642
           
The degree of protection that the financial institutions with particular reference to the banks 
have received from the government is tactically startling. This is coupled with the absence of 
sometimes, effective precautions for even the most blatant and egregious acts of criminality 
which possibly have led young and easily suggestible employees into believing that 
committing crimes in relation to the markets they trade and the benchmarks that they have 
been habitually manipulating is not a crime. This was probably correct or true at one time - 
although the banks that were involved in the LIBOR case were heavily fined and some 
individuals jailed. But the UK government, including the EU, responded to the LIBOR 
scandal by amending their laws to cover manipulation of benchmarks. Of course, before the 
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scandal, they were repeatedly rewarded by the managements, all of whom benefited from the 
criminal profits that were made, it is not very difficult to decipher why such offences 
repeatedly kept coming up then.
643
  
It is therefore no surprise on account of the ‘’mess’’ noticeable in the banks that the 
Governor, Bank of England (BoE), Mark Carney had a swipe on the banks. He made his 
observations known when BoE published the Fair and Effective Markets Review in London 
in 2015. He stated on account of the infractions going on in the banks: 
‘’This is a major opportunity for the industry to establish common standards of market 
practise. If firms and their staff fail to take this opportunity, more restrictive regulation is 
inevitable...unethical behaviour went unchecked, proliferated and eventually became the 
norm. Too many participants neither felt responsible for the system nor recognised the full 
impact of their actions.’’644         
Mark Carney is no stranger to infractions in the sector and effective regulation: he knows 
what he is talking about. There have been such scandals in the UK that involved the big 
banks - HSBC, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) - about Libor and foreign exchange 
benchmarks which cast aspersions on BoE. Massive personal profits were made by some 
bank officers and the legal persons (banks) in these issues and highly suggestive of criminal 
gang-up in the circle. The rate of the infractions in the circle, one can say, was noted to be 
happening with ‘’unpalatable frequency’’ and some of the employees have not covered the 
industry in glory. In fact, the former Chancellor George Osborne corroborated the 
observation of Mark Carney. He once indicated that the public was right to ask why it is that 
after so many scandals and the costs it brought to the UK, so few individuals faced 
punishment in the law courts. These people (responsible for the infractions) should be treated 
like the criminals that they are.  
The author surmises, that some people conversant with the financial industry have a ‘’deep 
rooted suspicion’’ that something ‘’sinister’’ has been going on in the industry. And the 
suspicion may be, because this is a ‘’powerful cartel,’’ it is going to take a while to break it 
up and come to the root of this ‘’nonsense.’’ This is really a massive source of worry. The 
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government, if it has the political will, should in all honesty beam a very penetrating 
searchlight towards the industry.                  
The issue of corporate governance was given attention. In actual fact, it has a crucial role to 
play in reducing corruption and money laundering. Admittedly, in the last two and half 
decades, corporate governance has become very important. However, we need to admit that if 
the issues of checks and balances are robustly focussed on, it is the submission of the writer, 
that corruption that is one of the predicate offences of money laundering will be reduced 
reasonably. The period the financial crises 2008 occurred, it was later evidenced that part of 
the problem was that corporate governance was not given due attention. This contributed to 
aggravate the situation. Of course, some people were very quick to point out that the US 
subprime mortgage issues were to blame. However, most people paid less attention to 
corporate governance side of events. Noticeably, the individuals that controlled the financial 
entities were less focused on corporate governance. Unrestrained risk appetite by the 
managers of the institutions blindfolded them. They wanted to make more profits. It is my 
submission that more attention needs to be on corporate governance. When this is embraced, 
there would be less doubt that corruption and money laundering will be reasonably reduced. 
The authorities, it is suggested should not treat this with levity.   
Adherence to the ‘’ethical codes’’ in firms as part of the corporate governance mechanism 
will contribute greatly. It is recommended that attention should be directed to this. In fact, the 
society should endeavour early to educate the masses about the importance or viability of 
adherence to ethical issues in whatever one does. This can be achieved through impacting this 
knowledge from very early stages of the individual’s development process. For instance, 
when people are made to understand tenaciously from their formative stage about ethical 
matters, the tendency is on maturity, at least, this will be displayed in their attitude - this is a 
good suggestion. Of course, the impact this will have in reducing corruption, bribery and 
money laundering should not be underestimated. This is important and possibly, will 
eventually metamorphose into business ethics. Ethics and nice corporate governance also 
germinated via foundations laid out in the global universal values.  
A close scrutiny of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has actually 
reinforced the global consensus directed towards the applicability of a shared moral 
behaviour internationally. The UN General Assembly on 10
th
 December 1948 adopted this 
document. The after effect is that many of the principles therein, are conspicuously reflected 
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on significant anti-corruption and money laundering documents present in many countries. 
Good examples come readily in form of  OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 1997, UNCAC 
2003, World Economic Forum Partnering against Corruption, Transparency International’s 
Initiative Business Principles for Countering Bribery, and ICC Rules 2005 to mention but a 
few. These benefited from UDHR, it is submitted. The positive thing is that the documents 
mentioned, ethically abhor corruption and money laundering.                           
Interestingly, the issue of soft law has generated quite a lot of standpoints from various 
perspectives. In truth, the writer submits, is simply that they are effective in curbing the 
incidents of corruption and money laundering. It is the writer’s submission that they should 
be accorded the relevant accolade for the prudential role they have so far been playing. It is 
suggested that we should pay less attention to their coercive sources. This is a distraction and 
uncalled for. What should be paramount should be that any mechanism that can help to curb 
the incidents of corruption and money laundering should be seen as a very welcome relief. 
We do not need to remind ourselves of the devastating negative unquantifiable consequences 
that these two have unleashed on the society as a whole. Therefore, the acceptability of any 
soft law mechanism is a timely relief, the writer submits, as they have plugged the lacunae in 
the so called hard laws in addressing pressing matters. The author pointed out in the thesis 
that we are ‘’forced’’ to accept FATF recommendations. My submission therefore is that this 
‘’forceful acceptance’’ must continue. It is from all indications, a massive help to use in 
fighting the scourge. Its periodic reviews are usually tailored to the changing global dynamics 
in relation to the reactions to money laundering and terrorist issues.    
The author is also highly suggestive of the fact that the soft law pronouncements of BCBS 
which are always prudential in outlook directed to the financial institutions should continue 
to be embraced without hesitation. This is irrespective of the fact that there may be 
reservations about the ‘’core decision making apparatus’’ of the Committee. The ‘’balance of 
convenience’’ hinges on the possible fact from all indications that the benefits outweigh the 
perceived negativities. The society should be more interested in the ‘‘substance’’ of the 
‘’messages’’ often directed to the financial institutions with reference to the banks and not the 
‘’form.’’ This is important, if we are serious in checking infractions in the industry. As 
already indicated, there are also other soft law mechanisms like the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention 1997 and ICC 2005 ‘’pronouncements’’ to mention a few. The message is simple 
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- they help to reduce the incidence of bribery, corruption and money laundering. As a result, 
it is submitted that the best option is to continue to adopt them aggressively.          
It is noted that the issues of whistle-blowing has now been associated with helping to combat 
corruption. Legislations in various countries are now in place. In the UK, for instance, this is 
covered by Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA) which came into force on 2
nd
 July 
1999. The interesting follow-up is that this has been emulated or copied in various 
jurisdictions to protect whistle blowers. In the USA, whistle-blowers are protected in the 
legislation - Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. It is this legislation that protected the 
main whistleblower during the ‘’Enron Incidents’’ in the USA. It was the bold report or 
concern brought forward by Sharon Watkins to the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) of now 
liquidated Enron that brought about or triggered the investigations that eventually unravelled 
the fraud that was associated with Enron. The company was the ‘’undisputable’’ winner of 
the crown - ‘’greatest bankruptcy’’ in US corporate history. The importance of the 
mechanism of whistle blowing need not be over emphasised. It is needed to check corruption 
and money laundering. The good thing about the mechanism is that it is very difficult 
sometimes to figure out the source of the complaints. But generally, it usually emanates from 
people that have close proximity to the source. Typical examples are your work colleagues on 
account of the fact that they are more likely to figure out the pattern of official procedures 
and behaviours of their fellow workers.   
There is also a whistle blowing legislation in Nigeria - Nigeria Whistle Blower Act 2016. To 
motivate Nigerians, to participate, a policy statement was made that if a report is followed 
that leads to the fraud to be unravelled, the whistle blower ‘’may’’ be entitled to an amount 
equivalent to between 2-5% of the principal amount recovered. Reports or complaints can be 
made to State Vigilance Commission (SVC) in Nigeria. It was on account of the above, that 
in 2018, a whistle blower was rewarded with the sum £880,000 (at the conversion rate of 450 
naira to a pound £).  
The writer has noted that only 10 European Union (EU) countries have a comprehensive law 
that protect whistleblowers at the time of writing. These are France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK. Interestingly, the good news is 
that the European Parliament in April 2019 voted in favour of backing the whistle blowers 
law in the EU. It is now left for the Council of Ministers to approve this. After this, 
transposition will hopefully occur in the next two years. The measure covers a very wide 
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range of policy areas which includes money laundering, banking, product and transport 
safety, nuclear safety, public procurement, and tax avoidance matters. The thinking is that 
when this comes into effect, it is envisaged that it will save substantial amount of money. For 
instance, in procurement alone, it is estimated that up to £9b would be saved. With the EU 
legislation, people that want to report infractions would be allowed to go straight to law 
enforcement or regulatory bodies and make their reports. They will have the option to make 
either internal or external report.
645
This is a welcome development and there would be 
safeguards against reprisals from employers.  
The EU rapporteur Virginia Roziere of Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
(S&D) stated clearly that the recent scandals such as LuxLeaks, Panama Papers and Football 
leaks have helped to shine a light on the great precariousness that whistle-blowers suffer 
today. And that on the eve of European elections, Parliament has come together to send a 
strong signal that it has heard the concerns of its citizens, and pushed for robust rules 
guaranteeing their safety and that of those persons that choose to speak out.
646
The EU 
Whistleblowing Directive was formally adopted on 7
th
 October 2019.               
It is a fact that in the UK, PIDA is designed to protect whistleblowers. This is fair, but in 
contrast, it does not provide for whistle-blowing bounties or financial incentives.
647
This does 
not look good. It is therefore, suggested that the various legislations already in place should 
be amended to include the fact that a whistle blower must be entitled to at least 50% of the 
recovered amount if the report he/she makes eventually leads to successful recovery of the 
loot. The reasoning is simple - you need to give a massive incentive for the people to 
participate in this. If you take a look at the Nigeria one, the policy used the word ‘’may.’’ 
This should not be the case. The government or the authorities should be seen to make an 
irrevocable commitment to the course. There may be the reasoning that this could look over 
ambitious. Far from it, and if you assess the other side of the coin, there is the reasoning that 
if no one comes up to report the envisaged infraction, nothing may be recovered. The EU law 
should be made to include the suggested ‘’50% rule’’ by the author. The author is fully aware 
that this may trigger unnecessary reports that could cause a lot of dissatisfaction. But the 
good thing is that the legislations should or rather have inbuilt sanctions to check vexatious 
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and frivolous reports. This should not be interpreted as being over ambitious. We must all try 
and implement the needful because the society will gain more from this. In truth, whistle 
blowing is an excellent mechanism to check the scourge.          
Additionally, the author is suggestive of the fact that more resources ‘’must’’ be allocated to 
anti-corruption and money laundering institutions in various countries. Their respective 
governments should increase the budgetary allocations usually directed to these institutions. 
It follows without much possible contradiction, that when you allocate more resources to 
these institutions, the effect would naturally transmute into reducing the scourge. This is the 
expectation. In fact, more resources will make the anti-corruption agencies to be more robust 
and productive in the work they do. I recognise the fact that the government provides them 
with financial support. If the government can increase what they are presently getting in their 
various countries by 100%, it reasonably follows that their productivity will increase. When 
FATF visited the UK in 2018, for the pear review process, aside indicating that the UK has a 
robust anti-money laundering set-up, they pointed out that UKFIU needs more resources. 
Although, it has been noticed that resources may be scarce, but the negativities associated 
with the scourge are gigantic.  
For the jurisdictions that may not be able to afford this, it is suggested that aid should be sort 
and when received, must be monitored closely to make sure that it goes to the right 
department - FIUs and corruption prosecuting agencies. In reality if FIUs and other agencies 
are under-staffed and under-resourced, it reasonably follows that they would not pose much 
of a deterrent to illegal activities. Most people engaged in corruption and money laundering 
are ‘‘smart guys’’ and will have little need to exert improper influence on them, because they 
feel that ‘’proper attention’’ would not be directed to them.             
The fact is that both the IMF and the World Bank are one of the most important bodies that 
pull the strings in issues concerning the scourge. This study recommends that in order to 
continue to raise the awareness level about the scourge, the subject or module of corruption 
and money laundering should be made compulsory in secondary schools in various 
jurisdictions - much earlier. At present, in appropriate professional and vocational training 
courses, it is offered in tandem with FATF recommendations for staff. It is also clear that in 
the UK, anti-corruption training is one of the key elements that is to be considered to be 
‘’reasonable adjustments under s7 of the Bribery Act for companies. The study recommends 
that this should commence early in secondary schools to increase awareness and early 
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adaptation for everybody. Therefore the two bodies should include this as part of their 
conditions to release their facilities to their members. This will possibly translate into 
reducing the volume.                                          
Corporate tax avoidance, when analysed closely without bias is arguably a form of 
corruption. Studies have shown that eventually it is the poor that suffer as a result of 
depletion and deprivation of tax revenues. Interestingly, recently, the UK based ‘’Tax Justice 
Network’’ in late May 2019 in their investigations, found out that the UK is the ‘’greatest 
enabler’’ of corporate tax avoidance globally. Out of 64 jurisdictions, the UK ranked 13. But 
globally, 8 of overall top 10 that got ‘’avoidance scores’’ are all UK ‘’dependent territories.’’ 
Topping the list is British Virgin Islands, followed by Bermuda and Cayman Islands. Jersey, 
that is a Crown dependency, was seventh. This in the author’s opinion makes for a depressing 
and uncomfortable reading. I am not saying that the UK has not been in the forefront of 
fighting corruption, after all, it has the Bribery Act 2010 to show for this. It is therefore, 
suggested that the UK ‘’must’’ not treat this lightly. The UK government ‘’must’’ quickly 
provide a legislation to block this loophole.
648
The government must develop ‘’quickly’’ the 
political will to deal with this. Alex Cobham, the chief executive of Tax Justice Network was 
not happy about this. He stated:  
‘’a handful of the richest countries have waged a world tax war so corrosive that they have 
broken down the global corporate tax system beyond repair...the UK, Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Luxembourg - the Axis of Avoidance - line their own pockets at the expense 
of a crucial funding stream for sustainable human progress ..the ability of governments 
across the world to tax multinationals corporations in order to pay teachers’ wages, build 
hospitals and ensure level playing field for local businesses has been deliberately and 
ruthlessly undermined.’’649                     
The shadow chancellor, John McDonnell indicated that the findings were very embarrassing 
and shameful. The only way the UK stands out internationally on tax is leading a race to the 
bottom in creating tax loopholes and dismantling the tax systems of countries in the global 
south. He clearly emphasised that the rot must stop. He accused the Tory leadership hopefuls 
of promising tax giveaways for the rich. His party - Labour Party will implement the most 
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comprehensive plan ever seen in the UK to tackle the scourge.
650
A government spokesman 
defensively stated that tackling tax avoidance was a priority and that the UK had been on the 
forefront of international action aimed at reforming global tax rules.
651
As previously 
indicated, the time for action is ‘’now,’’ time for unnecessary ‘’cross-accusations’’ and 
‘’defensive statements’’ on the part of the UK Government, I believe is fast running out.         
The authorities, in addition to requiring natural persons to declare their assets when they take 
a new post, it is suggested that when their respective tenures finish, they should be made to 
declare their assets within two months of leaving office. This will make it smoother and 
quicker to compare the information with regard to finding out if there has been any 
unjustified enrichment on the part of the officer/s concerned. At the moment, office holders in 
LDC like Nigeria are required to declare their assets when they take office. But when their 
tenure comes to an end they do not complete a second asset declaration form. This in the 
opinion of the writer will help at least to find out the level of enrichment, if any, concerning 
the office holders. However, some natural persons do not even declare their assets when they 
take office. This is one area where the authorities should wake up to their responsibilities and 
offer the necessary attention.   
The authorities should also make sure that when appointments are made, that this should be 
based on merit. Individuals should be well scrutinised to make sure that they are very capable 
of holding the said positions. A check on their criminal records is done in the UK - by 
referring to Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) and before they assume office. I 
understand that in some instances, even after a check had been done, there could still be 
instances of illegal enrichments when the person assumes office. But this is not in all cases. 
In some LDCs like Nigeria, the authorities must muster the political will to make 
appointments on merit inclusive of the corporate appointments. It could lead to ‘’corporate 
corruption.’’ The essence is that there is the tendency that if a proper due diligence is 
followed in the appointments and on merit, there is the likelihood the position holder ‘’may’’ 
not steal. Its importance, is to minimise the chances of ‘’unjust enrichments.’’ In truth, this 
will always be present. It is better to closely have a check on their past instead of just 
appointing people based on ‘’who they know’’ as powerful ‘’unseen hands’’ are usually at 
work in that country.              
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Another suggestion would be the removal of immunity of serving officials. I have to quickly 
point out here that this has been a sort of thorny issue that has not yet been addressed. All I 
am suggesting is that this is the time for ‘’a solid political will’’ to be utilized to address this. 
In some jurisdictions like Nigeria and some Commonwealth countries, serving political office 
holders like the President and Governors are immune from prosecution whilst in office. 
Prosecution can be started after they leave office. Although, it has been suggested that 
prosecution will distract them from governance, I do not think that this is sufficient reason to 
continue with the immunity. The facts on the ground in most cases is that some of these PEPs 
would have made so much money during their tenure, and recovering of the illegal profits 
they made after their tenure are not usually very substantial, although, this depends on 
individual cases. It can also be argued that because they are in power, they have this power of 
incumbency to frustrate ‘’due process.’’ Far from it, if the immunity is removed, at least, they 
would realise that they can be prosecuted whilst in office and could be replaced. The 
tendency could be that they would be very cautious. I do not think that most office holders 
would want this. They all look forward to completing their tenures. The amount frittered 
away by some office holders is alarming and obvious significant dent on the resources of the 
nation/s.                         
Of course, it is no longer news that some public officials that are accused of corruption and 
money laundering usually whilst in office object to both civil and criminal cases on the basis 
of privileges and immunities. In fact, there are some legal international instruments that one 
can say provide a bit of guidance on this. Article 40(2)
652
indicated that an appropriate balance 
must be maintained by States on immunity when necessary on issues of investigation, 
prosecuting, and adjudicating on public officials in accordance with its legal system. The 
writer submits that this has not gone far enough. It has given States very wide discretion on 
how to handle public officials’ immunity. Indicatively, it does not require states to alter their 
domestic laws on this. In Gambia, the constitution grants immunity to National Assembly 
members while attending to the proceeding of the Assembly.
653
Nigeria constitution grants 
immunity to serving public officials.
654
This does not have extra-territorial application outside 
Nigeria. For example, a former Nigerian Governor Joshua Dariye in 2004 was arrested in 
London on allegation of money laundering whilst in office. He jumped bail in London and 
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returned to Nigeria and was not extradited to the UK during his tenure.
655
However, he was 
sentenced to a total of 14years in jail in Nigeria in June 2019, on charges that bothered on 
criminal breach of trust and criminal appropriation of state funds.
656
             
The writer suggests that the authorities should look into the area of ‘’judicial corruption.’’ I 
need to quickly point out here that the UK and the USA have a robust judiciary that one can 
say have tenaciously fought and will continue to fight the issues of corruption and money 
laundering. This may not be true in some jurisdictions to fight the scourge. All I am 
suggesting, is that in these jurisdictions, more money needs to be allocated to the judiciary to 
make them more ‘’focussed’’ in fighting the scourge. Judicial corruption has the potential to 
produce a lot of negativities, to wit: poorly paid judges will become susceptible to corruption 
- corrupt judiciary has the hallmarks of undermining efforts to attack corruption and money 
laundering, and possibility of a successful deterrence of financial crime or even asset 
recovery from abroad.
657
The need to strengthen the judiciary should not be seen as 
unnecessary. In fact, Article 11 of UNCAC is specific on this: 
‘’each state Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system 
and without prejudice to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to 
prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary.’’658                     
It must be noted that in some instances, some judges have been accused of corruption 
irrespective of the fact that they may be well remunerated. It is not my intention to enumerate 
the many cases in Nigeria. But the consensus is that possibly, there is judicial corruption in 
Nigeria. There were allegations of corruption against the former Nigeria Chief Judge Walter 
Onnoghen. He was suspended from office and later resigned. And the matter is still ongoing 
at the time of writing. The writer therefore decided not to go into the merits and demerits of 
this case as it is still sub judice. The writer’s suggestion is that more money should be 
directed to the judiciary and efficient monitoring mechanisms put in place to monitor how the 
money is spent. This will have strong potential to reduce judicial corruption in many 
countries. But we should always bear in mind that ‘’bad eggs’’ are everywhere including both 
developed and developing countries. But the chances of ‘’polluted judiciary’’ is arguably 
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more in some developing countries due to resource constraints and possibly ‘’lax checks and 
balances.’’ In truth, if a country is perceived to have a corrupt judiciary, it possibly impacts 
on the willingness of other countries to be enthusiastic to permit individuals to be extradited 
to that country. And this could also hinder positive chances of ‘’asset recovery’’ process of 
corrupt proceeds.             
The author is optimistic that when these suggestions are taken on board, reduction of the 
problem would be brighter. It is not going to be easy but inaction on the part of the authorities 
should never be considered as a viable option because it could lead to ‘’greater doom.’’ To be 
fair, the scourge will never go away. The reasonable ambition should realistically be focussed 
on massive reduction. This is the reality on the ground as crime will ‘’never’’ be completely 
eliminated from the society.     
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